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Small Grants and Social Movements

Two Case Studies of Grantmaking and Extractive Industries in
Ghana and Peru

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Executive Summary

Communities around the world are faced with serious social and environmental consequences of industrial mining. Social problems can include an influx of outsiders into often isolated communities, increase in HIV/AIDS, conflict and violence, and loss of farming land and fishing grounds. Environmental problems include air and water pollution, new health problems, erosion, and destruction of habitat and productive land. On a broader scale, national treasuries may not benefit sufficiently to justify these costs, and in some cases the opportunities for corruption are significant.

In recent years a vigorous civil society response to these issues has emerged around the world. From community based groups responding to daily livelihood and health issues to international networks promoting a more even playing field between mining companies, host governments, and affected communities, these groups have made strides in towards greater responsibility in the mining industry. The Global Greengrants Fund (Greengrants) has contributed to this movement with small grants as part of a larger effort by other funders, civil society organizations, and communities.

Dealing with the social and environmental issues brought on by industrial mining challenges traditional grantmaking models. Industrial mining has disturbing effects from the local level in host communities through to the international level where it influences international financial governance. Problems in some places are actually caused by decisions made in others, and solutions at the international level often do not take into account the priorities of local communities. So local grantmaking often fails to deal with the root of the problem, and grantmaking at national and international levels often leads to undemocratic and unsustainable results. Traditional grants for community groups, national level NGOs and international policy groups on their own are insufficient to deal with the problem.

Instead, dealing with problems of this magnitude and reach often requires supporting movements. Large, loosely organized collections of individuals, informal and formal organizations, media, and academia often must come together to bring about change for problems of this scale. Yet funding movements can be difficult, given the variety of organizations involved and the complexity of issues involved. To inform this emerging grantmaking practice, the Global Greengrants Fund undertook a research study of how small grants can support social movements in the mining sector. The study chose two cases, in Ghana and Peru.

The hypothesis was that small grants improve the capacity of local actors to respond to changing strategies of mining companies and the state to impose a mining project or demobilize civil society criticism to existing projects. Research in both Ghana and Peru supported this hypothesis. The research also found that while small grants were an effective means of supporting these social movements, there were important limitations to what small grants could do.

The conceptual framework proposed four basic things that successful movements do:

- Social movements mobilize resources and develop movement infrastructure to intervene in social conflicts and the power structures of society.
- Social movements raise consciousness and reframe problems, discriminations, and inequalities in society.
- Social movements respond to political opportunities on different scales to promote their interests and social change
- Social movements develop alternatives to current political, economic, and cultural practices.

The study found that small grants do in fact support movements to do these things in the following ways.



Social movements mobilize resources and develop movement infrastructure to intervene in social conflicts and the power structures of society.

Small grants built skills, supported basic office and transport infrastructure, supported important organizing and networking meetings, and enabled organizations to secure further funding from other donors. Small grants supported the growth of a vigorous and important national mining network in Ghana and the organizing of local mining networks in Peru.

Social movements raise consciousness and reframe problems, discriminations, and inequalities in society.

Small grants allowed communities to learn about the effects of mining beyond the benefits presented to them by mining companies, supported their local research to establish their rights to land and resources, documented the abuses of mining companies and security forces to policy makers and the general public, and supported efforts to advance alternatives such as agriculture and tourism. Small grants were unable to support large scale efforts at promoting alternative economic models beyond raising the issue for wider debate or starting pilot projects.

Social movements respond to political opportunities on different scales, to promote their interests and social change.

By their nature opportunities for movements come rarely, but when they did, flexible grants allowed movement organizers to take advantage of them. In Ghana a national coalition of civil society organizations reacted quickly to a proposal to allow mining in forest reserves, and successfully protected the vast majority of the forest reserves in the country. In Peru small grants supported organizations that lost funding due to pressure from mining companies on other donors and allowed the movement to continue without loss of momentum.

Social movements develop alternatives to current political, economic, and cultural practices.

Small grants were limited in their ability to promote alternatives. Nevertheless, there is a role in documenting the feasibility of alternative economic practices such as the cultivation of medicinal plants, community reforestation, and small scale mining. Small grants have also supported the entry of excluded communities into policy discussions and supported indigenous communities to develop their traditional governance practices to deal with modern mining and policy processes.

The ability of grantmaking to support these outcomes largely depended on a responsive model that included movement leaders in grantmaking decisions. The study found that the ability of grants to successfully support the movement was based on the following factors:

- Flexibility
- Decentralization
- Longer term support, repeat grants
- Trust
- The donor was part of the movement

Elements that would make the grantmaking model stronger were the following:

- Need better documentation
- Scope of advisors needs to be limited
- Continue to encourage networks and collaboration



- Increase grants to alternatives
- Increase support for alternative knowledge generation
- Increase focus on women
- Increase grants for activist security or vulnerability



Introduction

Communities around the world are faced with serious social and environmental consequences of industrial mining. Social problems can include an influx of outsiders into often isolated communities, increase in HIV/AIDS, conflict and violence, and loss of farming land and fishing grounds. Environmental problems include air and water pollution, new health problems, erosion, and destruction of habitat and productive land. On a broader scale, national treasuries may not benefit sufficiently to justify these costs, and in some cases the opportunities for corruption are significant.

In recent years a vigorous civil society response to these issues has emerged around the world. From community based groups responding to daily livelihood and health issues to international networks promoting a more even playing field among mining companies, host governments, and affected communities, these groups have made strides in promoting greater responsibility in the mining industry. The Global GreenGrants Fund (GreenGrants) has contributed to this movement with small grants as part of a larger effort by other funders, civil society organizations, and communities.

GreenGrants makes 700 grants per year of \$5000 or less to civil society organizations around the world. Grants are recommended by environmental leaders based on their knowledge of local groups, networks, and issues. Grants advance social processes already underway, or attempt to start up new social processes in response to a perceived need. Other important studies have documented movements to promote greater responsibility in the mining industry, but few have looked in depth at the role of small grants and the ability of this type of grantmaking to fill in gaps not filled by other players. The objective of this study was to determine the effectiveness of GreenGrants grantmaking in building the ability of the environmental movement to deal with the social and environmental problems of mining.

In 2009, GreenGrants began a research study of the effectiveness of small grants to civil society, on the basis of two particular cases in Ghana and Peru. The purpose of the study was to determine how small grants enter in wider social movement strategies to respond to the expansion and impact of the mining industry. At the same time, the research was to look into the possibilities and conditions for the formulation of a GreenGrants strategy to create a more profound impact and deeper coherence in its small grants program.

GreenGrants staff chose Ghana and Peru because:

1. There was a history of small grantmaking around the issues that extended for many years
2. Advisors were making grant decisions with an explicit goal of promoting local movements
3. Both cases had seen both successes and setbacks that seemed ripe for learning

This report summarizes those two case studies. They appear here sequentially. The case study for Ghana was done by Thomas Akabzaa,¹ and for Peru by Raphael Hoetmer². The final section is a conclusion

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² Raphael Hoetmer is a Dutch activist-researcher, who has been living in Latin America over the last six years. He concluded his MA in contemporary history at the Groningen University on the Netherlands with a thesis on the debate on social movements in the context of the processes of globalization. Hoetmer is a PhD candidate at the San Marcos University, with a research project on social movements in Peru. He currently works as research fellow and coordinator of the Programa Democracia y Transformación Global (www.democraciaglobal.org), and is South American coordinator of the Interuniversitarian research consortium on Social movements and political-cultural change in the 21st century. Hoetmer has published various articles on social movements in times of globalization, and has edited several books on social movements in Latin America.



which draws together the lessons of both case studies about the ability of small grants to support social movements.

Hypothesis and research questions

Based on the stated purpose of the research, the consultants and GreenGrants staff developed a hypothesis. The agreed working hypothesis to be tested was *that small grants improve the capacity of local actors to respond to changing strategies of mining companies and the state to impose a mining project or demobilize civil society criticism to existing projects*. This hypothesis was based on the understanding that local actors might respond through a variety of ways including legal defense of criminalized leaders, immediate research on contamination by a mining company, workshops to build consciousness, capacity building around concrete issues, or initiatives that require immediate civil society reaction.

The assumption was also made that the small grants tend to be used more effectively in defensive struggles (reactions to the initiatives of companies and/or governments), but less so in offensive struggles (initiatives to deepen autonomy of communities, incite legal change, or apply alternative socio-economic activities). However, when small grants reply to midterm strategies for concrete conflicts, and more so to wider strategies for the mining sector, the small grants can strengthen these offensive struggles as well. This however would require the investment of resources in the development of such a strategy. Based on the main hypothesis and assumptions a number of research questions emerged to delineate the boundaries of the study. These are:

- How do small grants enter within wider social movement strategies? How do they relate to bigger grants?
- To what extent and in what ways can GreenGrants small grants intervene in national political discussions and struggles around mining?
- To what extent do individual grants make sense, if they are not related to wider strategic visions or a mid-term follow up of a concrete conflict?
- Can individual grants contribute to the construction of alternatives?
- To what extent do the theories of change of GreenGrants and its counterparts in Peru coincide? What changes in the TOC of GreenGrants are suggested by the cases in Ghana?
- How can local actors be more involved in the development of GreenGrants small term strategies?

A conceptual framework: social movements and change

In order to provide the basic framework for testing the research hypothesis and assumptions, the researchers and GreenGrants staff developed a conceptual framework. That framework is summarized as follows:

Social transformation occurs as the social, political, territorial, economic, and cultural organization of society and the ideas that sustain them change, which requires the transformation of power relations—a shift in the ways different social and cultural groups are part of society. In these changes social movement plays a crucial role.

Social movements are collective subjects of political action, which emerge from the social conflicts provoked by the different oppressions present in our societies. Movements are processes of action directed by a political awareness, shared by different organizations and persons, which go beyond the demands that provoke protests, and last a longer period of time. As such, social movements dispute the dominant societal model itself, from specific subjects (indigenous, women, workers, students, environmentalist, etc.) that question the power structures of society. Social mobilization and organization opens possibilities for the emergence and change of ideas, political proposals, power relations, social codes, and the organization of the social system itself, which might allow a deeper process of transformations of the social, political, territorial, economical, and cultural organization of society, and the imaginaries (or cultural models) that sustain them. These processes of political action have so-called social movement webs as their organizational basis (Alvarez 2009). These SMWs might include a variety of social actors, including NGOs, international activist networks, researchers, media, and state functionaries, capable of



applying a multiplicity of actions including direct action, legal and juridical initiatives, media campaigns, and political lobbying. However these SMWs in general, and in the case of the extractive industries in Peru particularly, require the mobilizing force and political imagination of grassroots social organizations at their bases.³ The transformative potential of social movements, therefore, depend to a great extent on the combination of the capacity to create constructive links and interactions with the wider web among actors and the presence and leadership of social organizations with mobilizing force. Transnational contacts are crucial components as they allow the construction of political pressure, the circulation of resources, the mobilization of media, etc.

Social movements provoke social change in four different ways, the interrelations of which define the kind of social change that might occur. The traditional way of analyzing social movements is through their interaction with the institutions that regulate society. These might include demands for legal change, the resolution of conflicts, protests against concrete policies or their consequences, or claims on territorial rights by local communities. This institutional social movement politics tries to reduce oppression in society through the recognition of demands or proposals by institutional actors. Protest and different practices of negotiation are two of the main strategies in this field.

A second way of thinking about social movements was developed in Europe, and insists on the construction of new identities through social organization and mobilization. This *identity politics* seeks to reduce oppression by making groups in society more visible and strengthening them through mobilization, the construction of new organizations, and media politics. As oppression in society is sustained by cultural practices and models, social movements also exercise a *cultural politics*. This consists of the construction of new cultural practices and conceptions, for insistence, the necessity of constructing a democratic political culture in Latin America.

The least analyzed and theorized dimension of social movement politics is the construction of proper spaces and social practices that remain relatively independent from the market and state institutions. Through this *autonomy politics*, social movements develop alternative economic, cultural, political, and social practices that resolve problems of their social basis without the interference of the state and the market. The Zapatista communities in Mexico might be the best known example.

A complex vision of social movements therefore takes in account how these different dimensions of social movement politics interact. For institutional change to be seen as legitimate, it should be preceded by the change of ideas in society, while autonomous practices of social groups might be at the basis of institutional innovation. For example, the law of the right to be consulted for indigenous people will be more legitimate if the indigenous people and their cultures are valued positively in society, and if the suffering, exploitation and expropriation caused during colonization and colonial regimes are approved in society. At the same time, factual processes of consultation that exist – for example in communitarian assemblies – can inspire such a law. In the study an analytical distinction is made between offensive and defensive struggles, or dimensions of struggles (as generally social struggle includes both), to evaluate how small grants strengthen wider social movement strategies.⁴ Defensive social struggles try to stop the advances of neoliberal capitalism, understood as a project promoted by powerful global actors, that seeks to reorganize society to maximize capital through the global market. When defensive struggles cannot stop these advances, they try to compensate for its social, cultural, and ecological consequences. This might include legal defense, legal demands for financial compensation for health damages, or mobilizations to demand the derogation of new laws or free trade agreements that promote the conversion of common social assets in merchandise for private gain. Offensive social struggles promote institutional and cultural change that transforms the power structures in society. These often include the promotion of a

3 Grassroots mobilization can also take other forms than mass based social organizations as especially the environmental and feminist movements have demonstrated. Both movements, have had moments of open social mobilization, but in other moments have applied alternative ways, as campaigns, symbolic actions and the insistence of changes in daily life, to relatively successfully mobilize large groups of persons and their actions around the world.

4 Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2010) uses this notion of defensive and offensive struggles in a slightly different way that nevertheless stands at the basis of the use I propose.



law on the right to be consulted for the communities, the implementation of participatory politics, the recognition of autonomy for indigenous peoples, or the development of alternative economic networks based on social and ecological justice.

The notion of social movement used in this research refers to the positioning of Greengrants as well. Greengrants commitment to social movement building not only implies an engagement with deeper debates on alternative futures for development and society in Peru, but *it also implies that Greengrants itself is part of this process of social movement*. This suggests an entirely different responsibility and relationship with the local actors for Greengrants than most financing NGOs tend to assume.

The capacity to generate these changes depends on four basic factors (three of which have been identified in the current Greengrants theory of change), which was the basis of analysis in the study:

- Social movements mobilize resources and develop movement infrastructure to intervene in social conflicts and the power structures of society.
- Social movements raise consciousness and reframe problems, discriminations, and inequalities in society.
- Social movements respond to political opportunities on different scales to promote their interests and social change.
- Social movements develop alternatives to current political, economic, and cultural practices.

In the study an analytical distinction will be made between offensive and defensive struggles, or dimensions of struggles (as generally social struggle includes both), to evaluate how small grants strengthen wider social movement strategies.

Defensive social struggles try to stop the advances of neoliberal capitalism, understood as a project of reconstitution and spatial reorganization of society in to adapt to the global market. If defensive struggles cannot stop these advances, they at least try to compensate for the social, cultural, and ecological consequences. This might include legal defense, legal demands for financial compensation for health damage, or mobilization to demand the derogation of new laws or free trade agreements that promote unregulated practices.

Offensive social struggles promote institutional and cultural change that transforms the power structures in society. These might include the promotion of a law on the right of communities to be consulted, the implementation of participatory politics, the recognition of cultural autonomy for indigenous peoples, or the development of alternative economic networks based on social and ecological justice.



Case Study 1: Ghana

The Role of Small Grants in Building Social Movements on Extractive Industry: The Case of Mining in Ghana

By Thomas Akabzaa

Introduction and background

Mining is an important economic sector in many African countries—the dominant one in a number of them—accounting for a significant amount of the continent’s exports and foreign earnings. The Africa-wide liberalization of mining codes since the 1980s triggered a boom in large scale foreign direct investment in Africa’s mining sectors. Ghana has been a pioneer in the revival of the mining sector. Since the early 1980s, Ghana has been one of the preferred destinations of foreign transnational mining capital. It has experienced phenomenal growth in mineral exploration and continues to attract direct foreign investment in exploration and mining. Today, Ghana is often touted as one of the ‘success stories’ of an enabling mining sector.

The revival of the mining sector in Ghana has been accompanied by underdevelopment, manifested in marginal economic benefits, destruction of livelihoods and the environment, and generation of social conflicts including the abuse of human rights. Indeed, local communities affected by mining typify the underdevelopment paradox common to most mineral producing countries. While mining is known to be an important economic activity and has the potential for catalyzing community and national economic development and transformation, the operations are associated with well-known environmental and social impacts. Each of the different stages of the mining cycle, from exploration through development, production, processing and closure, has different impacts. These impacts include land degradation, water pollution, vibration from blasting, improper disposal of mine waste, displacement of whole communities, environmental health and safety issues, transformation of the peasant economy into a cash economy, population redistribution through migrant workers (who are often associated with social vices), and economic deprivation through destruction of livelihoods.

The current prevalence of surface mining has accelerated loss of land, a critical environmental resource for many rural populations that depend almost entirely on land for income and survival. Land is also a permanent source of rural employment, and the loss of land means loss of jobs for rural communities. In most cases, due to limited capacity, the mines are unable to employ the number of people who have been displaced, much less generate employment for the teeming migrant workers who anticipate it.

Rural communities derive food, medicines and other resources from the vegetation in particular forests and forests reserves. In recent times, mining operations have been allowed in forest reserves. The remaining vestiges of Ghana’s forests reserves are under siege from small scale illegal miners as well as



large-scale exploration and production companies. About 15 forest reserves have been affected by mining, and an estimated 13,165 hectares of forest reserves are under mining lease. This trend is a major contribution to both diminishing the carbon sink and the ecological and social functions that the vegetation and forests provide for survival and development. In addition to the deprivation of their environmental resources, communities suffer atmospheric pollution in the form of dust, noise, and vibration. Dust, noise, and vibration from blasting were the major subject of public protest in Prestea in 2005, and Manu-Shed in 2008.

The problems of land alienation, inadequate employment opportunities, environmental pollution, inadequate compensation, and general problems of access to livelihoods constitute a violation of the social and economic rights of communities, a violation perpetrated by state policy and corporate practice. They also constitute the main justification for dissent and protests. State and corporate response to these protests with state and private security forces have often resulted in violence and blatant abuse of the communities' human rights.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) from the community level through national to supranational levels are engaged in advocacy around a number of these issues. The advocacy issues include:

- concerns about the disproportionate benefits earned by companies compared to host countries and local communities
- pressure for greater transparency in the relations between companies and national governments over the transfer and use of mining revenues
- demands for greater corporate accountability in relations between companies and mining affected communities
- environmental degradation
- destruction of livelihoods of affected communities
- violations of rights

The lack of linkages between mining enclaves and the rest of national economies have attracted demands from citizens groups for a re-examination of the incentive regimes enjoyed by foreign mining companies. This range of issues surrounding mining sector economics, environmental challenges, human rights, and governance has fostered the emergence of advocacy coalitions in many African mining countries as well as regional advocacy coalitions. Advocacy struggles have also taken many forms ranging from protest, petition, research, lobby, specific campaigns, litigation, and collaborative actions. It is in the context of these concerns as well as the existence and emergence of community struggles and coalitions that Greengrants sought to respond.

In West Africa, Greengrants made 132 grants within the period 2003 to 2010. Out of this number, 45 grants were made to networks, coalitions, communities, and NGOs like Centre for Public Interest Law (CEPIL), Civic Response (CR) and Network for Environment and Development (NEDA) in Ghana. Grants are usually recommended by environmental leaders based on their knowledge of local groups, networks, and new organizations for various activities and campaigns. Grants advance social processes already underway, or attempt to start up new social processes in response to a perceived need. In the 2009/2010 fiscal year the West Africa Advisory Board made a total of 14 grants to communities, organizations, networks, and coalitions in Ghana. From the strategy of the Greengrants West Africa Advisory Board, grants are made in support of different issues such as organizational start-up, advocacy infrastructure, capacity building and training, strengthening networking, intervening in policy processes, media campaign and litigation, among others.



The strategy of Greengrants in West Africa was to provide support for networks, small organizations, new organizations, and community level groups who by their nature and structure do not easily have access to large grants/funds. The underlying principle for support is to contribute to building and strengthening networking relations, improve the capacity of small groups to intervene and influence political processes, and reframe issues which reflect their interest and environmental sustainability.

Key findings

The study assessed the effectiveness of small grants in supporting movement building by looking at selected beneficiaries of small grants from Ghana. This section presents a summary of the key findings drawn from data gathered in the field.

The line of reasoning that informed the formulation of the study objective led to the *a priori* hypothesis that small grants improve the capacity of local actors to respond to changing strategies of mining companies and the state to impose a mining project or demobilize civil society criticism to existing projects. The findings support this hypothesis. The study found that since the inception of Greengrants grants (and indeed other small grants observed in the field) over 70 percent of grants administered went to support strategies for resistance and promotion of community voice and that these grants did improve local capacity and did influence mining projects. The study established that the high concentration of small grants on strategies for resistance and promotion of community voice was driven by ease of access and timeliness of small grants—a situation that is not typical of large-grants.

The study supports the stated assumption that small grants tend to be used more effectively in defensive struggles (react to the initiatives of companies and/or governments) and less so in offensive struggles (initiatives to deepen autonomy of communities, incite legal change, or apply alternative socio-economic activities). However, the study found that repeated grants tend to support offensive strategies in particular. They deepen community self-organization, autonomy, and alternative livelihood trajectories. Further, the study found that implicit in defensive struggles are a series of specific offensive struggles. For instance, when communities resist a particular policy or practice of corporations and institutions of the state they are consciously or inadvertently pointing to alternatives. In the legal case between Concerned Citizens of Sefwi and Chirano Gold Mines Limited, one of the demands made to the government was to carry out cost-benefit analysis for cocoa and mining. A similar argument was made by NCOM in its campaign against mining in forest reserves.

The research revealed that small grants play an important role in conscious and wider alternative strategies of movements. Small grants were very effective in facilitating such alternative and wider strategies. Yet despite the implicit offensive struggles (alternative agendas) inherent in the popular defensive struggles, small grants are inadequate to deliver more conscious and wider offensive strategies in the mining sector. Respondents were unanimous that a more conscious offensive strategy would require the execution of short, medium, and long-term plans. These plans would require a lot of investment in resources in the planning, mobilization, and actual execution which small grants cannot cover. Small grants on their own are more effective in facilitating debate or encouraging consideration of alternatives than they are in implementing the alternatives themselves.

The research found that in all the grantees examined, small grants (in particular Greengrants grants) have contributed to the formation, formulation, and strengthening the effectiveness of civil society organizations (NGOs, community based organizations and their networks). Support for litigation, capacity building and training, protests, networking relations, intervention in policy processes and decision-making, research, information dissemination, and specific campaigns are examples of how small grants play a critical role in the struggles of civil society organizations.



The most common strategy among grantees was capacity building and training. For many groups, capacity building and training needs are quite incidental, sporadic, and erratic. Capacity building needs come up in unpredictable ways in response to the dynamic and unpredictable events that often occur such as sudden meetings, policy-decisions, or announcement of compensation frameworks without notice. Therefore a flexible grant strategy is needed to respond to such needs. The flexible strategy that small grants like those of Greengrants allow makes them more effective than large grants. Yet mining struggles stretch over years and capacity building needs to be planned in advance of the different stages of the mining cycles, so there is also need for more considered, well-planned capacity building grants as well. Groups also favored capacity building and training since it has a wider but more cost effective impact than many other strategies. For instance, capacity building and training could be used to mobilize stakeholders around a specific issue, strengthen networking, or define specific campaigns and research agendas.

The study found evidence that small grants have been instrumental in strengthening local institutional capacity for self-organization, scaling up and turning mainstream local environmental concerns into national and international agendas. A clear example is the relation between community-based groups and the NCOM: community issues become the national agenda of NCOM and sometimes the international agenda of the African Initiative on Mining Environment and Society (AIMES).

The study found many factors that were responsible for the relevance and effectiveness of small grants to movement struggles. The main factors include:

- The small grants strategy seemed to be well adapted to the strategic concerns of grantees (compatibility of small grants and movement struggles).
- Greengrants has been flexible in its overall approach toward grantees (examples include sufficient time for reporting allows grantees to focus on issues rather than ensuring that accounts balance).
- Decentralized decision-making allows Advisors to recommend appropriate grantees in view of their knowledge and experience with such organizations. This would have been extremely difficult as the paperwork alone cannot adequately disclose the identity, nature, and attitude of grant seekers.
- The strategic focus of Greengrants Advisors on the specific needs of their grassroots grantees (as Darimani said in an interview, “if grantees succeed it is our collective success and so we must make a choice that has the high propensity to succeed”).
- Greengrants’ model allows for timely of access to funds in times of need. Time limitation is an important precondition for effectiveness of grassroots initiatives. Time-bound activities supported by small grants ensure the relevance of the results.

A careful analysis of the grassroots struggles and the evolution of community-based organizations and their relations with mainstream, non-governmental organizations leads to the conclusion that they qualify in generic terms as a social movement. However, this is not a monolithic movement. Beneath the surface, this movement comprises several distinct tendencies and characteristics that can be analyzed independently. Within it are different units of organization such as national NGOs and community-based groups. A distinction could also be made based on issues of focus and methods of work or the philosophical underpinnings of the movement.



Civil society organizations and their networks and coalitions are growing. The trend of the growth is shifting towards the extractive sector. While this growth is made possible by the current democratic dispensation accompanied by several freedoms (including freedom of association), the shift towards extractives is motivated by three things: the centrality of extractive sector in the economies of West African countries including Ghana; the increasing interest of the sector to foreign transnational companies; and the expansion of the sector (oil discovery and new mines) accompanied with heightened social, human rights, economic, and environmental concerns.

In the midst of this diversity and growth of civil society, the study confirmed that Greengrants small grants were indeed reaching civil society actors engaged in legitimate struggles who lacked opportunities to access financial resources in support of these struggles. This was due to more explicit targeting by Greengrants Advisors than a proactive search for finances by these civil actors.

The study found that individual grants make sense and are effective when they address grantees' livelihood concerns. Evidence from the successes around compensation pointed clearly to this issue. In addition, when grants make contributions to a specific process, it is likely to result in enhancing the interest of a particular actor, even if such a process does not relate to wider strategic visions. The examples that best illustrate this argument are grants made for start-up organizations.

The research found small grants to be useful in producing effective and politically sustainable results, even in highly contentious policy arenas, by pulling together knowledge and experiences through participatory and inclusive strategies and networking.

The study discovered that organizations that benefit from large funds generally despise small grants on the grounds that many of them have reporting requirements that, considering the time demands for such reports, are considered unattractive. However, staff interviewed at organizations that are benefiting from larger funds approved that flexibility of reporting requirement of Greengrants' funds makes them an exception.

Male-dominated social relations were also reflected in the advocacy landscape. Male-run organizations were more frequently beneficiaries of both small and large grants. However, the situation is changing. Community groups and networks are now conscious of gender relations and make an effort to target women's issues and include women in their programs. For example, NCOM has made it a practice to include women and women's issues in all their campaign strategies. At the national level, strong women's advocacy networks are emerging. Examples are the Network on Women's Rights in Ghana (NETRIGHT) and Women's Manifesto Coalition.

Research methodology

The research was conducted from May to June 2010 and involved the gathering of quantitative and qualitative information in order to make conclusions based on the formulated hypothesis. The philosophical approach of the research was essentially participatory, and included the use of a combination of different tools and instruments specified as follows:

- A literature review was conducted, examining reports of other evaluations, Greengrants' documents, and a record of grants made by the West Africa Advisory Board, which included background and operational location of grantees. Reports of grantees were also reviewed to help in understanding what grantees might consider as successful outcomes.




- A sample survey was conducted in which 13 grantees in Ghana were selected and assessed in terms of their project outcomes. The sample survey was conducted using the list of grants made by the West Africa Advisory Board for the period 2003 to date.
- Interviews were held with grantees, in some cases through telephone and in other cases one-on-one. The research questions were redeveloped into a questionnaire, keeping in mind the level of education of some of the respondents. These questionnaires were used for the interviews. In addition to grantees, the West Africa Coordinator pointed to some of the West Africa Advisors for further information. Contacts with the Advisors in other countries were made through electronic mail communication. The draft report was sent to these advisors for their comments. Interviews were also conducted with officials of state institutions and the mining companies operating in areas as part of the determination of effectiveness of small grants outcomes.
- A final workshop was organized in Accra on July 22nd, 2010 with key informants of the research to discuss and validate the findings. Based on the outcome of the workshop, some changes were made to the report. Although not fundamental, the changes helped in improving the quality of the report.

Overview of mining related struggles

In the mid 1980s, the government of Ghana liberalized the mining sector under the aegis of World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programme. Despite the fact that Ghana is historically known for mining, the liberalization of the sector resulted in a significant expansion of the activities of mining, mostly within the vicinities of rural communities. The resultant expansion has led to heightened adverse environmental and socio-economic problems in neighboring communities. Communities in mining areas across Ghana face a multitude of enormous challenges. On a daily basis, they are confronted with the challenges of ownership of and access to the minimum requirements for decent levels of human existence. Every large-scale mining project opens up a spectrum of struggles. These include: the struggles to obtain and retain land and other resources for livelihood; the drudgery of pollution and human rights violations; the burden of un-reclaimed lands, causing displacement and a large influx of migrants and consequently disruption of existing social structures and relations; an increased cost of living; and the disruption of livelihoods combined with the restrictions and limitations imposed by state policy and corporate practice. A number of common property resources, whose uses were determined and controlled by the traditional value-systems have been progressively eroded by mining. The area of land held by individual farmers and as a common property within communities of large-scale mining has declined due to large mining concessions. These problems compound the already marginalized and poor living conditions of rural communities near various mines. In response to these challenges, communities began to question the state and mining companies about the use of mineral wealth, to demand better conditions, and to deliver certain services necessary for sustainable community development.



Community struggles focused on a variety of issues and also took many forms and shapes. The focus was to find out how such struggles evolved and transformed into organizations or networks. The study found four broad ways by which community groups evolved and transformed into community based organizations in mining areas in Ghana (figure 1).



Many community groups evolved through sustained advocacy, i.e. consciousness raising and targeted organization building to improve the countervailing power of communities. While communities have the potential to influence decisions and safeguard their personal and communal interest from mining, this has often not happened due to a lack of effective organization. The study found that years of intensive advocacy combined with the lived experience of community members has resulted in the evolution of community-based groups. Several of the grantees supported in Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria by the West Africa Advisory Board fall in this category.

Some community groups evolved from a spontaneous event. Often groups struggle to achieve specific objectives and in the end fold up. While such groups may not be active, their experience in the spontaneous struggle provides fertile grounds for reactivation and alliance with other groups. The experience of Concerned Citizens Association of Teleku-Bukaazo best illustrates this category of spontaneous evolution. During one community based protest against mining-company operations, the company called in the police. Police came and beat community members, chasing them out of their residences. Some community members were arrested and put into cells for days, weeks, and even months before they were released. These events catalyzed the community to turn their hitherto uncoordinated action into a self-organized group known as Concerned Citizens of Teleku-Bukaazo. There is a high sense of loyalty among group members and within the community as a whole. Another example is Concerned Citizens of Sefwi, which also evolved through conflict with Chirano Gold Mines Limited over compensation and the company's social responsibility to the community. A cyanide spillage at Abekoase near Tarkwa in the Wassa West District of Western Region by Gold Fields Ghana Limited provided The National Coalition on Mining (NCOM) an opportunity to form a network in Ghana in 2001. There had been plans to start up a Ghanaian coalition similar to the African Initiative on Mining Environment and Society (AIMES), which was created two years prior. This cyanide spill was the catalyst that mobilized groups to form NCOM when they did.

The second broad category (split evolution) describes those groups that evolved from another group. This happens when individuals who comprise a part of an original group disagree on the basis of principles, ideology, approach, and splinter off to form another group. In such a situation, the two groups rarely collaborate, even if they are delivering on the same issue in the same area with the same targets. Guards of the Earth and the Vulnerable (GEV) and Livelihood & Environment Ghana (LEG), both grantees of Greengrants, best illustrate this category. GEV was first set up in Kenyasi by a group of farmers to protect the environment and advocate for better conditions for farmers in the face of Newmont mining activities.



In 2003, Newmont offered GEV quite a large financial contract. Some of the leaders welcomed the opportunity and others saw it as a threat to their ability to advocate against the company, so part of GEV split to form LEG in 2004. These two groups are located in the same town but they seldom collaborate.

Another type of group evolution occurs through surrogacy. Groups established as surrogates for other NGOs (national and international), mining companies, and government institutions may have loyalty to communities but such loyalty must fit into the world view of their superiors. The study did not find grants award to such groups, except Crops Rate Review Committees and Compensation Negotiation Committees. These are committees established by mining companies and comprised by representatives of communities, government agencies and mining companies. The committees serve as forums for negotiating the value of property, including crops and buildings which people lost to mining. Though such committees were established by mining companies, they became entry points pivotal for community level advocacy for the State, NGOs and the Mines. Among the three distinctive components of the committees, the community component was quite diverse, weak in its countervailing influence against State officials, and lacking in the technical skills to negotiate better deals. It was on this basis that support for the community component of the committees was justified.

The study found that irrespective of the history of their evolution, community-based groups engaged with government institutions, mining companies, local power holders (such as traditional authority, NGOs), and other communities as well. It is these different levels of engagement that provide the justification and opportunity for Greengrants. The relative ability of community members and the groups they form in terms of their strengths or weaknesses has made it difficult for them to deliver on their agendas, and several of them have failed in their efforts. This general propensity to failure reflects an inherent lack of capacity in community groups, one that has to be understood in terms of their internal dynamics and of the contexts within which they operate. Thus, these are challenges typical of movements that Greengrants grants seek to address.

Strategies and approaches of grantees and civil society organizations

The study analyzed strategies and approaches used by community-based groups in their struggles. This analysis was preceded by a brief examination of the contribution of small grants to struggles and movement building.

Contribution of Small Grants

Grants provided by Greengrants have helped communities to mobilize themselves in response to specific threats that mining development presents to their livelihoods. Community members get support from Greengrants to advocate for the protection of their environment, natural resources, and rights through advocacy, campaign, and representation in policy processes. Grants have helped build solidarity among community members and their groups. As a result of Greengrants grants, community groups in Ghana are able to promote and voice the problems around mining and its relationship to human rights, community interest, the environment, and development at the local and national levels. By benefiting from small grants from Greengrants, community groups have expanded to all mining concession areas in Ghana. Grant making has also transformed self-organized community groups into structured platforms i.e. the National Coalition on mining (NCOM) with resources and capacity to influence initiatives in favor of marginalized people living in mining communities. A multitude of capacities are used to present their struggles. These include representation of affected community members in courtrooms, boardrooms fighting for fair compensation and resettlement packages, attending and hosting national and international conferences focused on community struggles with large-scale mining, and liaising with local and international NGOs.



Support for advocacy has placed community issues concerning mining firmly at the forefront of contemporary discussions of mineral development in Ghana. There are many initiatives scattered all over the nation as communities mobilize and take action on their own against mining operations. Such community initiatives have facilitated the conglomeration of local groups to form the National Coalition on Mining (NCOM) that has become a common campaigning vehicle for groups in mining affected communities. Similar national networks are emerging in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Mali. These groups have made strides in promoting greater responsibility from the mining industry and host governments. At the Africa continental level, the African initiative on Mining, Environment and Society (AIMES) brings together a broad spectrum of community groups and organizations around the theme of mining and its role in Africa's development. Through all these processes, participating members develop extensive collaborative relations with each other and groups working on mining issues in other areas regions and in the international arena. We provide specific cases of the contribution of small grants to organizational development and movement building.

Box 1: WACAM

WACAM is a community based advocacy organization. Small grants have facilitated its growth and capacity to transfer knowledge and experiences. While members were engaged in advocacy, small grants from Third World Network-Africa enabled WACAM to rent an office accommodation, secure office furniture, put two of its staff on retainer for over three years, procure a motor-cycle to serve as transport, and to run its advocacy program for well over five years.

Today, WACAM has developed networking relations with groups of similar focus at the local and international levels. WACAM works with volunteers who represent its members in courtrooms and boardrooms fighting for fair compensation and resettlement packages. These volunteers attend and host international conferences focused on community struggles with large-scale mining. At the international level WACAM, liaise with local and international NGOs such as Oxfam-America, GRUFIDES, and Mining Watch Canada. It is also a member of the National Coalition on Mining (NCOM). In collaboration with Centre for Public Interest Law (CEPIL), WACAM and its allies have been instrumental both in improving the legal capacity of staff of WACAM and of the communities in which it worked through the organization of paralegal workshops as well as the provision of official legal representation for those filing suit against companies in court. WACAM has also facilitated a variety of community workshops. The organization now has the capacity to develop proposals and secure funding beyond US\$50,000.

Despite its growth, small grants are still an integral part of WACAM's funding. They enable its viability, outreach, networking relations, and skill transfers to communities affected by mining. Small grants from GreenGrants have enabled WACAM to issue press releases and organize conferences in response to various forms of corporate irresponsibility. Small grants from GreenGrants have enabled WACAM to provide invaluable support to displaced people, organizing shelter, hospital care and legal representation for those in need. With support from several mediums such as the GreenGrants grant, WACAM became increasingly involved in its activities on a national scale.



Box 2: Livelihood & Environment Ghana (LEG)

Livelihood & Environment Ghana (LEG) is a community-based Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) that was established in Kenyasi with the main goal of advocating for the protection of the environment, community interest, and livelihood of men and women. Repeated grants from Greengrants have kept LEG active. With support of small grants yearly, LEG has developed as an organization and built a critical mass of communities affected by mining in Ahafo and New Abirem. Small grants from Greengrants enabled LEG to source additional funds from Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in support of its expanded work. Now LEG rents a physical office location in Kenyasi, employs three permanent staff, and has 31 voluntary community facilitators around the concession of Newmont Ghana Gold Limited located in Asutifi and Tano North Districts of Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana. The three staff and the 31 facilitators constitute the agenda setting body of communities affected by mining in the Ahafo area. This body also has direct link to the Ghana National Coalition on Mining (NCOM) through which some of the agenda issues of the communities gain national and international recognition. Further support has enabled LEG to expand its mobilization effort from Kenyasi to Birim North District in the Eastern Region where the same company owns and operates a concession with Golden Ridge Resources Limited. So far eight communities have been brought together under one umbrella with a direct link to NCOM.

As illustrated in Boxes 1 and 2, small grants made important contributions to organization building. The growth of WACAM as an organization capable of defining its own advocacy agenda and mobilizing resources to support the agenda symbolizes the important role of small grants in movement building. Similarly, the expansion of community associations and their links with each other in the Kenyasi area illustrates the contributions of small grants to movement building. There is a risk in organization and movement building which large funders are slow and reluctant to bear. In the case WACAM and LEG, small grants embraced such risks and produced results. The case of WACAM and LEG also illustrates the benefits of repeated small grants. However, repeated small grants could also be a disincentive for community groups to work hard for additional and alternative funding. Indeed, repeated grants may weaken the willingness of community members to make financial contribution once funding at a certain level is guaranteed. While this is theoretically justifiable, the study could not establish facts to support how repeated grants stifle organization building. It is an issue to be flagged and watched in repeated grants. In fact, the demise of the Western Region Network of NGOs rather proves the point for repeated grants (Box 3).

Box 3: WERENGO

Western Region Network of NGOs (WERENGO) was established in 2005 to forge coordinated campaigns focusing on issues of mining, forests, and natural resources. The Western Region is the region in Ghana with the highest concentration of large-scale mining companies. It is also host to some of the rich timber concessions and now hosts the commercial oil extraction companies. WERENGO received one small grant from Greengrants in 2006. The study found that WERENGO still exists only as a concept.

There are still quite active civil society organizations campaigning on the very issues that brought them together under WERENGO. However, the campaigns do not carry the label of WERENGO.



Had the network received further support beyond its initial grant, it is possible that the network would still be active. It has to be pointed out that funding is just one of the many variables that bring coalitions together. Therefore, the demise of the WERENGO cannot solely be attributable to one-off grant. The growth, expansion and viability of the National Coalition on Mining (NCOM), even in the face of financial challenges, best illustrates this assertion (Box 4). In fact the viability of NCOM is a hybrid of repeated grants and strategic one-off grants.

Box 4: National Coalition on Mining (NCOM)

The National Coalition on Mining (NCOM) is a grouping of NGOs, communities, and individuals engaged in mining sector advocacy. It was formed in 2001 by four organizations led by Third World Network-Africa in response to a specific problem of cyanide spillage at Abekoase near Tarkwa in the Wassa West District of Western Region by Gold Fields Ghana Limited. The controversy surrounding the spillage created the opportunity for four organizations with varied expertise on policy, legal, media, and community mobilization to collectively create the National Coalition on Mining. This coalition formed as a response to government and corporate attempts to dismiss the fears and concerns raised by the adjoining communities.

The following year, the Coalition launched a much wider campaign to stop surface mining in forest reserves. This campaign led to an expansion in membership of the Coalition to include NGOs working and interested in issues of mining, forestry, wildlife, environment, human rights, gender, public interest litigation, researchers, and the media. The regular membership of the Coalition is now comprised of about 20 organizations and representatives of communities affected by mining. In addition to specific campaigns, the Coalition carries out policy advocacy, supports community capacity building, sets advocacy agendas, participates in meetings and events, issues joint statements, intervenes in particular political moments and policy processes, publishes sign-on letters, and initiates protests. It also collaborates with other organizations and networks on issues relevant to its broader agenda. These occur either as events on an ad-hoc basis, or as a routine process. For instance, the intervention in specific policy processes or political movements as well as the participation in meetings and events of other networks occurs in ad-hoc basis while the meetings and campaigns of the coalition occur in a continuous and coordinated process.

Some of the achievements of NCOM over the years include

- Building confidence and amplifying community voices state and corporate practices and other policies with respect to mining
- Successfully resisting the expansion of surface gold mining in Ghana's forest reserves in 2003, which resulted in a drastic reduction in the number of companies applying to mine in forest reserves (from 17 to 5) as well as a decision by government to reduce the size of forest reserves affected by mining from 2% to 0.01%
- Influencing public perception about mining and its environmental impacts with consequential effects on state and corporate responsibility
- Successfully changing the agenda of the Ghana Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) to include carrying out a study on the social and economic rights of communities affected by mining. A report of the study was published in 2008 and affirmed most of the issues NCOM has long raised.
- Providing alternative and parallel platforms to government and industry in major decisions and policy on mining and the environment
- In 2005, successfully influencing significant changes to a Minerals and Mining Bill, which became an Act in 2006, (Act 703)
- Providing platforms for strategy, exchange of experiences, and transfer of knowledge between and among grassroots organizations working against transnational mining companies and powerful state institutions.

Small grants have made important contributions to these landmark victories and the continued viability of the Coalition.



However, not all small grants administered produced the desired results (Box 5).

Box 5: A Case of Poor Grant Administration in an Activist Group

In 2009, a group of community activists impacted by oil and mining from Tarkwa, Obuasi, and Nzema East, some with over a decade experience in mobilizing communities affected by mining, came together to facilitate community level networking through targeted organized workshops and meetings. These activists are participating members of NCOM. Each works in a separate constituency and together, they decided to promote synergy in their work by organizing joint meetings and events. The area of their work covers Tarkwa, Prestea, Obuasi, and Nzema East and West mining regions of Ghana.

Both Jomoro and Nzema East Districts have been farming communities and are new to oil and mining. All of a sudden the two districts have been exposed to large-scale oil and mining activities. The gold mining activities cover about 14 communities in the Nzema East District. This District and Jomoro District are quite close to the newly discovered oil fields in Ghana. Communities such as Asiamia, Cape three-Points, Salma Anwia, Nkroful among others are living with problems including the destruction farmlands and water bodies as well as police and military brutalities.

During the same year (2009) this group made a request for a small grant from GreenGrants to carry out community workshops and meetings to facilitate the development of community-based strategies for networking and linkages in defense of their interests. A grant was awarded for US\$3,000 to achieve the following objectives:

- Organization of awareness raising workshops and campaign meetings on the impact of oil activities using the experiences in mining.
- Identify common issues that could promote linkages and networking between oil and mining impacted communities.

The grant was poorly administered. Only one meeting was held as a group. The study found that while the issues were clearly identified there was no common framework for delivery on the issues. For instance, no leadership was agreed upon and specific responsibilities were neither defined nor assigned. There was no pressure from the funder and more importantly the definition of the problem was not articulated with the constituencies. The activists took for granted that since unity was fine, community members would be ready to work together. This grant does not point to a failure of the activists, rather it points to inadequate preparedness and lack of framework for implementation. This is an issue that small grants usually overlook but which large grants would demand as condition for access.

Strategies and approaches used by grantees

Grantees used a combination of different strategies to resist environmental pollution, defend and reclaim their rights, intervene in policy, draw attention to specific issues, and improve their countervailing power to corporations and state institutions. Below, some cases are presented as illustration.

Training and Transfer of knowledge and skills

One of the most common strategies and approaches used by movements for enhancing their struggles is training and transferring of knowledge and skills. This is a process in which individuals are informed about their rights, the harmful effect of policy and practices, the appropriate timing and platforms for actions, and targets for certain actions. The study found the training and transfer of knowledge and skills were the most prominent among the strategies used by grantees, and that they were mostly linked to major decisions by government and companies. These strategies also established practices which communities



had little or no knowledge of. In view of the fact that most decisions are external to local groups, the training programs require urgent response. This was where small grants, unlike large-grants, become very crucial and responsive to the needs of communities. The study found that each grantee had to conduct some type of trainings and skills transfers program which were either planned, informal or incidental.

Infrastructure and Administrative Improvements

Support for infrastructure and administrative improvement is one of the strategies through which movements deploy their resources to improve their effectiveness in advocacy and campaigns. Small grants have helped grassroots organizations to acquire office space, office furniture, stationary, computer accessories, public speaking equipment, gadgets for evidence gathering in support of campaigns, and tools for environmental regeneration. Beneficiary organizations have also been able to employ a relatively good number of people to run the organization. A small grant of US\$3,000 enabled Guards of the Earth and the Vulnerable to acquire chairs that facilitate their planning and agenda setting and bicycles and motor-bikes that facilitate their movement and outreach to other communities. Also, a small grant to Concerned Citizens of Chirano enabled them to establish an office and procure digital cameras. While the office space gave the group social recognition and space for secretarial work, the group was able to use the camera to gather evidence that supported their courtroom litigation against Chirano Gold Mines Limited. However, in cases where groups are not legally registered GreenGrants Advisors, there may need to be *minimum acceptable limits* on the type and amount of infrastructure that can be provided. While such infrastructure is significant in community struggles, the study could not establish mechanisms and plans put forward by groups for the disposal of their assets beyond what is provided for under the Company's Limited by Guarantee Law.



Partnership and Networking

Through small grants from GreenGrants, grassroots organizations have been able to improve their capacities to engage in networks with the aim of presenting a mobilized front to articulate their concerns. The grants have helped beneficiary movements to effectively interact with each other around major problems posed by mining activities. This interaction takes place at different levels: local, national, and international (Fig.2).

This relationship has ensured the active engagement of civil society with mining companies, policy officials and duty-bearers from the local through the national to international. In this relationship, movements have demonstrated the importance of forming strategic local alliances to fight a common course rather than fighting individually. This alliance has helped other smaller movements gain information and experiences as well as promoting the diffusion of knowledge and skills.



Figure 2: Scheme of Relations of small grants




Figure 2 also presents the schematic relations between small grants and movements. The figure depicts linkages from community based actions through the national (NCOM) to the international (AIMES). This strategy helps improve pressure on company and government institutions at the three levels to yield to demands made by communities. For instance, in respect of compensation, communities successfully raised their entitlement by 70 percent in 2006. While this study was ongoing, communities in Birim North went on a protest to demand suspension of work until their grievances were addressed. The company yielded to the demands and called for dialogue between it and the communities. The communities protested because negotiation was still ongoing when the company began to destroy crops and farms. The National Campaign Forum launched four years ago has been a major platform at which NCOM brings government officials and communities to engage in discussions about the best way to protect community rights, livelihoods, and the environment as well as prevent the destructive legacy of mining.



However, in reality the relations are quite diverse and dynamic and not necessarily in a linear form as depicted by Figure 2. There are cases where community-based actions assume national and or international dimensions without having to pass through NCOM or AIMES. For instance, in 2008, Manu-shed community received a grant of US\$5,000 from GreenGrants and used the money to draw national response without having to pass through NCOM.

Manu-shed community is located between Kenyasi No.2 and Ntotroso all in the Asutifi District of Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana where Newmont Ghana Gold Limited (NGGL) operates its Ahafo gold project. Members of the community were affected by the operations of the company. Some of the adverse impacts include forced evictions, water pollution, dust pollution, vehicular noise, and blasting effects. This grant sought to build capacity for members of the community, enabling them to organize resistance to the negative impacts and engage in negotiations to receive compensation for their property.

The grant enabled the community to draw national attention to their problems through the media. They also compelled the Ghana Environmental Protection Agency and the company to discuss ways of addressing the problems and finally agreed on action points. Although they might have drawn inspiration from work of NCOM, the community took up the issue at their own level and got government and company to respond without having to put the issues through NCOM.

Again, despite the impressive successes and the potential that partnership and networking have for movement building, NCOM and AIMES reproduce some challenges that undermine movement effectiveness. In the first instance, the identity of individual organizational interest different from the collective interest was reported to be one of the areas of competition as opposed to cooperation. Due to identity interest, some organizations find themselves competing with the collective agenda. They sometimes find it convenient to act in isolation or to claim the work of the collective as their doing.

Related to the idea of identity interest is also the issue of territorial protection. There are some organizations which hold the false impression that they have exclusive access to a particular area and the population. Because of this false impression, they feel threatened each time the collective agenda makes an incursion into this particular area, especially when the incursion is not led by the organization. Some respondents also expressed concern about the approach of some northern NGOs which seek to undermine the autonomy and legitimacy of movement building in Ghana and West Africa. Rather than supporting existing initiatives, such Northern NGOs prefer to establish parallel initiatives which rely on previously mobilized groups. Schachhuber (2004) indicates that the objectives of Northern and Southern social movements and organizations often diverge significantly. Using financial resources as key leverage, Northern NGOs create their own space domestically and use the same local network membership to do the same thing.

Protests, Petitions and Demonstrations

Community-based organizations sometimes use their grants to organize protests as a strategy for resolving their concerns. Community protests and petitions have been common and regular. Protests present communities in a unified front and pressure the mining companies and government agencies into dialogue with them.

In 2004, Chirano Gold Mines Limited paid compensation to farmers affected by its operations in order that they would surrender their legitimate title to their crops and other properties to the company. Subsequently, Concerned Citizens of Sefwi, a member of NCOM, discovered through discussions that the Company paid compensation rate below the minimum rate stipulated by the Land Valuation Board. For



instance, while the stipulated minimum rate for matured cocoa tree was over GH¢5 (US\$3.45), the company paid GH¢2.50 (US\$1.72).

Concerned Citizens of Sefwi led the farmers to sue the company in court in 2006. In 2009, the parties agreed to refer the matter to the Minister for determination of the amount of compensation payable to the affected farmers in compliance with section 73 (3) of the Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703). Despite repeated reminders, the Minister has yet to respond to the communities. The delay in response indicated apparent lack of concern for the farmers.

Therefore, TWN-Africa set up a meeting of the communities and the Minister to try to secure a solution. The meeting was to take place in the offices of the Minister on March 24th, 2010. Three days to the meeting, there was no confirmation from the Minister which suggested that the Minister was not going to honor the meeting. So TWN-Africa and the farmers went ahead and invited the media (print, radio, and television) to meet and interview the community representatives at the Minister's office. Instead of five representatives, the number of participants from the community was increased to 13, and all of them wore red-barns and arrived singing.

The media interviewed them and they expressed their concerns to the public. This created an agitated but peaceful scene and the Deputy Minister was compelled to invite the media and the farmers to discuss the matter. A date was immediately fixed for a meeting of the Minister with the farmers, their lawyers and that of the Company's lawyers to determine the amount payable to the farmers. In this case, the protest was used as an instrument to secure a date for a determination of compensation payable to the affected farmers.

Petitions in the form of public demonstration are rapid forms of information dissemination through the media. In addition, they serve as platforms for exchange of ideas and evaluation of approaches used in specific struggles.

There are also instances where other local groups have used non-protest approaches to secure their demands. The study illustrates the examples of the Resettlement Negotiation Committee and Youth and Concerned Citizens of Teleku-Bukaazo.



Box 6: Resettlement Negotiation Committee, Kenyasi

The Resettlement Negotiation Committee (RNC) was formed in February 2004 by Newmont Ghana Gold Limited (NGGL) in Kenyasi as a body to negotiate on resettlement issues between affected communities and the company. The membership of RNC is 67, comprised of designated representatives of Government ministries, departments, and agencies (7); Traditional Authorities-Chiefs (7); Farmers (41); NGGL (7); and a secretariat with interpreters (2), scribes, (2) and a moderator (1).

While the farmers have the largest delegation, they lacked the necessary skills and voice to negotiate especially when representatives of Government, Traditional Authority and Company lined up in opposition to community interest.

Support from small grants for capacity building in negotiation skills, paralegal, and media relations not only amplified community voices in the committee but also enabled the farmers to raise the level of compensation for their crops and other immovable property. For instance, farmers were able to raise the amount of compensation from GH¢5 (US\$3.45) set by the Committee to GH¢7 (US\$4.83) per cocoa tree. They also abrogated the fixed annual 2 percent increase of agreed compensation rate and provided for a percentage increment based on many other variables not accounted for in the 2 percent increment such as the cost of maintenance of property and the nature of the property, among others.

Box 7: Youth and Concerned Citizens of Teleku-Bukaazo

The concession of Adamus Resources Limited is located about 300 meters away from Nkroful, Teleku-Bukaazo and Anwia in Elembele District in Western region of Ghana. Eleven other neighboring communities are exposed to the operations of the company bringing the total of affected communities to 14. Over 90 percent of the people in these communities are farmers and depend on land and other environmental and natural resources for their livelihoods. Since 2002, activities of the company have generated hostilities between members of the communities and the police.

Police invasions of Teleku-Bukaazo and Anwia took place on a number of occasions. Each occasion of police swoops resulted in injuries and destruction of property. The most severe invasion took place in October 2007. Twelve houses were burnt, about five shops were destroyed, 18 people were arrested and detained in police custody, , and eight others allegedly sustained various degrees of gun-shot wounds.

The Youth and Concerned Citizens of Teleku-Bukaazo obtained a grant from Greengrants. With the support of the grant, the group was able, through non-violent and non-public protests, to:

- Secure the release of 18 members of the community who had been in police custody for over one year without proper charges.
- Suspend the environmental permit to Adamus Resources until adequate consultation was conducted with communities.
- Keep the permitting process on hold for three years in order to enable real community participation.

The non-violent means included networking relations with NCOM and other organizations, a series of training workshops for members of the communities, engagement with the media, and the submission of petitions.



Trends of movement building

According to Darimani (2008), the emergence and expansion of the NGO sector in sustainable community development in Ghana has spanned four historical epochs. These are pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial and the regime of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) to date. In the pre-colonial period in Ghana, like many other societies, there were a wide array of informal and voluntary groups and associations that contributed towards the organization of the affairs of local communities and people. These informal and voluntary groups and associations included development associations, religious organizations, and ethnic groups. Historically, these groups and associations were formal in the context of the particular micro-society. They were involved in a broad range of activities, including the delivery of services, defense of the community against external attacks and aggression, and influencing various aspects of community organization and the lifestyle of individuals. The emergence of the nation-state during colonial rule not only appropriated some of the key functions of these groups and associations but also redefined their functions and reproduced them together with other non-state associations and groups as informal or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Under the colonial nation-state, more modern forms of non-governmental organizations emerged. They initially took the form of charity associations providing education and health services, water, and other essential services to local communities. A good number of the pre-independent schools and hospitals were provided by missionaries who were technically non-state actors, although politically they were active facilitators of the growth and spread of the doctrine of colonialism. During colonial period, Ghana's informal organizations were gradually supplemented by more formal church organizations, which saw social and educational work as a fitting complement to evangelism.

Following independence, a number of Ghanaian and foreign non-governmental organizations emerged in the NGO sector. For instance, the young pioneer movement can be described as both a non-governmental organization and the political wing of the Convention People's Party. By the 1970s, a number of "radical" activists emerged, mainly from the universities, to establish NGOs. Some of these NGOs subsequently grew to form the core of the major local service NGOs operating in Ghana today. During this period, although some NGOs critiqued and resisted government policies, the majority of NGOs continue to focus their activities narrowly by serving small numbers of their beneficiaries. During periods of political and economic instability that followed independence, citizens were dependent on humanitarian aid and emergency services provided by non-governmental organizations.

The trend of focus on NGOs as mainly service providers has, since the late 1980s, dramatically changed following the launch of the World Bank Group (WBG) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescribed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). During this period, community based organizations and NGOs sprang up in response to both the growing impact of SAP and its mitigating measures introduced at the time. Mawdsley et al (2002), point out that the growth of donor support to Ghana following the introduction of the Economic Recovery Programme in 1983, which encouraged a major expansion in the activities of both local and foreign NGOs operating in the country. For instance, as the heat of SAP began to build up, the government of Ghana (in collaboration with its donor partners) introduced what was known as the Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). Funds from this program helped fuel the growth of national- and community-based organizations. Also, northern and international NGOs who had experience in resisting programs of this nature began to look for local partners to aid in advocacy for and service delivery to victims of SAP. Their intervention also contributed



to the development and spread of national and community based NGOs. By the mid 1990s, the number of registered non-profit organizations grew to over 700.

The growth of the NGO sector in Ghana is also linked to certain global phenomena. These include the declining capacity of national governments; the weakening of global institutions in their role in protecting the interest of citizens; the reconstruction of global norms and poverty; the growth of capitalism and the emergence of a public sphere of pressures separate from the political space of the state; and the evolving democracy sweeping through the continent. Today, the NGO sector encompasses hundreds of organizations of all sizes and types.

Despite the fact that mining is historically known in Ghana, the liberalization of the sector under SAP resulted in a significant expansion of the activities of mining, mostly within the vicinities of rural communities. The resultant expansion has led to heightened adverse environmental and socio-economic problems on neighboring communities. For communities affected by mining projects, each day opens up a spectrum of struggles, including the struggle to obtain and retain land and other resources of livelihood, the burden of pollution, together with the restrictions and limitations imposed by state policy and corporate practice. These problems compound the already marginalized and poor living conditions of rural communities in the vicinities of various mines.

In response to these challenges, NGOs intervened to question the state and mining companies about the use of mineral wealth, to demand better conditions, and to deliver certain services necessary for sustainable community development. According to Darimani (2008), in the mid 1990s, there were very few NGOs working on mining issues. By the late 1990s, the number had grown to 10 or more, comprising a variety of perspectives for analyzing the problems and developmental impacts of mining. These entry points range from the environment through economics, human rights, gender, and political economy, to services. In 2001, NCOM was the only known civil society coalition on mining. At the time of this study an anecdotal survey showed the presence of Coalition/Networks such as Forest Watch Ghana, (FWG) Oil platform, Coalition on Freedom of Information Bill, Publish-What You-Pay Campaign, Women's Manifesto Coalition, Economic Justice Network, and Network for Women's Right in Ghana (NETRIGHT).

In addition to the quantitative expansion, there is also a qualitative shift of focus. Firstly, there is a trend that combines a more conscious alternative agenda with continued resistance. Civil society organizations are now more consciously putting forward alternative policy positions and seeking change in policy rather than resisting the impacts of policy. Even at grassroots levels, community based organizations are able to identify their problems with specific policy weaknesses. Secondly, there is a qualitative shift of focus from mere ecological degradation towards the social, economic and human rights dimension of mining. This has manifested in demands for policy and practices of corporations and state institutions to incorporate, for example, human rights, governance, and gender principles in frameworks for resource extraction. This trend is motivated by a number of factors including the sophistication of the industry, the continued expansion of the sector and its relevance to the developmental priorities of host countries and citizens, the discovery of oil in Ghana, and the increased democratic space.



Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions

The report shows the growing importance of small grants in the efforts of social movements to provide a platform for communities affected by mining development to raise awareness and pressure for accountability of mining companies and state agencies. Small grants have helped build the capacity of social movements to become important actors in the mining sector of Ghana. The struggles of these movements have become important means through which public attention is drawn to the plight of mining communities and fundamental flaws of mining. Struggles have also contributed to recognition of socially marginalized and politically weak groups by existing dominant institutions. As communities mobilize and are able to assert themselves toward small yet significant achievements, their faith in a process of struggle as a means to effect change is consistently renewed.

Recommendations

To sustain such struggles and to improve upon the relevance of small grants without inhibiting the potential of small groups, the study makes the following recommendations:

- The study outcomes support the view that small grants directly contribute to the self-organization of social movements and their interlinkages. The grantees that were interviewed rated the relevance and effectiveness of small grants as very high and very satisfactory to their struggle. However, there was general concern that small grants do not prioritize staff costs, which makes building sustainable organizations difficult. It is recommended that special a medium-term funding facility be established to support promising organizations in order to ensure that qualified groups benefit in the long term. Criteria for access should be developed with input from grantees.
- In the case of networks such as NCOM and AIMES, we recommend an annual standing facility that enables the participation of grassroots organizations. This facility may be a contribution made from Boulder and the West Africa Advisory Board or a special facility created by Boulder and funds purposely raised for it. The study found that each routine meeting of NCOM which is held monthly and rotates among participating members costs between US\$1500 and US\$2500. In view of the cost involved, the hosting is virtually limited to larger and well endowed NGOs. A special facility would enable communities to participate and even host the meetings.
- The decentralized approach of Greengrants was well accepted by grantees, advisors, and non-Greengrants associates. It might be worthwhile to explore the possibility of decentralizing the location of funds for regional advisory boards. For example, funds for West Africa could be allocated annually, or for a similarly defined period, to an institution located in West Africa which holds them in trust for the Board. Such a process would give more ownership of the process and minimize the perception of northern NGOs driving the agenda of local grassroots groups. Again, the local NGO hosting the money might well be an active participant of the issues but also may know some of the grantees in the same way advisors know them. This arrangement may come with its own challenges, including communication and staffing, and needs to be thought through thoroughly to avoid such challenges.
- We recommend that any strategy of further decentralization should not limit opportunities or potential opportunities open to local grassroots organizations.
- While mechanisms such as reports, personal contacts between grantees and advisors, and the grantees forum exist for monitoring and determining how well grantees apply their grants to stated project purposes, these have not been clearly documented for the benefit of funders. This is a challenging issue where Greengrants wants to remain as flexible as possible but also has to account to funders in order to justify for more funding. Existing mechanisms such as the annual



reports, personal contacts with grantees, and the grantees forum may need to be used to help address this challenge. In addition, the advisory board could allocate a small part of their budget to grantees to make annual presentations of the most exciting projects. The winner, based on developed transparent and participatory criteria, takes a prize. Only one person will win, but the Board will receive information on success stories which Greengrants could publish. It has to be emphasized that this exercise should be optional so as not to let grantees feel that there are many conditions attached to small grants.

- Grantees were unanimous in their view that the timeliness of grants is an important ingredient for effectiveness and relevance of grants. However, some delays were recorded during most of the funding rounds due to administrative and communication challenges. The causes of delay include late submission of applications by advisors, translation of materials for decisions, and lack of definite timeline between submission of completed forms and payments. Moving into the future there should be a greater effort to avoid delays, and advisors may need to devise creative ways of avoiding delays, especially with time-bound projects.
- Unclear communication tends to produce different expectations from potential grantees. It appears, for example, that many potential grantees are not aware of the West Africa Advisory Board's funding rounds. This also seems to be the case for other regional boards in Africa primarily due to communication challenges. This is an area that needs attention. It would be useful if Greengrants' Boulder office could help publish the funding rounds of Advisory Boards.
- The current approach and criteria for access to Greengrants grants already enable intervention of citizens in national policy discussions and struggles around mining. This means that small grants have done well in defending citizens' interests and these struggles need to be systematized through conscious, coordinated, and targeted small grant strategies for alternative agendas (offensive struggles).
- The study found that there is a logical sequence of small grants/initiatives leading to large grants/initiatives. Our field survey found several examples of initiatives and processes which originally began as small actions funded and promoted by small grants. Examples include NCOM, WACAM, NETRIGHT, and Global Environment Facility (GEF) of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Greengrants may need to consciously facilitate grassroots access to large grants. This could take the form of joint proposals, references, capacity building on proposals, and introduction of funders, among others.
- Establishing a basic measure of trust is critical for delivering on Greengrants' theory of change. This is already one of the core values of Greengrants. Even if unwritten, trust has been demonstrated in practice by Greengrants and should be sustained. A truly participatory and transparent structure, process, and sourcing of knowledge are key to building and sustaining trust and closing any operational and governance gaps.



Case Study 2: Peru

Global Greengrants Fund, Mining and Social Movements in Peru: On the Contributions of Small Grants to the Construction of Alternative Development Models

By Raphael Hoetmer

“This democracy ain't democracy anymore....”

Women of the CONACAMI in a protest march during the IV Continental Summit of the Indigenous Peoples of Abya Yala

“The mine dresses up as judge, as medic, as lawyer and as politician”

Juana Martinez from Choropampa

“The conflicts generated by mining are like fire. They heat up things, making possible dishes with great new combinations, but it can also end up burning down everything”

Pablo Sanchez from Grufides, Cajamarca



Introduction

Peru is one of the most diverse countries in the world, in both natural and cultural terms. The country's geography includes the enormous Amazon basin, the Cotahuasi and Colca canyons (the two deepest canyons in the world), the Misti and Chachani volcanoes, the precious Urubamba, Mantaro and Huaylash valleys, the Mangroves in Thumbes, the beaches of Piura, the Ballestas Isles, the Titicaca lake, the cloud forests of the north, and the high peaks and glaciers of the Andes, among many other places.

A wide variety of peoples, nations and civilizations have lived and interacted with these places. Major civilizations as the Moche, the Nasca, the Tiwanaku and the Incas have left their marks in the country. In contemporary Peru there are more than 50 different peoples, including the Quechua and Aymaras in the Andes and the Shipiboo, Awajun and Ashaninkas in the Amazon region. They share Peruvian society with afro-descendants, Andean and Amazonian migrants in the bigger coastal cities, mestizo populations, and the descendants from European and Asian migrants (and colonizers in the first case). Within these groups and their daily intercultural interactions live multiple dreams, desires, and plans for the future of the country. They are inspired by individual and collective points of view based on gender, class, ethnicity, culture, and historical memories, which include suffering and happiness, domination and struggle, despair, and hope.

In spite of this enormous diversity and the presence of a wide variety of comprehensions and practices of development, colonial and republican history has been dominated by the idea of development as economic growth based on the exploitation of the country's natural resources (and of the popular classes, of women and of non-white populations). Hegemonic discourse effectively produced other visions of development as "backward and ignorant", and naturalized the incorporation of Peru in the world economy as exporter of its primary resources.⁵

The mining industry has played a crucial role in this development model, with deep consequences for society. Anthony Bebbington analyzed the contribution of mining to Peruvian developed as follows: "[...] the consequences left in the modern history of mining are both socio-economical and environmental. It is difficult—one could say impossible—for the mining sector to identify one locality in Peru where the expansion of mining led to significant human development for the local population" (Bebbington 2007a, 7). A future based on the current development model in Peru, and of the role of mining within this model, is especially worrying in the context of global warming and progressive ecological destruction, in combination with the absence of effective public policies to protect the environment, distribute water, transform the economy, and protect communities and urban populations from the consequences of the extractive industries.

In the interviews done during this study, social leaders and most analysts agree that the tendency of continuous expansion of mining projects and concessions throughout the country, in spite of growing criticism, rejection, and social conflicts provoked by these projects and their consequences, leaves only two future paths. Either the Peruvian state and elites will continue to impose the current extractive model at any cost, which will imply social polarization, and growing conflict, repression and authoritarianism or democratic control over the political and economical decisions over the future of Peruvian society will be reestablished, on the basis of the recognition of the diversity of development models and ways of life present in Peruvian society. Within such a social, economical, ecological and cultural democratization, environmental and indigenous organizations, and the communities and populations affected by the extractive industries, should play a crucial role.

⁵ See Arturo Escobar (1995) on the discourse of development, and Paulo Drinot (2006) on the implementation of this discourse on Peru.



Global Greengrants Fund: contributing to a counter-globalization

Greengrants makes “small grants to grass roots groups around the world working to help people protect the environment, live sustainably, preserve biodiversity and gain a voice in their own future.” Since 1993, over 5000 grants have been made around the world, contributing to a “globalization with a heart.” And, in fact, this work offers an antidote to the excesses of corporate globalization. The better we can link this community, the better we can reckon with the environmental and social challenges of the twenty-first century.”⁶ Grants are recommended by environmental leaders based on their knowledge of local groups, networks, and issues. Therefore several regional advisory boards (including one in the Andean region) have been founded to identify and decide which projects will be supported. These regional advisory boards are complemented by global advisors, who use their global networks to support these struggles from an international perspective.

Greengrants has been engaged with the efforts of Peruvian populations and communities to cope with the negative impacts of mining projects in their individual and collective lives, or even to construct alternatives to the current hegemonic development model on local and/or national scales, through the approval of 43 grants over the last 10 years (out of a total of 104 grants to Peruvian organizations). This study analyzes how these small grants enter in wider social movement strategies to respond to the expansion and impact of the mining industry. The impact of Greengrants projects in Cajamarca and La Oroya was evaluated, as well as the impact on the grantees who received the small grants. In the final stage of the research, some grants approved in the northern department of Piura were also reviewed, as some of the principal struggles against mining have taking place there.

At the same time, the research looked into the possibilities and conditions for the formulation of a Greengrants strategy to create a more profound impact and deeper coherence in its small grants program. The main working hypothesis for the research—defined in dialogue with Greengrants—was that *small grants improve the capacity of civil society to (a) respond to changing strategies of mining companies and the state to impose a mining project or demobilize civil society criticism to existing projects; (b) promote lasting changes in mining policy; and (c) advance communities’ own alternative development strategies.* Additionally, the assumption was made that small grants tend to be used more effectively in defensive struggles (react to the initiatives of companies and/or governments), but less so in offensive struggles (initiatives to deepen autonomy of communities, incite legal change, or apply alternative socio-economic activities). However, when small grants reply to midterm strategies for concrete conflicts, and more so to wider strategies for the mining sector, the small grants can strengthen these offensive struggles as well.

Research Questions

Based on the main hypothesis and assumptions a number of research questions emerged to delineate the boundaries of the study:

- How, if at all, has Greengrants contributed to strengthening local, national, and international movements to reduce the impacts of mining? To what extent do individual grants make sense, if they are not related to wider strategic visions or a mid-term follow up of a concrete conflict?
- How do small grants enter within wider social movement strategies? How do they relate to bigger grants?
- To what extent and in what ways can Greengrants small grants intervene in national political discussions and struggles around mining?
- Can one-time grants contribute to the construction of alternatives?

⁶ These quotes come directly from the Global Greengrants website.



- To what extent do the theories of change of Greengrants and its counterparts in Peru coincide? What changes in the Theory of Change of Greengrants are suggested by the cases?
- How can local actors be more involved in the development of Greengrants short term strategies?

Methodology and the organization of the report

The working hypothesis and research questions have been discussed in almost 50 interviews with former and current responsible persons at Greengrants, the counterparts that received the small grants, political analysts, researchers, leaders from national social organizations and local communities, the Yanacocha mining company, state officials, and directives from leading NGO's and civil society networks specialized in mining (see Appendix 2-A). Two sites were visited in both Cajamarca and La Oroya, including the Cajamarcan communities of Porcon, San Marcos, Chorapampa and La Pajuela that were directly affected by mining. A series of previous interviews in Ayavaca (Piura) were taken in account in the study as well. The conclusions were presented and discussed in a final workshop in Lima that contributed enormously to the final draft. Specifically, the final workshop discussed the distinction between emblematic and strategic cases, with the necessity and difficulties of generating alliances and with wider Greengrants methodology.

The final report is divided in five parts. First, I will briefly analyze the context and reality in which Greengrants small grants have tried to intervene over the last years. In the second part, I will evaluate the impact of small grants in the concrete cases of Cajamarca and La Oroya. In the third part, I will present some of the principal tendencies in the current scenario that have come up in the interviews, and are relevant for the future work of Greengrants. In the fourth part, I will present some ideas on the future work of Greengrants, identifying possible strategic priorities, and engaging with the discussion on how to define strategy in an organization as Greengrants (this is based on the interviews, internal documents of Greengrants, and my own analysis of the cases. It wasn't part of the original project, but emerged during the research). Finally, in the fifth and last part of the article, I will present some conclusions and recommendations, referring to the initial working hypothesis and research questions as well as some provocations for further debate within Greengrants.

Finally, I am deeply grateful to all the interviewees, especially to the Grufides team who did a great job in receiving and helping me during my visits to Cajamarca, to Liliana Carhuaz from MOSAO who was very helpful in the organization of the visits to La Oroya, and to Cesar Padilla and Chris Allan who have been great (and patient) in accompanying the process. Martin Scurrah's profound revision of the document allowed more precision in its arguments; he pointed correctly to the necessity of emphasizing the potential of alliances for both Greengrants and Peruvian social movement organizations. Reinhard Seifert also contributed important critical comments. I'd also like to thank Valeska Ruíz who assisted with the research in a crucial way, recollecting literature and doing interviews for the La Oroya case; Diego Saavedra who organized the presentation of the first draft and gave insightful feedback on the discussions during the workshop; CooperAcción and Raúl Huerta for the preparation of the map; and Alison Wright at the Greengrants office for her quick replies to solicitations for information. Finally, I think it is very important that an organization like Greengrants wants to evaluate its work and is open to the opinions and ideas of its counterparts. Unfortunately this is often not the case in the world of philanthropy and cooperation. In my opinion this alone shows the importance of Greengrants and their work, which will only increase in the coming years and decades. It is also part of a reconsideration of traditional north-south relations within the cooperation sector and towards the comprehension of transnational social movement networks in which socio-political actors from the Global South play a crucial and leading role.



Overview of Mining Related Struggles

The commitment of GreenGrants to the *building of social movements in response to extractive industries* implies more than just the defense of populations affected by mining or a commitment to leveling the asymmetries between these populations and the mining companies. As the opening quote of Pablo Sanchez suggests, social conflicts emerge from problems, conflicting interests, and inequalities in society. At the same time, these conflicts contain the desire for social change and the possibility of the emergence of socio-politically active people able to construct these transformations. This section explores the complex reality of mining, development, and social movements in Peru.

Mining in times of neoliberal globalization



In 1992 a new cycle of expansion of the exploitation of natural resources started in Peru, facilitated by the neoliberal reforms implemented by the Alberto Fujimori government. Fujimori's structural adjustment program included the massive recognition of privileges for transnational companies that made the so-called *mining boom* of the nineties possible. The reforms minimized juridical protection of territories (principally communitarian properties) and optimized the incipient environmental, political, and social conditions for investments in extractive industries in Peru. The combination of these policies, favorable prices at the international market for minerals and precious metals, the necessity for the mining industry to explore new frontiers for its activities to amplify its reserves, and the access to new technologies for the

exploitation of minerals all attracted large investments to Peru. This attraction caused the spectacular growth of mining concessions from 2.26 million hectares in 1991 to more than 15 million in 1997.

The Fujimori policies aimed at a rapid integration of the Peruvian economy in the global market, through the reorganization of society, politics, and space based on the interrelated logics of transnationalization and privatization. As the extractive industries played a fundamental role in this project, Peru's historical integration in the global market as exporter of its natural resources was confirmed. The neoliberal reforms started by Fujimori were consolidated and deepened after the return to electoral democracy by the Alejandro Toledo and Alan Garcia Perez governments. Under the current Garcia government new legal reforms have been proposed to facilitate the privatization of communal property, though most of these had to be cancelled after strong protests in the Peruvian Amazon.

Currently, mining represents around 60 percent of Peru's exports, 6 percent of its GDP, and receives around 15 percent of foreign direct investment. In 2010 the mining concessions reached more than 19 million hectares. Already in 2001 research indicated that due to the expansion of mining throughout the country, 3326 legally recognized communities out of a national total of 5680 had parts of their territories occupied by concessions to mining companies. The combination of the rapid growth of the mining sector, the incapacity (and lack of political will) of successive governments to have the state regulate economic life, protecting human rights and the environment, and the continuity of the repressive side of state activities to back up mining projects led to a large series of incidents that affected the environment, human health, and communitarian life in different parts of the country: the spilling of mercury around the Cajamarca village of Choropampa affected the health of its inhabitants permanently; hundreds of people with elevated levels of heavy metals in their blood in La Oroya, Cerro de Pasco, and Callao have been recorded; accessibility of water sources around the country has been reduced while other sources have been contaminated; and finally, at least seven social leaders critical of mining projects in the North of the country have been killed by the police or in unclear circumstances. These are only some of the worst cases



in the country.

The systematic violations of the social, cultural, environmental, and political rights of Peruvian citizens by mining companies in compliance with the successive Peruvian governments in recent years has caused a progressive growth of social conflict, criticism and protest throughout the country. According to the monthly reports of the National Ombudsman, the so-called socio-environmental conflicts have become the principal source of social conflict in the country; within them conflict related to mining represents about 70 percent of the total. Motivations for the mining conflicts are diverse. They vary from the demand for bigger participation in the (economic) benefits of the industry or for



compensation for health or environmental damage caused by the projects, to the direct resistance against (new) mining projects by potentially affected populations. Generally, the dispute over the control and management of natural goods between mining companies and local populations has been a central element of conflict. In some cases, like Mount Quilish and San Marcos in Cajamarca, Tambogrande, Ayavaca, and Huancabamba in Piura, local communities and populations succeeded—at least temporarily—in stopping mining plans that would affect their way of life.

The Peruvian government and the mining companies' responses to these conflicts have varied from ignoring the protests and problems related to extractive activities (passing by the application of mechanisms for auto regulation by the mining companies, justified by the discourse of corporate social responsibility and the organization of inefficient dialogues after the escalation of conflict) to the intimidation and harassment of social leaders (including the use of violence by police or private security forces) and the criminalization of protest. Neoliberal reform was accompanied from its start by the construction of a juridical framework to illegalize and repress protest against its consequences. The criminalization of protest has led to hundreds of formal charges presented against social leaders and environmental activists around the country, including charges for terrorism, kidnapping, extortion, and inciting violence. Also, the police and private security force violence, following, and intimidation of activists and social leaders has led to several deaths, as well as a climate of fear and confrontation in some of the major conflict areas.

The legal persecution of protesters and activists is being backed up by a highly aggressive public discourse applied by Peruvian national media and politicians, accusing critics of the practices of extractive companies of being conspirators against development, agents of foreign interests, or simply backward and ignorant people. President Alan Garcia himself wrote several articles during 2007 in which he insisted on international investment as the only alternative for national development, which “gives value” to otherwise “lazy” territories throughout the country. He also stated that the principal obstacles to this “development” are the critics of this model: “this is where the anti-capitalist communist of the nineteenth century disguised as protectionist in the twentieth century, is changing his appearance once more in the twenty first century, to become environmentalist. But always anti-capitalist, against investment, without explaining how, with poor agriculture, one can reach higher development” (Garcia 2007).



Understanding neoliberal restructuring and the impact of mining

To fully understand the impact of mining in times of neoliberal globalization, it is crucial to understand neoliberal capitalism as a project for the integral reconstitution and reorganization of our societies in the service of the global market. Neoliberal transformation is shaped and enforced by the principal global political actors including powerful states, multilateral institutions, transnational companies, and elites from the Global South. It aims at reorganizing national and local space through the creation of legal regimes and politics that facilitate their integration in transnational networks of investment, production, and commerce. This legally guarantees the imposition of the logic of the market without regulation (which sees economic growth as the only indicator of development) over the logic of democracy (the practices and procedures which allow the formation of decisions on the future of our societies out of its diversity of interests and understandings of development and well being). This has deep implications for contemporary society.

In the new geography of power (Sassen 1996) of the globalizing world, sovereignty is shared in transnational networks formed by supranational institutions, stock markets and investment flows, transnational companies, mass media, and national states. This process does not necessarily (or only) mean the weakening of the state, but should be interpreted more as its incorporation in new configurations of authority on a global level, which equally serves the interests of global and national elites.

In the case of mining in Peru, this means a strategic retreat of parts of the state, allowing mining companies to become a source of sovereignty superior to the power of local communities or municipalities, backed up by the repressive force of the state. The restructuring of markets also opens up the possibility for the negotiation of (and confrontation over) the use and organization of local spaces between different actors, as happens in the mining conflicts. One of the principal consequences of these processes is that economic actors have come to hold rights around the world. Saskia Sassen (1996) states that a kind of *global economic citizenship* has been shaped through international treaties, free trade agreements, and the transformation of the national state. This development protects the rights of companies, and has not been accompanied by sufficient legislation to protect fundamental human rights by determining a kind of global human citizenship. The radical neoliberal reforms started by Fujimori, consolidated by Toledo, and deepened in the second García administration, in this sense imply the reorganization of the legal system and state administration to facilitate and protect international investment and neoliberal reterritorialization (see: Pinto 2009). One lawyer interviewed in this study identified a clear example of this logic: “In Peru there are mechanisms to question and object to any kind of administrative actions realized by the State, except for the decision to give land in concession to a mining company, or approve the right to exploit land”.



Box 1: Doe Run in La Oroya – Legacy and continuity of state irresponsibility

The city of La Oroya is located in the central highlands of Peru, 176 kilometers from Lima, at an altitude of 3750 meters above sea level. Here a smelting operation, with the highest chimneys of South America was founded in 1922. La Oroya was considered a strategic place by the Cerro de Pasco Corporation for the smelting of lead and copper and for the refining of zinc. In consequence of decades of processing of minerals, currently the local population is suffering enormous risks and damages to their health (Pajuelo 2005). A study by Saint Louis University confirmed that the wide majority of the population has extremely elevated levels of heavy metals in their blood. The American Blacksmith Institute qualified La Oroya in 2006 as one of the ten most contaminated cities in the world.

North American company Doe Run has been the owner of the complex since 1997, but has not implemented the *program for environmental adaption* (PAMA) agreed on by the government to improve the environmental and human health situation in the city. Since 2004, the Ministry of Energy and Mining repeatedly gave permission for delays of the implementations of this program.

Also in 2004 the Constitutional Court supported the demand of the local Movement for Health (MOSAO) that the Ministry of Health had to develop an emergency health plan to resolve the damages suffered by the local population. As this has not led to government action, the MOSAO presented a case to the Interamerican Commission for Human Rights in December of 2004, which solicited the Peruvian government precautionary measures to protect “the lives, physical integrity and health of the local population.” Due to financial problems Doe Run announced in 2009 a period of austerity during which the activities at the operation have been reduced and finally paralyzed. It is unclear, if, when, and under what conditions the operation will restart its activities, but health damage persists.

In spite of the whole situation, the Doe Run company counts on strong support from the local trade union and the biggest part of the population, as the town’s economic life depends heavily on the operation. Although, the MOSAO is not opposing the smelting operation, they have been attacked fiercely by both the company and the trade union. The climate of polarization and harassment towards the MOSAO has reduced the number of people and organizations involved in the movement. Ramon Pajuelo, himself from La Oroya, stated that the solution of the situation requires attending to both the labor and economic worries of the biggest part (if not all) of the local populations, as well as the protection of the environment and human health.

Anthony Bebbington (2007b) analyzes how the expansion of mining leads to conflict between two geographical projects: one based on mining, and the other on a variety of productive, social, and cultural activities. In the sites where mining projects end up defining the use of local space, the relationship within the groups of people living in a place, their relationships to the principal economic networks, as well as their relationship with these places change profoundly.



Box 2: Mining in Cajamarca – Inauguration and experiments with a “new” mining model

Cajamarca is the capital of the department with the same name, located at approximately 560 kilometers from Lima, in the Northern Peruvian Andes, at an altitude of 2700 meters. Although in some parts of the department (like Hualgayoc) mining has taken place for centuries, the local society and economy have been dominated historically by agriculture and farming. Therefore the start of the Yanacocha mine in 1992 marked a new moment in Cajamarcan history and in the history of mining in Peru.

The mega project—currently financed by the American Newmont Mining Corp., the Peruvian Buenaventura and the International Finance Corporation from the World Bank—was the first mining project facilitated by the neoliberal restructuring implemented by the Fujimori regime. As such, it represents an experiment for the mining boom that emerged in the nineties and for the relations of these “new” transnational mining projects with local communities and populations. This relationship has been conflict-ridden, as most studies indicate, with massive mobilizations against the exploitation of the Quilish mountain (2004) at one of its peak moments.

Currently, Yanacocha is the biggest gold mine in Latin America, and there are plans to expand its activities in different parts of Cajamarca. However its activities remain controversial, as conflicts over land, access to water, work at the mine, and indemnification for damages to health and the environment persist. Over 40 percent of Cajamarcan territory has been put in concession to mining companies, including most of the worlds principal companies, like Anglo-American, Rio Tinto and Vale.

Some of the principal studies on mining in Cajamarca characterize societies’ response to mining as “social conflicts without social movement” (Meléndez 2009), or as “weak social networks with a high perception of damage” (De Echave 2009a). However, at the same time, the conversion of current mining concessions in actual exploitation has proven highly complicated, including in the case of Yanacocha. In sites like San Marcos and Cerro Quilish mass mobilization impeded—at least until now—new mines being exploited.

This apparently paradoxical situation reveals on the one hand the fragmentation of local civil society (partly due to the affiliation of local leaders and organizations to competing political parties) and the difficulties of maintaining continuously active shared platforms and organizations, and on the other hand, the persistence of organizational networks with the capacity to articulate demands and agendas in situations of crisis. Among the organizations leading this conflict are local defense fronts (who unite organizations), community and farmer organizations (including the famous *rondas campesinas*), backed up by environmentalist and human rights NGOs (some of whom emerged from the conflicts themselves, like Grufides).

Simultaneously, Cajamarca is one of the departments where the repression, intimidation, and violations of the rights of critics of neoliberal mining has been fiercest, indicating the enormous interests at stake in the region.

Mining activity requires the conversion of enormous amounts of land previously used for agriculture by local communities into the actual mine and the infrastructure needed for its operations. In the negotiations for the purchase of lands, many difficulties have occurred around the country (especially in Cajamarca) including corruption, the violation of the collective rights and procedures of communities to decide on the use of their territory, the division of the community into several factions with differentiated relations to the company, payments far inferior to market prices, and the intimidation of those unwilling to sell their lands.



In many cases disputes emerge between local communities and the mining project on the access to, and use of, water and land) as the pressure on these resources increases enormously (as in the cases of Porcon and La Pajuela. Interviewees confirmed these problems generally end up negatively affecting the relations among the inhabitants and the way of life of local communities. The impact includes the weakening of solidarity, collective practices in the community, and the migration of part of the local population.

Simultaneously, most interviewees indicate the entrance of large mining companies also alters the political, legal, and economical system. On the one hand, the combination of neoliberal national reforms, a clientelistic political culture, the institutional weakness of local governments, and the enormous economic resources and political power of big transnational companies restructure local and national institutions in different ways to accommodate the companies. Consequently, the interests of the companies are favored over the rights of local populations, as is explained insightfully in a scientific report on the Rio Blanco case:

Looked at in the cold light of day, then, we are confronted by a situation in which: the Ministry responds to the demands and concerns of the company, not those of the local populations; the Ministry respects the concession rights of the company, but not the surface rights of the communities; the Ministry responds to the company's project plan and not the local governments' development plans; the Ministry ignores complaints submitted by the communities but decides to recognize the company's surface rights; the courts have brought legal action against members of the local population for protesting and damaging property (finding some guilty and placing them on suspended sentence), but the courts have not found anybody guilty for the killings of two peasants; the police has defended the exploration camp, against rural people; and the Ministry, to all intents and purposes, dismisses the findings of the Defensoría del Pueblo, arguably the most neutral actor in this whole conflict (Bebbington 2007a, 51)

At the same time, the economic, technological, and political resources of mining companies generate enormous expectations in local populations (and a lot of times even in municipalities) in terms of the redistribution of economical benefits and the participation of companies in the construction of local infrastructure such as roads, schools, etc.

Finally, the local economy, infrastructure and services are reorganized on the basis of the needs and requirements of the company (people start working for the mine; communal companies are founded with the help of the mine to organize services to its operations; new roads redefine the infrastructure of a place). As such, new socio-economical networks are formed in dependence on the mining company. La Oroya might be one of the clearest examples of this dynamic as the urban and demographic development of the city has been defined almost completely by the mining industry.

All the described processes make the mining companies a new source of sovereignty in localities throughout the country, as their projects and interests end up defining a large number of decisions on the future of these places. Therefore, mining companies play a crucial role in the neoliberal capitalist restructuring of society. This transformation of local places is evaluated in very distinct—and even opposite—ways by the different actors involved in these processes.

In the documents of the mining company and in interviews with its officials, it is stated that Yanacocha aims to contribute integrally to local development through the modernization of the local economy. Therefore the original paradigm of social assistance has been transformed into one of promoting sustainable development as part of a private contribution to the struggle against poverty in which the company collaborates with civil society and the state. Apart from the obvious expansion of mining activities throughout the region as the principal economic activity, this implies the transfer of knowledge to local populations to improve their life and the foundation of communal enterprises related to the mine.



Yanacocha officials interviewed stated that mining is the only real economic option for the development and the modernization of Cajamarca.

Box 3: Mining and women – bigger impact and crucial role in resistance and alternatives

The consequences of mining and its restructuring of society have a differentiated impact in different groups in society. The research, for example, clearly suggests that gender roles tend to change under the influence of mining projects. As the benefits of mining tend to accrue to men, women deal with its negative consequences due to their role as caretakers in society. Women are thus especially affected by mining projects as eloquently summarized in a study on the impact of mining on women in the localities of San Mateo de Huanchor, Callao and Choropampa:

The lack of environmental security in these three localities provoked damages to the health of women, and to their traditional role in local communities (as collectors of water and food, providers of care and caretaker of the children), it incremented their working load (generating stress, tiredness and fatigue), and intensifying problems of poverty, discrimination and violence. As such, apart from their general precarious living conditions have to confront situations of insensibility, discrimination and injustices (Bastidas 2009, 283).

At the same time, women play a crucial role in the development of alternatives to mining and in the organization of resistance. Interviews evidenced that women tend to be the first to identify the consequences of a mining project, and their role as caretakers forces them to look for solutions to the problems they face. This gives women a crucial perspective in the elaboration of projects for alternative development in communities affected by mining as well.

Around the country, women have also played a role in organizing and leading social organizations (both Cajamarca and La Oroya cases are clear examples of this). However, women leaders face adverse responses, as in many social organizations women leadership is questioned, as it subverts existing patriarchal relations within society.

On the contrary, critics of the mining industry state that this comprehension of development is simplistic and ethnocentric, as it doesn't do justice to the diversity of peoples, cultures, spiritual beliefs, and economic practices that compose Peruvian society. They state that mining activity and in general the concentration of capital cannot coexist with agricultural activities and/or communitarian life. Therefore local leaders from places as different as San Marcos, Tambogrande, and Ayavaca affirm they act in defense of a local proper development model, which would be put in danger by mining projects in their territories or lands. These leaders, supported by many analysts, state that development based on agriculture is more sustainable, democratic, and inclusive than mining exploitation, at least with adequate government support, which is based on the exploitation (and destruction) of nature and the concentration of capital in a few hands.

Mario Palacios goes as far as understanding the expansion of mining projects and concessions around the country as an example of genocide: "Genocide[s] are the practices that make the reproduction of a people and its culture impossible. Usually by mass murder, as happened in Peruvian history with the indigenous peoples. Although in the case of mining the indigenous are not massively killed, the projects do attack our way of life, and eventually make our existence as peoples impossible".



Although most interviewees agree that the co-existence of agricultural activities and a mining projects is difficult, if not impossible, in several sites, communities already live within the sphere of influence of mining companies. Therefore their demands and relationships with the mining company are different and include conflicts over the access to water (Porcon and La Pajuela); just prices for the purchase of land (La Pajuela); respect for the communitarian culture, practices, and authority (Negritos); indemnification and reparation for health and environmental damages (La Oroya, Choropampa, La Pajuela and Porcon); access to work and the economical benefits of the mining activities (La Oroya and La Pajuela); access to jobs in the mining company; and the full respect for human and political rights (all cases).

Beyond these problems and violations (about which local communities have presented several legal demands with the help from Grufides) interviewees agree that the mining companies assume authoritarian (and even racist) attitudes in their interaction with the communities. Most leaders have suffered police or security violence and several have been sued in cases related to their opposition to the mining projects. The indignation about this treatment, and the asymmetrical power relations it reveals, is for most—if not all—interviewed leaders one of the principal reasons to insist on their criticism of the mining projects and its consequences.

What is at stake: Development, territory and democracy in dispute

There are two fundamental ways of analyzing the problem described in the previous pages and defining strategies of intervention afterwards. On the one hand, one can insist in the necessity of creating legal and political frameworks that allow the supervision of mining companies, which guarantee the rights of affected populations, minimize and supervise damages to the environment, and distribute mining's benefits in a just manner. These mechanisms currently do not function adequately or do not exist, and are therefore a first condition for organizing the extractive industry sector within a proper liberal framework.

An alternative perspective—which will be assumed in this study—questions the dominant conception of development, on the basis of the structural tension between economic expansion and the limits to growth in terms of sustainability, social, cultural, and ecological justice (Martinez Alier 2002). Such a perspective allows an understanding of the social conflicts provoked by the neoliberal restructuring of society and territory, of which mining expansion is a crucial dimension, as the continuity of historical processes of negotiation with local and national elites in which marginalized local populations try to improve their position in society, transforming their territorial, economical and political organization. In many interviews it was stated that the mining companies simply have taken the place of large land owners as an all-powerful elite in local contexts. Thus, within these conflicts, the organization of the state, territory, democracy, and development itself are at stake.

The existence and continuity of this developmental model, its territorial and societal organization based on the concentration of capital, the fragmentation of society and its collectivities, and the exploitation of nature, requires constant economic expansion and reproduction in places with differentiated potentials for resistance and negotiation. Therefore concrete conflicts and resistance become important. In some of these conflicts, possibilities for other developmental, societal and territorial models emerge. In all of these conflicts the organization of society and territory itself are at stake and are being negotiated. Anthony Bebbington (2007b) therefore talks of “glocal” conflicts as the production of place happens at the same time in international, national and local spaces, making the construction of transnational networks of crucial importance. In some cases (like La Oroya) national and international networks can compensate the highly difficult circumstances for local actors. It is in this dispute on development and its terms, practices, and narratives that Greengrants intervenes.



Ten years of Global Greengrants in Peru

Over the last ten years, Greengrants approved 43 grants to projects related to the impact of mining on Peruvian society (eight in 2010 and 2007, seven in 2008, and five in 2009 and 2005). The grants represent a total investment of 182,732 USD (see Appendix 2-B). The 15 grants related to Cajamarca, 7 related to La Oroya (one of them related to both), and some specific grants (17, 19 and 38), are considered in this chapter in order to evaluate the impact of Greengrants' work in Peru.

In general, Greengrants methodology supports communities in an impressive variety of activities and over an enormous geographical range. One of the principal approaches to grantmaking articulated in the internal documents of the Andean Advisory Board might be the idea of contributing to “informed activism” as opposed to opportunistic and ideologically inspired activism. Greengrants has supported an “informing activism,” as most grants combine the strengthening of social movements with consciousness-raising on environmental issues in wider society.

The direct link between grassroots social organization, public debate and environmental awareness, and the construction of political proposals as necessary conditions for political change sustains the general work of the organization. The Greengrants theory of change considers the possibility of strengthening social movements through (i) resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure; (ii) framing and consciousness raising; and (iii) facilitating response to political opportunities. For the sake of this study a fourth category of (iv) the promotion of alternative forms of production and organization was added.

An overview of Greengrants' work on mining

Although most grants respond to several lines of intervention (to start with, all of them respond to political opportunities), they are organized here according to their principal strategies, which give a general understanding of Greengrants' main goals.

Resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure

Almost half (20) of all grants for activities related to mining are invested in the strengthening of social movements, which include the organization of training (11, 13, 16 and 43) and legal defense (11, 13 and 16) for communities and populations affected by mining, the organization of processes for strategic planning and the development of agendas in networks or organizations (1, 36 and 38), the facilitation of the formation of transnational activist networks (42), security measures for threatened activists (16 and 18), and the systematization of processes of struggle (19).

Framing and consciousness rising

Another 18 grants are related to framing and consciousness raising, which includes the training of social leaders and activists from Cajamarca in filming and video editing (3 and 34); the elaboration of videos on mining (3, 34, and 39); research (8, 16, 31 and 40), local (17 and 28), national (10 and 40) and international (26) awareness campaigns, including informative materials, public forums and workshops. This line of intervention includes the construction of rigorous knowledge that strengthens social movement arguments, awareness campaigns directed to wider populations to generate public pressure on companies and the state, and consciousness raising of affected populations about their rights.

Political opportunities

Although in a sense all cases respond to the juncture of social conflicts provoked by mining, only four of



the cases reviewed received grants responding to direct and immediate possibilities within the legal or political system. These included legal action against the Doe Run (in the Interamerican legal system) and Yanacocha companies (9 and 18), negotiations with state authorities (33), and a public campaign for “No” against mining in a local referendum (17). In none of the reviewed cases did a grant support social mobilization or street protest (though grant 22 does mention a march to the city of Moquegua).

Promotion of alternative practices of production and social organization

In Cajamarca and La Oroya no grants were approved for the direct development of alternative means of production or social organization. In general, this strategy was applied only in two cases (4 and 5), though in some other cases (12, 14, 17, 21, 23, and 32) one could argue that grants contributed to the creation of conditions for alternative modes of production and organization through community based territorial mapping, the inventory of local natural common goods, the development of local sustainable production in women’s organizations, and the development of official positions on mining in their territories by local populations.

Organizations’ perceptions and use of small grants

- Over these years Greengrants has supported very distinct organizations, including major NGOs like Labor and the SPDA, activist NGOs such as Grufides, national social organizations such as the National Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI⁷), activist groups such as Manos Limpias and Tropicico Seco, regional defense fronts and coordinators such as the Corecami’s and the MOSAO, and even farmer communities and women’s associations on a local level. These organizations manage very different budgets, respond to different organizational structures and strategies, and use and perceive small grants very differently. Bigger NGOs use small grants to respond to opportunities (for example, legal initiatives) or create resources useful to their work (for example, research). Therefore they usually use the small grants within the scope of the projects in development and or to complement other funds within a precise scope of work with clearly identified objectives.
- Activist NGOs like Grufides use small grants to respond to political opportunities, and they perceive them explicitly as a resource to be used to react to the complexity and uncertainty of struggles around mining. They state that development projects alone do not allow sufficient flexibility to respond to the demands of the communities or the initiatives of mining companies, and therefore tend to use the funds to complement their work with activities outside of the logic of other projects in development, for example, by accessing areas and communities outside of their geographical scope or responding to unforeseen circumstances.
- For grassroots organizations, small grants tend to stand by themselves, allowing activities and processes that normally wouldn’t be possible, but that are seen as crucial to the advancement of their struggles. As these organizations tend to work at low costs and do not have access to larger funding, 5000 USD is perceived as a lot of money. Their projects tend to include several activities.
- For networks, small grants offer the opportunity for concrete activities such as meetings or campaigns. Grants tend to respond to clearly identified opportunities, conjunctures, or goals that allow collaboration. At the same time the grants may give life and increased coherence to the network (although the opposite may occur as well, if increased collaboration provokes tensions and conflicts).

⁷ The National Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining is the national representative organization of communities and populations affected by mining in Peru, which was founded in 1999 as the result of a series of meetings of leaders from the principal mining conflicts in the country. Originally the organizational basis of the CONACAMI was regional coordinators of populations affected by mining, called CORECAMIs. Over the last years farmer communities and federations, local defense fronts have been organically integrated into the organization.



- CONACAMI, which combines the dynamic and structure of a representative social organization with the realization of projects funded by development agencies, represents a unique case. Greengrants has primarily supported its regional operations (22, 25, 37 and 38), with only one grant going to the national organization (20, for the systematization of its experience). This strategy enabled local Corecami's to participate in activities for which CONACAMI did not have (sufficient) funding and consolidated local processes with a relative autonomy from the centralized projects and office. The projects that grants supported seem to have followed the more general pattern of grassroots organizations.

Key findings

The following key findings of the study are determined to a certain extent by the delimitation of the research, which was dedicated to the review of the impact of Greengrants small grants on the conflicts around mining companies in La Oroya and Cajamarca. Both cases represent highly complicated struggles in which the defense against powerful transnational companies, and its initiatives, remains the principal logic of the conflict. In some other cases, like Tambogrande and Ayabaca, more offensive dimensions of struggles can be found..

Although the conclusions are not necessarily general conclusions on the functioning of small grants, the work of Greengrants, or social struggles around the impacts of mining in Peru, they do offer information on the strategic decisions and priorities of Greengrants that determine its intervention in mining conflicts in the country.

Impact and success

The wide majority of Greengrants grants have been given to *organizations and communities for their actions in concrete local conflicts*. Grants seek to strengthen groups' capacity for self determination, exercise of their rights, and protection of the environment. Far fewer grants have been directed to national debates or movements to change public policies, or to national or macro-regional organizations and meetings. This implies a bottom up approach to social change, *in which social movement advances, initiatives and victories in concrete conflicts end up transforming legal and political frameworks and national debates on mining*.

Within such a vision of change the *choice of who to support—which actors in which conflicts— becomes crucial*. In the case of mining in Peru, Cajamarca and La Oroya ended up as the two conflicts which received the most Greengrants support (see Box 3). According to the interviews, this strategic prioritization was a consequence of the working experience of both successive Greengrants advisors in these regions, which gave them a clear picture on local actors. At the same time, Cajamarca and La Oroya were seen as two examples of some of the worst practices of mining in Peru and where local organizations consequently needed the most support to increase their capacity to negotiate with the companies. Finally, it was mentioned that both companies shared American roots with Greengrants, although this was not presented as a determining factor.

In general, local advisors play a determining role in this decision making process. They both receive and evaluate proposals and seek possible counterparts working on themes or conflicts that they perceive as strategic. Explicitly, Greengrants relies on the *personal networks of local advisors* for the identification of strategic counterparts and for the access to information, which allows the study of other proposals. Potentially this risks a clientelistic or personalistic use of the small grants by local advisors, and therefore periodic follow up on local advisors—probably by continental coordinators—is required. However, in the



Peruvian case, the careful choice of local advisors, their genuine commitment to the movements, and the periodic review of grant applications in the Andean Advisory Board have supported transparency, efficiency, and commitment to Greengrants interventions on mining in Peru.

Nevertheless, the almost complete reliance of Greengrants strategy and decision-making processes on local advisors *seriously limits the accessibility of Greengrants small grants to organizations outside of local advisors and Greengrants' existing networks*, which especially affects the possibility of grassroots groups outside of established civil society networks to access these small grants. In the Cajamarca case some interviewees therefore argued that crucial rural grassroots actors have not been taken into account by Greengrants.

Simultaneously, one of the main advantages of this approach is *the possibility for Greengrants and its local advisors to take risks*. Since it is nearly impossible for all grants to be successful and since relatively little money is at stake, advisors might engage with projects whose success is unsure, but could lead to significant innovation and the emergence of new actors in crucial conflicts. The cost of support is relatively low, whilst the gains of success can be quite high.



Box 4: Strategic counterparts: Grufides

Although the Greengrants methodology does not necessarily foresee the existence of counterparts who become crucial elements of a local strategy and receive funding repeatedly, in practice, such relationships have emerged from the complex contexts of social conflict. In the study, Grufides, Guarango, and the Movement for Health in La Oroya have stood out as organizations who repeatedly received Greengrants small grants.

The Group for Training and Intervention for Sustainable Development (Grufides) was founded in 2001 by Father Marco Arana and a group of students in Cajamarca. As a pastor in the community of Porcon (located within the influence of the Yanacocha mining company) Arana had seen the consequences of mining and the difficulties of local populations in defending their rights in an adversarial political system. Grufides originally hoped to create a connection between the university and students engaged with the environment, community rights, and affected populations.

Over the years, Grufides has gained local, national, and international fame; the work of the organization and of Father Arana in defense of local communities and the environment has received recognition and several prizes. Consequently, the organization passed through a process of growth and institutionalization, without losing its activist identity. Currently, Grufides could be characterized as a kind of activist NGO working with paid staff and volunteers who have unique connections with local communities and populations in sites like La Pajuela, Porcon, and San Marcos. As such, the organization aims to reduce unequal relations among communities and mining companies through activities like training and systematization processes, legal defense, public campaigns, and environmental supervision and research in which perspectives like gender equity are being developed as well. The organization also follows up on the development of mining in Cajamarca for the national and continental Observatories of Mining Conflicts, organizes public activities, participates in local and regional participatory political processes, and maintains a connection with the university.

The success of Grufides' work also had serious consequences as staff have been victims of continuous harassment, death threats, and surveillance, which provoked a demand of the Interamerican Commission for Human Rights to the Peruvian State to protect Grufides key figures Marco Arana and Mirtha Vazquez.

Greengrants has supported Grufides several times over the years. In the beginning this support represented a large share of Grufides' overall budget, and even saved the continuity of part of its activities in one occasion. In Grufides' history, Greengrants grants have been used for legal defense, public campaigns, capacity building, the development of a communication program, research, and even for security measures when the team was being permanently followed and intimidated. Guarango and DocuPeru, who received separate support for the development of audiovisual materials on mining in Cajamarca and for training in filming and editing, worked with Grufides on their projects.

As the organization has grown, small grants have not lost their importance. On the contrary, key persons at Grufides explained, the small grants allow them to react to unforeseen opportunities or threats, and to do things they would not be able to do with normal financing, but that are demanded by affected populations. Therefore the organization hopes to count on small grants in the coming years as well. The research justifies such continuous support, as the role Grufides currently plays in Cajamarca is highly important and strategic.



Most interviewees agree that small grants by themselves cannot sustain processes of resistance or social transformation of concrete conflicts, as their complexity and continuity require larger and longer investment. The impact and success of the grants should therefore be evaluated in relation to wider social movement strategies, to which they contribute in two strategic modes: (a) through the initiation, strengthening, consolidation or sustaining of *social movement processes*; and (b) by creating *breakthrough moments* in concrete conflicts. Particularly, investment in processes is hard to measure, as its success takes time and depends on general accumulation in struggles. Simultaneously the effectiveness of small grants depends to a large extent on the strength of social movement networks, and their ability to use them properly.

All interviewees agree that small grants *are very important as they cover a range of social movement activities that are usually not funded*, and as such, express a *genuine engagement* with social organizations in Peru. Four types of success—consequences of small grants that contribute to wider social movement struggles—were clearly identified in the research (see Box 5 as well):

- An effective response to political, economic, social, and cultural or media opportunities (or the creation of these opportunities) directly *improves the correlation of forces*⁸ in a conflict (for example: 9 & 17);
- Successful *defense against changing strategies* or new initiatives of mining companies impedes the advance of the mining agenda (for example: 11 & 16);
- The emergence or constructions of *new collaborative relations, synergies or collective strategies* opens up new possibilities for the advancement of social movement (for example: 34 & 36);
- The emergence or construction of *products, proposals, knowledge, or arguments* that allows social movement to advance in the realization of its agenda (for example: 3 & 40);

⁸ The correlation of forces is a concept from Marxist theory and refers to the relation between different forces and powers in a certain context that matter for its development.



Box 5: Strategic counterparts: MOSAO

The Movement for Health was founded in 2002 by local habitants of La Oroya with the support of local and national NGOs working on the environment, human health, and corruption. The organization's vision is to become a civic movement with capacity to present demands, articulate local social organizations, raise awareness, and even negotiate with the authorities on the pressing issues in La Oroya. Originally, a variety of local leaders (several of them related to the church) and some organizations entered the movement that gained immediate relevance in the local context. The NGOs formed a technical body that supported the work of MOSAO, separate from the movement structure of the organization.

Over the years the MOSAO has organized health and public awareness campaigns, demanded government action, and presented legal cases at the national and international level in support of the local population. The principal leaders of the MOSAO also participated in several national campaigns and networks, including the CONACAMI. Greengrants support has been channeled mainly through the integrants of the technical body. The last grant was the first to be recognized directly to the MOSAO, which now concluded its process of formalization.

The conditions for the work of MOSAO have been highly adverse (as described in Box I), including the continuous harassment and intimidation of its leaders and public campaigns against them in the local media. This has caused some of its key figures to leave the organization, and several of the originally affiliated organizations have pulled back from association with it. Although the Movement might be weakened, its very effective legal and communication strategies (also thanks to the technical body) and the absence of other critical actors in La Oroya make the organization crucial in not only the resolution of environmental and human damages in the city, but also in articulating an agenda that highlights the social demands of the population of La Oroya.

MOSAO leaders indicate that small grants are crucial for the continuity of their work. The grants allow them to maintain pressure on the government and the company, as Greengrants support has been used to travel continuously to Lima for meetings with officials from different ministries or follow up on legal cases. At the same time, interviewees stated that small grants might lead the way toward bigger funding for the organization.

Small grants have been *less successful when their aims were too ambitious*, in terms of the goals of a project (too many or too complex for a small project, 31), its geographic scope (for example, national campaigns are difficult to realize with 5000 USD, 10) or its time limits (to less time to realize the activities). Over-ambition seems to have led, in some occasions, to difficulties in concluding a project, or in maintaining its strategic orientation.

One of the main challenges in the struggles around mining in Peru is *the construction and strengthening of alliances between different actors*, as several of the principal organizations working on mining currently have difficulties in collaborating and creating common agendas (like CONACMI and the Red Muqui), while at the same time, the connection of local conflicts and struggles to wider agendas and processes is precarious. In part, these difficulties have their roots in the contemporary history of civil war and the Fujimori dictatorship that left social organizations and civil society networks fragmented and dramatically weakened.

Although some small grants have allowed new synergies (the collaboration between Grufides and DocuPeru is a successful example, see Box 4), *in general terms they have not contributed directly to the*



construction or strengthening of alliances and articulations outside of local conflicts in the reviewed cases. In some cases interviewees showed certain reluctance to involve other actors in projects supported by Greengrants grants.

Theory of change and strategies

Most small grants were used for three principal strategies: (a) facilitating *encounters and networks* between actors; (b) raising *awareness*; and (c) *capacity building*. Just as Greengrants, Peruvian activists, and social leaders insist on the importance of these strategies, they eventually allow the construction of structural change within the country and the movements themselves. Three additional strategies, less present in Greengrants work, were mentioned in the interviews as necessary elements of processes of social and legal transformation: (d) the construction of *economic and productive alternatives*; (e) *mobilization and direct action* (both were mentioned principally by social leaders); and (f) *legal initiatives*, both in court (legal precedents) as in politics (public policies).

Only two out of 43 grants were dedicated to the *construction of alternatives*. As both were outside of the scope of the research and approved quite some years ago, it is impossible to evaluate to what extent small grants can trigger alternative practices of production or social organization. It is clear, however, that this line of strategic intervention *has not been a priority to Greengrants in relation to mining in Peru*.

At the same time, social leaders feel that the construction of economic alternatives (even if at a small scale) are important as they can counter the economic incentives and promises that (a certain kind of) development companies use to divide populations. This line of reasoning suggests that the experimentation with alternative production, distribution, and social organization would be favorable to social cohesion and confidence in the future among affected populations, and therefore to wider struggles. Also, successful experiments increase the autonomy of local populations, serve as examples for other struggles, and contribute to the deeper debate on development.

Although generally larger investments might be needed for this, several interviewees insist that 5000 USD is more than enough for small scale experiments or processes like territorial planning for development by a community. This might especially be the case if these grants relate to already existing initiatives within local populations and organizations.

Non-violent direct action and mobilization have been supported in only one of the cases, although almost all interviewees insist that in the current situation in Peru, *mobilization is—unfortunately— a necessary condition for the transformation of conflicts, implementation of policy change, and the creation of possibilities to participate substantially in decisions* on the future of communities and the environment around the country. Mobilization can alter the logic of a social conflict and its correlation of forces profoundly (and positively) in a relative short period of time.

Some interviewees stated that supporting mobilization also implies risks including: (a) pressures to Greengrants or to its funders not to support “radical” groups and (b) negative media attention for the protests, as Greengrants support could be explained as “foreign intromission” with national affairs. Although these risks do exist (and should always be evaluated), the current necessity for mobilization and the hesitancy of financing agencies to support these activities, Greengrants’ support for protest and non-violent direct action is very important.

Initiatives to generate direct institutional change on mining at the national level supported by Greengrants funding are scarce, and are focused more on legal cases that seek to create juridical precedents (both through the national and international juridical system) than on pressuring the



government for new laws and changes to public policies (as for example would have been possible by supporting the campaign for a law on the right to be consulted for the indigenous peoples).

This, however, does not imply that Greengrants does not have influence in policy change. This influence is indirect, through *contributing to the creation of conditions that allow these changes*, in terms of public consciousness on the problematic and social movements that in concrete conflicts show the necessity and possibility of change through struggle, information and proposals. Conflicts like Tambogrande, San Marcos, or Cerro Quilish for example, have evidenced the necessity of participatory processes of territorial planning.

Box 6: What worked...

If used effectively small grants can support important advances and breakthroughs or impede significant setbacks to larger processes. Some examples of this are:

In 2002 Global Greengrants supported the Guarango film collective (for the first time) to conclude the final production phase of their documentary on the mercury spilling in Choropampa that dramatically affected the health of local populations. This funding was for a crucial phase of a larger budget.

An informed interviewee explained that the video is being used by transnational mining companies to train their personnel on bad practices, and it has been shown at the International Finance Corporation as well.. At the same time, the documentary has been shown dozens (or hundreds of times) at festivals, universities, and public debates in Peru and outside the country. Also through local television networks, and social organizations like CONACAMI (to whom the documentary has been provided), the film has been shown to thousands of people.

The film has had a huge impact due to its quality and the connection of Guarango to Peruvian movements and civil society. It therefore seems to be one of the reasons for the slow (but real) growing awareness of the risks of mining in the Peruvian population. However, it did not lead to the changes the local population had hoped for—in spite of the general appreciation of the film by the critical part of the local community; their situation remains very difficult.

In 2005, after the mobilization against mining exploitation of the Quilish mountain in Cajamarca, the Yanacocha mining company pressured the Canadian embassy to block the NGO Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR) from supporting “anti-mining” organizations in the region, reasoning that their actions would be putting the development of the region in danger. As half of CLWR funding came directly from the Canadian government, the Embassy had leverage over the agency, which led to the immediate cancelation of already committed funding for both Grufides and Adea, NGOs that had emerged from the struggle and played a crucial role in local social movement networks.

As both organizations already planned activities with communities affected by mining, and as the political conjuncture in Cajamarca was in a favorable moment after the popular victory in Quilish, the Greengrants support (11, 12 and 13) was crucial to guarantee the continuity of the processes started by both activist groups. These particular Greengrants projects not only impeded an offensive of the mine against crucial social movement organizations, but actually allowed the consolidation of these organizations (especially Grufides) in a very critical context.



In 2010 Global GreenGrants supported the travel of two social leaders from the San Marcos region and two activists from Grufides to a meeting in Brazil of communities and populations affected by the activities of the Brazilian Vale company. In San Marcos one of the strategic conflicts in the Cajamarca region is taking place, in which local population (especially from the fertile lowlands) oppose mining. The Brazilian company (and local authorities) reacted extremely harshly to this opposition and applied some of the most aggressive strategies seen in Peru, including the hiring and arming of a proper security group, conformed by convicted criminals and a former integrant of an armed insurgent organization to harass and intimidate the local population. These practices have been exposed through Grufides in the national media, which forced the company to assume a more low profile.

The travel to Brazil was very important for the two leaders, as well as for the general struggle for several reasons. On the one hand, Grufides activists confirm that the travel allowed the leaders to escape for a short time during the very stressful local situation that had affected their sense of security. At the same time, it was very important for the leaders not only to see that in other places similar struggles were taking place, but that actually in San Marcos the response of the population was particularly dignified and strong. As such the trip meant an enormous energy boost for the involved leaders and the local struggle in general. Also, both Grufides and local leaders perceive that the trip increased pressure on the Vale company, and in that sense helped to consolidate the—temporary—retreat of the company from the zone.

This approach seems to make sense for two reasons. First, initiatives and campaigns for public policy change still seem to count with relatively sufficient funding from development agencies. On the other hand, the Peruvian government has showed itself to be very resistant to implementing public policies that effectively regulate the mining sector and give legal tools to civil society to defend its rights and protect the environment. Even the most interesting initiatives backed up by international laws and commitments (like the law on the right to be consulted) have encountered fierce resistance (or subtle sabotage) by the government.

Therefore it is unlikely a democratizing transformation of the sector will take place without conditions that force the government to do so. Therefore, several interviewees stated that at this point of time in Peru, resistance against mining expansion seems to be a more direct priority than the creation of alternatives; a lot of proposals do exist, but the current correlation of forces does not allow their implementation. For example, in spite of continuous demands for the implementation of the 169 covenant in Peruvian law by the national indigenous organizations, it was only after the Amazonian uprisings in 2008 and 2009 that a Law on the Right to be Consulted for the Indigenous People was presented, discussed, and approved in the Congress.⁹

Only one of the grants explicitly shows interest in the situation of women in the context of mining, suggesting that *gender relations are a relative blind spot within Greengrants work on mining in Peru*. Possibly discrimination on the basis of gender relations has been considered secondary to ecological injustice, even if the impact of mining on women and girls is far more dramatic than on men and even if women play a crucial role in detecting and denouncing these impacts, in organizing affected communities, and in the construction of alternative practices.

⁹ However final approval and implementation by the government has met several delays, and remains uncertain, evidencing the lack of political will of the Peruvian government of really incorporating indigenous rights within the national legal framework.



Unintended consequences

The effects of small grants are far *more complex than can be foreseen* when one formulates, receives, or evaluates a concrete project application, as the *support intervenes simultaneously in a social conflict and in a social movement itself*. In both cases relations and interactions become modified in multiples ways. New synergies might emerge, power relations change within the conflict and the movement, and even concrete decisions and political strategies can be transformed. One of the concerns stated in the interviews is that the *development of cooperation authorizes certain voices and leaders, possibly creating artificial leadership* that ends up being disconnected from local processes. In some cases, such leaders even become easier targets for cooptation by mining companies.

The cases and interviews suggested three kind of unintended consequences from the Greengrants small grants:

- They provoked encounters and synergies that lasted after the project, and promoted new, stronger collaborations (for example: 3 & 34);
- The management of a project presented a series of exigencies that forced organizations to create a minimum of institutional consolidation (a bank account and legal status), that can be used afterwards, but at the same time, can generate significant delays in realizing the project (this happened for example in 30 and 40);
- The small grants alter power relations and political positions within social movements, as they support, prioritize, and in the end, authorize certain voices, organizations, perspectives and leaders, over others (see box VI);

Although several of the groups supported by Greengrants are regularly pressured or threatened because of their critical position towards the consequences of mining in their regions, *no evidence was found that due to Greengrants support activists or social leaders have encountered more intense intimidation or persecution* than they would have met without the projects. However, several interviewees indicate that this could occur in specific cases, for example if a certain company accessed information on specific projects. On the other hand, Greengrants support allowed for response to security threats to activists in some cases (16 and 18).

Several interviewees—including social leaders and Greengrants advisors—*warn of the effects of funding on grass roots organizations*. These might include the reduction of autonomy and self sufficiency in organizations; the growing dependence of their activities, agendas and perspectives on external funding; internal conflicts and competition on the control of these funds; reduced disposition of leaders to leave their directing positions; and a reduced openness to incorporating other actors, leaders, and organizations in the organization (with whom resources would have to be shared).

However, the research did not find evidence of such consequences in the case of Greengrants small grants. In fact in several cases, activities were realized even before Greengrants funding arrived, due to the demands of a concrete conflict. *It is crucial that Greengrants remains permanently alert on these risks of funding, allowing small grants to contribute to rather than limit the autonomy of grass roots organizations*.

Advantages and risks of small grants

The flexibility and minimum administrative load of small grants make them more compatible *with the*



development of social conflicts and with the working modes of social organizations than regular projects of development agencies, which tend to establish –or impose—conditions on themes, strategies, time lines, and even organizational modes. Consequently, small grants are *perceived more in solidarity with the struggle*, then as development cooperation or philanthropy.

Simultaneously, one of the main advantages of this approach is *the possibility to take risks* for Greengrants and its local advisors. Since it is impossible that all grants are successful and since relatively little money is at stake, advisors might engage with projects whose success is unsure, but could lead to significant innovation, and the emergence of new actors in crucial conflicts, etc. The cost of failure of such initiatives is relatively low, while the benefits of success can be quite high.



Box 7: What also happened...

One of the main types of unforeseen consequences of small grants is their influence in the internal dynamic of social movements. Financial support can alter power relations and favor certain leaders, political perspectives, or decisions. Although such influence can be very positive and important (for example when this favors stronger positioning on environmental or social justice), this potential impact is not always anticipated from the start, as the following two cases show:

In 2007 Tropicico Seco (17) intervened in the conflict provoked by the Rio Blanco project, through the organization of workshops in the Yanta (Ayabaca) and Segunda y Cajas (Huancabamba) communities that shared the experiences of referendums on mining in nearby Tambogrande (where TS leadman Ulysses García played an important role) and in Guatemala. TS shared information on the obligation of companies and states to consult (indigenous) communities on projects that would affect their future and compromise their territories (as recognized by the ILO).

At this point in the conflict, local communities, municipalities, CONACAMI, and accompanying NGOs were discussing if and how to organize such a referendum. The workshops had a major impact on participants (as stated in several interviews in the zone) who were particularly impressed by the experience of Guatemala, where indigenous communities voted in their assemblies according to their proper customs. In the deliberation in the wider social movement network on how to organize the referendum, several community leaders, backed up by CONACAMI, insisted on the organization of a communitarian referendum (like in Guatemala), while the NGOs, part of the communities, and the municipalities proposed the organization of a referendum convoked and organized at the municipal level (with participation of the urban population), as had happened in Tambogrande. After a period of intense discussion, the decision was made to organize the municipal referendum, which resulted in an explicit “no” against mining.

In this case, an individual grant had a tremendous impact on a conflict, as the workshops were highly effective. At the same time they seem to have favored a particular perspective on the conflict and the referendum over another. This effect ended up having a very positive impact on the conflict, as it facilitated the local population’s engagement with the idea of a referendum. However, the workshops could have gone differently, and it is unlikely that Greengrants foresaw its support going to one of the two perspectives on the referendum.

In April 2010 a Greengrants grant (38) supported participation of the Farmer and Indigenous Federation of Cerro de Pasco (FIFCP) in the national congress of the Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) in Lima. The delegates of the Pasco region formed a coalition with the Junin, Ancash, and part of the Lima delegations in support of the candidacy of the president of FIFCP (who also directed the organizing committee) as new president of the organization. Due to the massive presence of delegates from Pasco, and in spite of the participation of a total of 13 regions, the three and a half delegations made up approximately half of all delegates.

This situation contributed to a climate of polarization, mutual accusations (as two out of three former CONACAMI presidents also came from Pasco, other regions denounced the intent to control the national organization), and generalized irregularities, which impeded the election of a new president and generated a series of organizational problems. Four months later a mini-congress was convoked in which Magdiel Carrión, from Ayabaca (Piura), was chosen as new president.

This implied a waste of economic resources, affected personal relations between social leaders, and damaged the public image of the organization. Obviously, these events respond to structural dynamics within the CONACAMI (including regional polarization and internal power struggles) and in no way are responsibility of Greengrants. However the Greengrants grant was one of the elements that contributed to this moment of organizational crisis.



The main worry for some of the interviewees on the small grant methodology is the danger of dispersion in the Greengrants program, as small grants by themselves cannot generate the transformation of local conflicts. According to this argument, Greengrants might end up supporting positive initiatives in concrete local contexts, but *without geographic or thematic priorities or a strategy of articulation of and within these conflicts, the general context of mining in the country will remain unaffected*. Therefore these interviewees advise repeat funding of organizations in prioritized cases or themes.

In fact *most grants are already made as part of a series of grants* (only in fourteen cases one time support has been given), and *research shows that even unique grants* (like 9 and 17, and according to the interviews 30 and 32) can have a significant impact in concrete conflicts and processes, and are usually related to other projects and processes or open up these possibilities towards the future.

Also the Greengrants *approach does (and should) not pretend to sustain or transform conflicts on the basis of small grants, but instead should contribute to wider processes, create possibilities and allow responses to concrete opportunities*. However, the argument presented in 2.3.15 does pose valid questions on how to prioritize in a complex context, like mining in Peru, with never ending-demands, and how to generate progressive advances of these projects. This issue will be dealt with later in this report.

Complementarity with bigger funding

Apart from the relation to wider social movement strategies, small grants also relate to bigger funding. This is especially the case when Greengrants supports national organizations (CONACAMI), bigger institutions (Labor or the SPDA), or activist NGOs (Grufides) who do manage budgets for their activities. Regular funding usually implies the agreement (and/or imposition) of a series of limitations (geographically, thematically, in time, and radicalism) due to the nature of development cooperation.

Greengrants small grants *allowed these organizations to complement the work done with these regular funds*, by:

- acceding geographic areas outside of these projects (16 & 18), including foreign countries (26 & 42).
- realizing specific activities like research, campaigns, or legal cases are crucial to the general projects, but without specific funding (9, 28 & 31).
- responding to unforeseen conjunctures in the conflicts (13 & 16).
- supporting types of activities that are not accepted or incorporated in the regular projects, such as the constant travelling of MOSAO members to Lima to sustain negotiations with state institutions and the company (33) or the participation of activists from Cajamarca in an international network meeting (42);
- creating preparatory activities to projects, like strategic planning, which do not count towards specific funding (36).

A particular kind of complementarity refers to the conjunctures in the world of philanthropy and development cooperation. Both in the Cajamarca case (because of political pressure) as in the La Oroya case (due to the end of the support of a funder) *Greengrants funds were used to guarantee the continuity of processes started with funds from other development agencies*. This might be particularly relevant as funds for the support of Peruvian civil society –and even more so, for its more critical expressions—have been reduced in development agencies over the last years in the context of the financial crisis. All predictions are that this reduction will progressively continue in the coming years.



Interviewed officials of development cooperation agencies also see several ways in which bigger projects and small grants complement each other. These might include *the preparation of bigger projects through a small grant* (that allows organizational learning, as well as strategic planning) and funding for activities that cannot be covered by bigger agencies. At the same time, *bigger projects can give continuity to processes started by small grants*, and are therefore important for the integral socio-economic transformation of the conditions at the basis of mining conflicts.

In spite of the obvious complementarities between different funders, and specifically between small grants and larger projects, *no specific coordination exists between like minded development organizations* like Oxfam America, Jewish Community Service, Greengrants (USA), EntrePueblos, AcSur (Spain), Broederlijk Delen, 11.11.11 (Belgium), Ibis (Denmark), SAL (Sweden), ICCO (the Netherlands) and others. Interviewed officials of these organizations, as well as former Greengrants local advisors, agree such coordination is very useful and might become even more important in the face of progressive reduction of funds for development and social movement action.

Several organizations, including Grufides and MOSAO, expressed that the small grants allowed them to access larger funds, or create conditions to do so afterwards:

- The small grants demand a proper legal status and a minimum administrative capacity that serve for larger projects afterwards (36 & 40);
- The management of a Greengrants grant is converted into a positive reference for new applications;
- Projects and synergies supported by Greengrants might be the basis for larger future projects (for example: 32, 34 & 36);
- Greengrants grants can also be used as the proper contribution of a local organization some development agencies demand as counterpart of their funding, allowing access to bigger funding in which the Greengrants grant becomes embedded;
- Greengrants has also canalized funds for specific organizations, created public visibility for counterparts and facilitated contacts with interested funders, which led to concrete projects, especially in the case of Grufides.

Procedures, strategy definition and administration of Greengrants' funds

Several grants reached the organizations after activities were already completed (for example: 17, 30, & 38) with borrowed money or proper funds. These expenditures were replaced afterwards or new activities that gave continuity to the original project were implemented. In other cases, the requirement to have a proper bank account, and therefore proper legal status, generates delays in the start of certain projects (40).

In general, *very little information exists on Greengrants* and its procedures within the counterparts (usually only present with directing persons), and less with other actors:

- Both counterparts and Greengrants advisors stated the structure of local advisors, regional offices, and a global office in Boulder generates *confusion with whom to communicate, in what phase, and on what issues*. This might be the reason that Greengrants could present a report on their activities on only one of the reviewed projects, in spite of the assurance by several of the grantees that they did present a report.
- *Even for Greengrants advisors, this implies a lack of information* on the advances of approval and money transfer for certain projects.



- It's quite unclear how *projects are followed up after their approval*; as some advisors felt their formal role ends after advising, they do not feel the necessity or authority to assume this role.
- No policy or *practice exists to obtain the products* created with Greengrants support and make them accessible to the general public and/or other actors (both within and without Peru).
- As stated above, the lack of information on funding rounds and procedures makes funds almost *inaccessible for organizations outside of the immediate network of local advisors* and Greengrants in general. This allows a first filter to the enormous amount of demands that exist in socio-ecological conflicts around the country, but also means that interesting new organizations or crucial conflicts might not get to Greengrants. This is especially detrimental grass roots organizations outside of existing networks, which might need Greengrants support most.

Greengrants methodology is built upon a *fundamental tension around strategy making and prioritization, as there are no clear spaces and procedures for periodic fundamental strategic discussion within the organization, nor with strategic actors on the ground*:

- Greengrants officials have argued that the organization does not want to centralize strategy definition, nor define narrow theories of change, as this would seriously limit the capacity and openness to support a wide range of activities by environmentalist groups. Simultaneously, it is stated that strategy should be defined on the ground by grass roots actors themselves, leaving it up to Greengrants to support them. Nevertheless within the Greengrants network, strategic choices and priorities have to be made continuously. Demands for support in socio-environmental conflicts are virtually endless, as the Peruvian case shows.
- The only place where strategy and prioritization are formally discussed is within the regional advisory board, between local advisors, and within annual meetings and periodic virtual meetings to decide on what grant applications to support. However, interviewed current and former advisors agree that the criteria of local advisors on strategy and priorities in “their” country are rarely questioned or discussed. Simultaneously, some of the strategic concerns raised by local advisors have been validated within the regional advisory board as new strategic priorities, as is evidenced by the incorporation of IIRSA¹⁰ as a thematic focus.
- Consequently, the biggest influence on decision making on strategy and grant prioritization within a country is concentrated in the local advisors, whose proposals and perspectives are validated to a certain extent within the regional advisory board.
- This methodology reduces participation of local actors and analysts within strategy making to their informal interactions with the local advisor, which in practice happens continuously. As local advisors are activists themselves, they participate in many social movement meetings and networks, as well as organize or coordinate them.¹¹ A former local advisor also stated that she sought advice regularly from social leaders, NGO officials and analysts on certain conflicts, themes or regions.
- The main arguments and convictions sustaining this methodology put forward by key persons at Greengrants are that (a) it allows a decentralized way of working, as it assumes that decisions should be taken locally, and should not be conditioned by centralized offices that do not

¹⁰ IIRSA is the Initiative for the Regional South American Integration, and consists of a series of huge infrastructural projects (including highways, canals, ports, etc.) to completely interconnect South America. Many of these projects penetrate and damage areas with enormous biodiversity and indigenous territories, causing social, cultural and environmental damages.

¹¹ The local advisor in Ecuador is an excellent example of this. Apart from his responsibility within GLOBAL GREENGRANTS, he coordinates the Latin American Observatory on Mining Conflicts, based in Quito,



understand local realities; (b) the activist identity with local advisors; their position in the Greengrants network as volunteers allow them to understand social movement processes from the inside, and to relate in a democratic and dialogical way with other activists and social movement organizations, increasing the accessibility of small grants; (c) the existing methodology allows a relatively low investment of time and resources so that the largest share of Greengrants funds can be used for the small grants.

- The lack of participation of local actors within strategic orientation of Greengrants was questioned by several of the interviewees. They stated that this could easily generate a bias within the small grants towards certain tendencies and parts of the movements around mining. Although this argument is rooted partially in local political culture of fragmentation and mistrust, without a doubt the reliance on the networks of local advisors generates clear prioritization within Peru, without necessarily being preceded and sustained by a fundamental debate on these priorities.
- In this sense, the problem might not be the choices made (as one key person at Greengrants rightly stated, “supporting one part of the movement, and not another, evidences a lack of resources, not wrong choices or insufficient commitment with the movement”) and even less so the work and commitment of local advisors, but the lack of operating places to discuss these choices previously.

The crucial role of local advisors within Greengrants strategy definition, based on relations of trust and activism, implies a huge responsibility in a rather limited situation:

- Principal limitations for the work of the local advisors are their lack of time (as this is voluntary work) and access to certain localities, which are made up for by personal networks that provide information on possible projects and their posterior impact.
- Although there exists a possibility of a local advisor using small grants in a way that strengthens his or her own position in the movement more than the movement itself, no evidence of this was found in Peru. In general, the careful choices of new advisors and the mechanism of grants being discussed in the regional advisory boards have allowed efficient, transparent, and integral use of grants and secured trust as the basis of the Greengrants network.
- One of the risks for local advisors is that their position within the wider movement changes, as they can be seen as decision makers on the allocation of resources instead of as fellow activists. However, this does not seem to have happened in the case of Peruvian advisors, as both were already linked to financing agencies and highly respected by grass roots groups.
- A former advisor stated that combining a directing position at a development agency with Greengrants work limited his ability to take on initiatives while he didn't want to create any suspicion on favoring OA counterparts or work through Global Greengrants.
- In spite of (incipient) initiatives within Peruvian social movements to create more interaction and networks between the Andean and Amazon regions, it seems unlikely one advisor could cover both regions in Peru. Normally activists tend to prioritize their work in one of the regions, as each has its own complex actors in combination with huge geographical distances.

General evaluation

The research has clearly evidenced the value of small grants for wider social struggles, the positive impact of Greengrants work on the development of social movements around mining in Peru, and the uniqueness of its methodology. The relatively small investment of 180,000 USD has contributed to the construction of social movements and to the development of local conflicts in multiple ways, and in the wide majority of



the cases, with very positive results. Also the evaluation of social organizations, NGOs, and activist collectives that received support from Greengrants small grants is very positive.

This, however, does not mean that small grants can perform miracles and transform or resolve social conflicts around mining, nor does Greengrants claim to do so. Greengrants correctly assumes that this is the task of Peruvian social movements, for which the small grants can be a tool used in wider, long term, and very complex struggles. In this sense the effect and impact of the small grants depend on the strength and ability of social organizations to use them, leaving the task for Greengrants and its local advisors to identify strategic cases, moments, and counterparts with the highest capacity or necessity to do so.

In general terms, the hypothesis that small grants contribute to the capacity of social movements to respond to political conjunctures or changing strategies by mining companies has been confirmed by the research. Individual grants can mark crucial moments in the development of local conflicts, or they can “plant seeds” (Luis Vittor), allowing the start of new processes or synergies in situations that require social movement action. Small grants also allow the construction of resources and capacities that improve the overall social movement ability to influence the development of a conflict.

Less evidence has been found that the small grants allow the promotion of lasting changes in mining policy and the advancement of communities’ own development strategies, which seems to confirm the hypothesis that small grants are *more easily and effectively used for defensive struggles* than for offensive ones. However, this also is a consequence of the particular situation of mining in Peru, in which the correlation of forces dramatically limits the possibilities for offensive struggles. As a result, the strategic priorities of Greengrants favor local grassroots struggles, which take place in very complicated situations. It therefore will be recommended to give more attention (and resources) to the construction of alternatives and offensive dimensions of struggles around mining.

Crucial blind spots in the work of Greengrants on mining in Peru that require attention in the theory of change, strategy definition, and approval of grants are (a) the relation between the impact of mining and gender; (b) the development of alternatives within the communities affected by mining; and (c) the role of direct action, protest, and mass mobilization in processes of social transformation.

Greengrants methodology is quite unique –and might even be seen as a provocation, as a key person at Greengrants stated—in the world of philanthropy and development cooperation as it depends entirely on networks (or communities) of personal relations and trust. The largest share of the decisions on the approval of grants, and the definition of the priorities and strategies that guide these decisions, are basically made in boards of local advisors who themselves are activists embedded in social movement networks in their countries and contribute voluntarily to Greengrants.

Counterparts in Peru have also received grants through Greengrants Global Advisors, and in exceptional cases through funders who donated to Greengrants to support a concrete organization (this happened in the cases of Grufides and La Oroya).

Some key persons at Greengrants stated that contradictions and tensions between global and local networks might occur if the global grants are not consulted with local advisors. However, all Greengrants interviewees agree that important advances have been made on this issue. On the other hand, local actors have no participation in Greengrants strategy definition, thematic, or geographic prioritization or in the approval of grants, other than through their (in)formal relation with local advisors.

Existing methodology allows higher flexibility, lower administrative, easier bureaucratic procedures for grantees, and greater accessibility of Greengrants grants in comparison to projects from the wide majority



of funders (especially the bigger projects). Consequently, small grants are more in tune with the timelines, working modes, and necessities of social movements than bigger projects. Therefore, they are perceived as solidarity grants rather than traditional of philanthropy or development cooperation.

Within Greengrants there is the general idea that strategy has to emerge from the grassroots and that the Fund itself should define strategy as little as possible. This is a bottom up approach in which local advisors play a crucial role. However, this does not at all mean that Greengrants does not constantly make strategic choices: favoring certain types of intervention, conflicts, social leaders, and actors over others are themselves strategic choices. The prioritization of La Oroya and Cajamarca within Greengrants' work—instead of Ayavaca, Tambogrande or Islay—is a clear example of such prioritization.

The tension between the definition of strategies that allow the growth of social struggles (which would probably require prioritization of cases, and possibly reiterate support to some crucial organizations) and the very flexible and decentralized interventions that respond to concrete conjunctures within Greengrants methodology is very real and requires constant discussion. Nevertheless, no sufficient spaces and movements currently exist for this discussion within Greengrants, nor can local actors inform or contribute significantly to its development.

The activist, decentralized, low cost, and quite informal methodology of Greengrants allows for flexibility and a high level of solidarity and engagement with an impressive number of struggles and counterparts around the world. Almost inevitably, it also has a downside in difficulties with administration, follow up on the grants, and internal communications. It is not clear to all involved levels of the organization (and less so to local counterparts) who are the responsible persons for what movement and action in the process of a small grant, and so far no internal tool for the sharing of information on the development of a grant, or of its final products, exists. Of all grants reviewed during this study, Greengrants administration could present a final report for only one case. This problem does affect the capacity of the organization as a whole to know of the results of its work, although no indications were found that this affected the quality of the work done with the grants.

The following sections, as well as the conclusions and recommendations, will further develop the analysis of the work at Greengrants and present some ideas on its further improvement and consolidation.

Mining, social movements and change in Peru: tendencies in the current scenario

The evaluation of the potential for positive transformation of the scenario described in the first section and the definition of strategies that give shape to these transformations require the identification of principal tendencies in the current context. Therefore I'll briefly review (a) the social organizations and civil society groups active around mining; (b) the initiatives of the corporate sector; (c) the actions of the government and different dimensions of the State; (d) and the international scenario, on the basis of the realized interviews.

The combination of the context of widespread social conflicts, the environmental, cultural and social problematic caused by mining projects, and internal processes of Peruvian communities and civil society stands at the basis of the emergence of a variety of **social organizations, collectives of activists, networks and institutions**, as well as new political discourses and leaderships that react to this situation. Within this process new forms of understanding development, democracy, and territory have been taking shape that might generate possibilities for social transformation. However, the politicization and articulation of local conflicts within broader perspectives and discourses, and with other local or national



organizations, remains very difficult, and a major (if not the principal) challenge for the movement around the extractives industries in the country. Some important tendencies in this context include:

- In general a political culture of distrust, confrontation, and pragmatism dominates within Peru. In combination with the persistence of personalist and paternalist leadership, this culture weakens social organizations and civil society networks considerably, as it is difficult to renovate and amplify leadership and the construction of alliances, relationships, and mid- or long-term political projects.
- At the same time, relations between NGOs and grass roots organizations are quite often (but not always) tense. According to Ramon Pajuelo, the power and resources of NGOs are overestimated by themselves, local communities, and the media, generating false expectations among local populations of their transformative potential. The result is often ambiguous and opportunistic relationships. The anthropologist argues that NGOs actually have been occasional allies in concrete conjunctures, and no longer shape discourses or strategies of socio-political interventions of the communities.

Nevertheless, NGOs can contribute to the processes within the communities if they construct complementary relations with the communities on the basis of their resources, capacities, and panoramic vision of socio-environmental conflicts. Pajuelo mentions CooperAcción as one of the NGO's that has succeeded in the construction of such a relationship in Peru.

- Due to a variety of factors in populations around the country, and especially in communities and popular neighborhoods, a reconfiguration of political discourses and identities have taken place in Peruvian populations. Pajuelo identifies an emergent environmental consciousness in the grass roots of Peruvian society to which the work of school teachers has been crucial. At the same time, within communities “the invention of collective resources” such as water and territory, have converted indigenous and farmer communities into principal political actors in contemporary Peru.

The meeting of both discourses seems strategic and crucial for the future, for the notion of community as central in processes of social transformation. In any case, this process explains (in combination with political opportunities due to the return to electoral democracy) the rise of the so-called socio-environmental conflicts.

- The interviewees expressed varying opinions on the role of CONACAMI in the current scenario, as the organization has passed through internal crises over the last years, and lost connection to several of the principal mining conflicts in the country (Vittor 2008). Clearly, in La Oroya and Ayavaca the evaluation of the organization is far more positive than in Cajamarca due to the local history of the organization in each site. However, the organization has developed an important role in public debate, a solid integration in transnational civil society networks, and a critical discourse that questions the roots of hegemonic developmentalism, which allowed that the organization has put important new perspectives and proposals on the political agenda in Peru.

The development of an indigenous identity within the organization remains controversial, as some observers see this as an obstacle to the articulation of a solid position for all the diverse Peruvian populations affected by mining, while others insist that this process allows the development of a



more critical and transformative vision of Peruvian society. In any case, CONACAMI remains the principal national organization addressing the issue of mining, unites a group of interested leaders from different parts of the country, and is linked to a variety of local, national, and transnational networks, which makes it a unique and strategic organization within Peruvian society.

- Other crucial actors in the conflicts around mining are organizations and authorities related to the church. Both in Cajamarca and La Oroya (and also in Piura), the progressive Catholic Church gave legitimacy to the local struggles, facilitated contacts with organizations and authorities in Lima, participated as mediators in tense moments, and offered their infrastructure for the activities of local organizations. But the Church also participated directly through organizations like CEAS, the Vicaría de Medio Ambiente in Jaén, and the radio stations Marañon and Cutivalu with capacity building processes, organizational support, and information on socio-environmental issues. In a very Catholic Country like Perú— in which deep polarization between the conservative church and the tendencies related to the liberation theology exists—religious engagement with social struggles has deep significance.
- Both external observers and social leaders point to partisan and electoral politics as one of the principal obstacles for the strengthening of their organizations. As consolidated political organizations are non-existent in the country (outside of the governing APRA), during election campaigns pragmatic short term alliances are built under the flag of one of the formally existing parties and usually behind local strong men. These alliances often divide social organizations and give more space for the cooptation of leaders by the mining companies (who have great influence in local elections). At the same time, all interviewees agreed that changes in the economic model and political regime are required to transform the conditions in which mining develops. This would include constitutional reform, increased government regulation, and new public policies on extractive industries.

Within the **mining industry** the search for new projects and for the conversion of exploratory projects into real exploitation remains the principal tendency and objective. Although some companies have learned from earlier experiences and developed more intelligent strategies towards the communities (including economic assistance and more communication), José de Echave states that the current context of conflict and widespread skepticism towards mining have affected the ability of companies to start operating projects, reducing the annual growth of the mining PBI. The tension between these two developments seems to define the interaction between communities and companies:

- The private counterpart of the state's politics of criminalization of protest is the growing activity of private security forces working for the mining companies as part of a strategy of shutting down protest and criticism through intimidation and violence. The case of the continuous following, intimidation, and sending of death threats to members of the Grufides team is part of this development. The illegal detention and torture of 28 peasants in the Rio Blanco camp (Piura) by police men and staff of the security company Forza show the close coordination that many times exists between these companies and the security apparatus of the state. As Peruvian law allows police men to complement their income by giving their services to private companies, the company in Yanacocha came to an agreement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs to allow policemen to stay at the company's base in their free time in order to react immediately to possible irregularities around the mining project.



- The rise and growth of Chinese mining companies, interests, and investments—more often than not owned by, or related to, the Popular Republic’s State—in the country presents new challenges to social movement networks, as Chinese companies are less transparent and sensitive to lobbying or media campaigns and haven’t shown any interest in incorporating social responsibility initiatives. The backing of the Chinese state also implies lesser economic vulnerability and a rapid connection to Peruvian government, as the investments reply to geopolitical interests. Resistance against these projects therefore requires other strategies and might be much more difficult.
- In different parts of the country, informal mining is on the rise, resulting in mining projects of different scales outside of government regulation. As such, these projects many times turn out to be more damaging than formal large scale mining. Several interviewees convincingly argue that this development probably is orchestrated by bigger mining companies, as these present themselves as better alternatives to the informal mines.
- According to all the existing research, Peru will be heavily affected by climate change. Among many other things, water will become even scarcer in the coastal and Andes regions. Julia Cuadros states that the areas most affected by climate change are often mining areas, which implies that there will be an intensification of conflict over water between companies and local communities. At the same time, mining companies also know that the progressive impact of climate change might complicate new projects, as local populations will be even more hesitant to risk their land and water access, and therefore might want to accelerate the expansion of their projects even more. The relations between mining and climate change in Peru therefore deserve more research, especially as a large share of mining projects are located at the sources of rivers and water streams.

The **Peruvian government and the largest part of the state apparatus** remain crucial allies of the mining companies. As most interviewees state, all signs point to the persistence of the political will to impose mining expansion unconditionally throughout the country without considering the huge social, environmental, cultural, economic, and political problems around these projects. This implies the continuation and potential deepening of repression and persecution of community leaders and environmental activists. At the same time, among local authorities, more interesting processes have been developed over the last years.

- The Garcia government has widened the legal framework for the prosecution of social leaders and activists over the last years through a series of new laws, which include the creation of conditions for the impunity of integrants of the police and armed forces when they cause injuries or death “executing their duties,” and higher punishments for political actions like road blockades, which under the figure of “extortion” can lead to 25 years of prison (qualified murder is punished with a maximum imprisonment of 15 years). This illegalization of protest is accompanied by more intense auditing of NGOs and quite often fierce police repression of protest marches.
- The most interesting new initiative in the legislation on the extractive industries has been the approbation in the Peruvian Congress of a *Law for the Right to be consulted for the Indigenous and Original Peoples of Peru* in accordance with the Covenant 169 of the ILO, in reply to demands of the national indigenous organizations. However this law has not been implemented



until now, and indicates that the Peruvian government at best is trying to add amendments that will leave the law without its original (though also limited) incidence.

- It is quite unlikely that government policies will change after the 2011 elections, as almost all candidates support the existing neoliberal capitalist model. The most popular alternative candidate, Ollanta Humala of the Nationalist Party, proposes more state regulation and participation in the mining sector without questioning the principle of basing the national economy on extractive industry. However in some departments (including Cajamarca and Junin) and provinces, candidates critical towards existing or planned mining projects have been successful –and in some cases have even won—regional elections. Even in these cases, the margins for alternative politics seem to be very narrow, due to the enormous power of the mining companies and the centralization of political decision-making in the country.
- In spite of all the difficulties and constraints on local and provincial levels, some municipalities have developed interesting initiatives – usually stimulated, and sometimes facilitated, by local and national civil society—to regulate mining activity in their regions. These include participatory processes of territorial planning, the organization of non-binding referendums on mining activities in their zones, and the declaration of protected zones within their territories. Several interviewees therefore argue that the deepening of the political decentralization could lead to the democratization of the governance of the extractive industry.

A final crucial dimension and battleground for the socio-environmental conflicts are **international politics and institutions, and transnational civil society networks**. The tendencies in this terrain also offer political opportunities, constraints, and new dilemmas:

- The Interamerican Commission for Human Rights issued verdicts favorable to the rights of populations affected by mining in five different cases over the last years, and the committee of experts of the International Labor Organization formally solicited the Peruvian government in March 2010 to suspend all exploratory and extractive activities that affect indigenous peoples in the country, until the “participation and consultation of the affected peoples through representative institutions that work in a climate of respect and trust” is guaranteed (De Echave 2010). International institutions thus remain an interesting battleground, and transnational activist networks an important tool, for Peruvian social organizations.
- Transnational activist networks can offer tremendous possibilities to strengthen the position of local actors, both through the transfer of resources, as through the political pressure these networks can develop over companies and the government. Both in Cajamarca and La Oroya (and also in the Piura cases) local struggles have been strengthened through transnational contacts, and at the same time, these networks allow these local struggles to stimulate struggles in other sites as well. In that sense, the experience of Tambogrande clearly influenced resistance against mining in countries like Argentina and Guatemala. At the same time, these networks also consist of tensions, differing views and internal contradictions (Bebbington 2007b).
- Due to the tendency of reduction of funding for development cooperation, the concentration of this funding in some regions and themes, and a decade of sustained economic growth in the region, Latin America and Peru are rapidly becoming more marginal on the international development agenda. In Peru, this has resulted in, for example, the end of Oxfam GB and Oxfam Novib programs and the dramatic reduction of the funding capacity of many other organizations. Most likely, available funding for social movement organizations will progressively decrease, be more conditioned, and come with a higher administrative load. As institutions and social



organizations around extractive industries have been heavily funded, this requires an urgent redefinition of strategies for both donors and recipients.

- The electoral victories of Rafael Correa and Evo Morales opened the possibility for re-foundational processes of the state and the economy in Ecuador and Bolivia. After very promising constitutional processes in both countries, leading to the incorporation of the recognition of a plurinational state, the right of indigenous peoples to be consulted on issues and plans that affect them, and the rights of nature in the new constitutions, developmentalism (though more regulated by the State), and a macro economy based on extractive industry have remained dominant in both countries, resulting in what Eduardo Gudynas calls “neo-extractivism” (Gudynas 2009). Increasingly (more dramatically in Ecuador than in Bolivia) objections and resistance against this economical continuity by (parts of) the (indigenous) population have become evident. Apart from the possible limitations of these progressive governments, this also shows the difficulty in constructing alternative economic practices and imaginaries, and translating these to public policies within sectors critical of neoliberal capitalism.

“Food for thought”: Reflections on Greengrants theory of change and strategies in future scenarios

The research suggests that Greengrants has had a very positive impact on environmental struggles in Peru. Apart from the necessity of improving the follow up and administration of the grants, no major changes of the working methodology are strictly necessary. Eventual modifications or strategic reorientations should be discussed carefully as the structuring of the Greengrants’ work could easily trigger a process of institutionalization (which none of the key persons at Greengrants showed interest in during the interviews) of conditions and priorities that would seriously limit the range of grassroots initiatives to be supported. However this does not negate the necessity of the continuous discussion of some of the major challenges for the work of Greengrants (in general and in relation to mining in Peru) in the context of continuing neoliberal corporate globalization, progressive environmental destruction, as well as of progressive reductions of development cooperation.

This chapter presents a series of ideas on approaches, demands of the political context, and possible strategic priorities that might contribute to (or provoke) internal debates in Greengrants and its Andean Advisory board on the general work of the Foundation and on interventions in the specific case of mining in Peru. The presented ideas are not complete or definitive recommendations, as the endless number of demands and the existence of several strategic options do not allow this. More so, they are intended as “food for thought” on the approaches, methodology, and theory of change of Greengrants and the work on mining in Peru that intend to provoke debate within the organization and in dialogue with its counterparts, on how to continue to improve the work of the Foundation, maintain its unique identity, and respond to the demands of the coming scenarios. As such, the reflections emphasize new strategies and approaches or modifications of existing ones, and do not focus on the strategies that are already working or incorporated sufficiently in Greengrants work, like alternative communication and legal actions.

Approach and theory of change

In terms of the strategic thinking on social transformation at Greengrants, the following approaches are suggested to be discussed and potentially incorporated in its working methodology and theory of change. Also, potential concrete actions for Greengrants are presented to implement these approaches in the concrete case of mining in Peru.



For a strategy definition it might be important to distinguish between emblematic cases and strategic cases, as both open up different possibilities and require different strategies in their development.

Emblematic cases represent the principal problems generated by the mining industry in Peru, and therefore serve as excellent, timeless examples of awareness campaigns and political lobbying. In general, the work in these cases seeks to create public debate and legal precedents, reparation of injustices and damages suffered by local populations or the environment, and eventually, the elaboration of different public policies that avoid repetition.

Defensive dimensions of struggle predominate in a large share of emblematic cases, though this is not necessarily the case. Emblematic cases can develop strategic dimensions when damages to local populations or the environment become strategic in specific conjunctures and when they allow the renegotiation of the governance of the mining sector in the country.

Strategic cases on the other hand, are more related to political conjunctures, in which the definition of development of certain places and populations itself is at stake, so that the development of certain concrete struggles can transcend their locality and influence other regions or the country at large.

In some strategic cases a new mining project could imply a domino effect, as it would open up new regions for extractive industries, or allow entrance to areas with conditions formerly considered inappropriate for mining (like frontiers, or areas with great biological importance). In other cases, national mining policies have to be changed in the face of concrete demands in a local case, or populations critical of mining might end up rejecting the entrance of a new project and consolidate a different development model. This is crucial as “victories,” like in Tambogrande, might be the best promotion of social movement.

A strategic case approach thus analyzes which cases have the potential to generate structural change in the governance and development of the mining sector, and in the comprehension and practice of development itself in society and in the communities and populations affected or threatened by mining projects. Therefore crucial elements that need to be present in strategic cases are the elaboration of agendas that transcend a local struggle, the development of concrete programmatic alternatives to (current) mining activities, the commitment to a midterm project for alternative development, and the construction of communications and alliances between different actors to sustain the struggle and connect it to wider public debate.

This analytical (and political) distinction between emblematic and strategic cases could have the following implications for Greengrants small grants strategies:

- Without a doubt the support to emblematic cases (like La Oroya and Choropampa) needs to continue for both symbolic and humanitarian reasons, as the populations in these cases are among the most affected and overlooked in the country.
- However, strategic cases tend to have bigger influence on the wider struggle for a distinct development model, and therefore play a central role in Greengrants’ support for the movement around mining.
- To support strategic cases, Greengrants needs a flexible grants system, and simultaneously must develop strategic alliances (or integrates existing ones) that allow integral and long term support. Due to the complexity and continuity of these cases, repeat or bigger grants are necessary over a long period of time. It is also crucial that strategic support continue after the immediate conflict is over to transform the conditions underlying the conflict in the first place, and generate real



alternative development. Therefore, Greengrants cannot adopt several strategic cases in Peruvian mining conflicts; it must develop a fundamental discussion on what case(s) require such a systematic support.

- In a sense the follow up of the conflicts in Cajamarca informally seems to have constituted a strategic case, and several solid arguments justify this. However in other clearly strategic cases Greengrants has had very little (in the case of Tambogrande, Ayabaca and Huancabamba in the northern frontier of Peru) or no (in the case of Islay) presence.¹²

In many discussions on social mobilization and protest, these events are principally analyzed as reactive and destructive. While street protest usually takes place as a reaction of populations to the closing down of the possibilities for legal and institutional political action, at the same time, social mobilizations can strengthen collective identities, empower marginalized populations, launch new discourses into the public domain, build sympathy in parts of society, consolidate relations of solidarity between social actors, and alter power relations in society. As such, the moments of mass mobilization can represent constitutional moments for social movements and societal transformation.¹³

In the case of mining in Peru, interviewed social leaders and analysts concur that mass social mobilization with the participation of populations from different parts of the country is a crucial element (if not a necessary condition) for the transformation of the current authoritarian governance of the extractive industries and of Peruvian development in general, as such episodes could convert the context of local conflicts and problems into a national public debate led by Andean communities and their organizations with the potential of democratizing economic and territorial governance in the country. Currently, the conditions for such a scenario (or for electoral options that question developmentalism and canalize the energy of distinct conflicts) do not exist as local conflicts remain local, and mistrust and social fragmentation reign within social movements. Additionally, this requires well developed communicational strategies, allies within the political and legal institutions, international solidarity to pressure the government, collaboration from other sectors of organized society, and concrete proposals for policy changes.

The assumption of the creative and constitutive dimension of protest and mass mobilization could have the following implications for Global Greengrants small grants strategies on mining in Peru:

- The collaboration among different social organizations, civil society, and political actors is crucial. Therefore Greengrants supports and stimulates encounters for strategy definition and

¹² During the final workshop it was heavily debated whether Tambogrande can be seen as a success or a failure. Although, Tambogrande did not lead to policy changes, a new offensive against a mining company is very likely in the coming years, and though the transformation of the local economy has not been sufficient, important changes were realized (like the implementation of a local participatory planning process that goes beyond the legal obligation of participatory budgeting in Peru), local organizational networks remain stronger than in most parts of Peru, but most importantly, Tambogrande is seen by many populations affected by mining around the country (and continent) as an example of a local population that expelled a transnational company from its territory.

¹³ One of the best examples of this creative dimension of protest might be the Ecuadorian indigenous movement whose public appearance in the streets in the first indigenous uprising changed the history of the country, and planted the seeds for successful indigenous local and regional governments and political proposals like the “plurinational state”, the “rights of nature,” and “good living” as alternative models that ended up in the constitution of the country in 2009.

In Bolivia some of the principal thinkers on social movements, like Luis Tapia and Alvaro García Linera, state that processes of political organizing and dissidence within a political regime can result in mass mobilizations (and specifically uprisings as happened in Bolivia in defense of the national gas reserves or access to water in Cochabamba) in which important sectors of society express their rejection of its formal representatives and their decisions and assume direct control of decision-making about the direction of society.



alliance building on a national or macro regional level. These encounters, at the same time, could play a role in strategy definition within Greengrants.

- The facilitation of encounters between social leaders from different strategic and emblematic cases in the country is very important and will be supported and stimulated by Greengrants.
- Mobilization and protest will be supported by Greengrants (especially in strategic cases), taking into account the risks mentioned above. Specifically, (but not only) communication strategies and the elaboration of informative materials might be supported, as these allow protesting organizations to present their proposals to wider audiences, and as such, emphasize the constructive and creative elements of protest.

The expansion of extractive industries does not affect all sectors of population equally, as the different systems (or practices) of discrimination, exploitation, and control that regulate society tend to interrelate in mutually enforcing ways. Therefore neoliberal capitalist expansion (and mining) affects the lives of indigenous or afro-descendent populations more violently, and within these communities, women and the impoverished (not to speak of impoverished women) are the most affected. This phenomenon—called the braid of domination in feminist thinking—has been confirmed by several interviewees, and important research on the issue has been done (Bastidas 2008). The understanding of society in its different dimensions (including socio-ecological conflicts) therefore requires the analysis of the impact and mechanisms of the different systems of domination.¹⁴ At the same time, a braid of resistance might be constructed as well, in which different struggles articulate in a project for deeper transformation of society.

The incorporation of this perspective of intersectionality of domination and resistance in Greengrants theory of change could have the following implications for small grants strategies:

- Within the Andean Advisory Board, the understanding and attention to the relationship between extractive industries and the discrimination against indigenous and afro-descendent peoples, cultures, and models of development has been present. The dialogue and articulation between the movement for ecological justice and the indigenous and afro-descendent movements remains a priority.

¹⁴

These systems of domination are the consequence of the construction of our societies on the basis of social hierarchies, through historical processes like colonization, slavery, and the systematic exclusion of women and popular classes from power and resources, and include:

- *patriarchy* (the system that simultaneously produces the exploitation, discrimination and control of women and feminized populations, and makes it look as something natural);
- *racism* or *coloniality* (the system that simultaneously produces the exploitation, discrimination and control of non-white populations, and makes it look as something natural);
- *capitalism* (the system that simultaneously produces the exploitation, discrimination and control of the popular classes, and makes it look as something natural);
- *heteronormativity* (the system that simultaneously produces the exploitation, discrimination and control of bodies and sexuality, and specifically of the populations that live their sexuality outside of monogamous and heterosexual relations and roles, and makes it look as something natural).

The relationship between extractive industries and the discrimination and control of women and feminized, non-white, and popular class populations has been present throughout the research in the analysis of several interviewees, and important initial research has been done that confirms the presented hypothesis. In the case of the relationship between extractive industries and the control of sexuality and discrimination against non-heterosexual populations has not come up explicitly in the interviews. Without a doubt both relations require further research to sustain the existence of such articulation and provoke debate on the issue within social organizations and civil society.



- As women are not only most affected by the impacts of mining but also play crucial roles in organizing resistance and developing alternative development strategies, GreenGrants needs to explicitly support initiatives that strengthen the position and organizations of women within the wider movement around extractive industries (until now this has happened in only 1 out of 43 projects). These initiatives include symbolic and public action, awareness campaigns on women's rights, capacity building of female leaders, productive initiatives, and networking among female leaders and women's organizations. Due to the complexity of this issue, actions can be focused on the state, the company, local communities, and also on male dominated social organizations.
- Additional research to understand the relation between gender, sexuality, and extractive industries is required and could be supported by GreenGrants to inform its policy and theory of change and to support discussions within Peruvian social organizations and civil society on the issue.
- As patriarchal relations within communities, social organizations and civil society networks tend to be an obstacle for such proposals, an effort will be made to identify counterparts or incorporate this perspective in proposals, without imposing a specific gender perspective.¹⁵
- GreenGrants should consider incorporating a question about how the local problems are affecting different gender groups and in what way the project seeks to contribute to democratic gender relations.

Latin American social movements have shown over centuries, as well as in the last decades, that apart from strategies of resistance, social struggle also produces, consolidates, or deepens alternative social, economic, cultural, spiritual, and political practices that can prefigure the transformation of society on other levels.¹⁶ Almost all—if not all—progressive institutional change requires first the existence of alternative practices. These practices are possible, since marginalized and impoverished populations in Latin America (and around the world) historically have learned to live both with and without the state and the market, as both regulatory mechanisms have never resolved their principal problems.¹⁷ These practices do not mean the negation or rejection of the state or global market, but allow a different integration or relation with them.

The development of alternative practices of production and social organization are crucial to resistances against extractive industries and neoliberal capitalism in general, as they show the possibility of

¹⁵ Liberal feminism has been correctly criticized—for example by lesbian, afro-american and indigenous feminisms—for imposing a certain way of thinking about male domination that did not recognize sufficiently the articulation of patriarchy with racism, capitalism, and heteronormativity. In spite of the shared discrimination within male dominated society, this articulation clarifies that indigenous, poor and lesbian women are dominated through different patterns than white middle class women.

Therefore, support for the position and leadership of women in any society requires enormous cultural and socio-economic sensibility that enables support for the emancipatory and liberating processes of brave women that exist within every society and community, according to its own historical processes. This argument is entirely different from cultural relativism that reduces feminism to a European, modern, and liberal struggle without relevance in other cultures, as it embraces the existence of diverse struggles for female liberation around the world, and throughout different cultures.

¹⁶ Among the endless examples of these practices are the solidarity economy developed by the landless farmers in Brazil, the juntas of good governance in Mexican Chiapas, the interchange economy that was working during the Argentinean crisis, the communitarian justice mechanisms of farmer and indigenous communities around the continent, lesbians and gays who publicly celebrate their relationships before these are legally recognized, the feminist mutual help and awareness groups that allow female autonomy and the exercise of sexual and reproductive rights.

Some of the most emblematic examples of grassroots practices inspiring institutional political change are the participatory budgeting in Brazil that was born out of practices of local civil society; the institutionalization of communitarian consultations on public decisions of the International Labor Organization; or agrarian reform around the world that almost always followed factual agrarian reform achieved through social struggle.

¹⁷ Aníbal Quijano, Raúl Zibechi, Arturo Escobar, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui and others have demanded attention to this logic of simultaneous adaption to state and market mechanisms and autonomous social organization.



alternative development in practices, and as such strengthen internal cohesion of local actors, serve as an example for other movements and conflicts, and might inspire institutional and legal changes afterwards.

The incorporation of this perspective of prefigurative social movements¹⁸ in Greengrants theory of change could have the following implications for small grants strategies:

- Small grants will be used regularly for the support of small scale alternative practices of production, distribution, or social organization related to environmental struggles.
- Greengrants supports efforts to systematize and spread information on successful alternative practices that might inspire other struggles and influence wider political debates.

As mining conflicts in general are “glocal conflicts,” whose development is defined in several geographic scales and places simultaneously by distinct—including transnational—actors, a crucial question for Greengrants (which was actually asked directly by several of the *grassroots leaders*) is what role it assumes in the transnational social movement on extractive industries. Is this role limited to financing and solidarity with groups in the Global South? Or can this include, explicitly, activism in the Global North on this issue, including pressuring US based companies, lobbying in political institutions, awareness campaigns, symbolic actions, and coordinating medical and legal support from the US to cases in the South, etc.?

Without a doubt this has been debated before, and interviews evidenced that Greengrants has supported Global South groups with networking and lobbying activities in the US as well, though not in a systematic way. Evidently, a more active role in the North would imply a bigger investment of Greengrants in the Global North, taking away some financial resources to the Global South.

If such a role is important to the organization, the following ideas can be considered in its implementation:

- This discussion is especially relevant in cases that involve American companies, like in Cajamarca and La Oroya, and maybe even more in the case of Newmont (co-owner of the Yanacocha mine) which is based in Colorado as well, as in these cases, US activism is both possible and necessary.
- A systematic effort to facilitate networking and connections of Global South organizations and movements with those of the Global North would be of enormous importance to environmental struggles. Media campaigns in the North, research, and legal and medical assistance are simply out of reach for most organizations in the Global South as they lack resources, contacts, and expertise. The support of universities, research centers, PhD (or even MA) students, alternative and mainstream media, and legal offices, etc. with interest in civil society initiatives, environmental or human rights issues without an explicit activist approach can be of an enormous help that may exceed largely the potential of a 5,000 USD small grant. Again some of this work has been done by Greengrants and by other groups, but not in a very systematic or accessible way.
- The adoption of this interface work (or the creation of a small resource center) would make Greengrants’ methodology even more unique, and could include the creation of one or two functions within the organization dedicated to find information and facilitate connections.

Alternatively, Greengrants could strengthen or create strategic alliances with activist organizations based in the Global North with the capacity for this interface work. This option would allow the concentration of

¹⁸ The notion of prefigurative social movements refers to the development of alternative practices within social movements that prefigure the wider social transformation they are after.



energy and resources of Greengrants in supporting processes in the Global South, while simultaneously strengthening the possibilities for Global North collaboration and solidarity. However, this would require explicit coordination and agreements on the support to Global Greengrants grantees in the Global North, as this has not been working sufficiently so far. Possibly, Global Greengrants could support organizations in the Global North for this work (and specifically the Global Advisors).

Elements of the context that require consideration

In the concrete case of mining in Peru, the struggle for change is still being held hostage by a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand fundamental political and economical change is a necessary condition for other relations between the distinct development models and peoples present in society, between economic actors and local communities, and between society and nature. On the other hand, conditions for such a transformation seem far away, as strongly articulated social movements with the capacity to act on a national level do not (yet) exist, national politics are dominated by parties and candidates who openly favor (and depend on) corporate interests, and the attempts to create political instruments (or parties) favorable to social struggles are precarious, incipient, and so far seem to provoke more division and tensions than solutions.

Greengrants contribution to overcoming this scenario might include the following strategic considerations:

Several interviewees and the report of a recent participatory strategic diagnosis funded by *AcSur Las Segovias*¹⁹ identify the absence of a socio-political actor that unifies or articulates the different struggles around mining as (one of) the main obstacle(s) for the democratization of the governance of the extractive industries in Peru. Originally CONACAMI was founded to assume this role. However the organization never really realized this objective, partially due to internal difficulties, but mostly because of structural limitations in the general socio-political context of the country that is still largely defined by the legacies of the Fujimori dictatorship and the civil war.

The research indicates that the funding of a single political actor to fulfill this role is unlikely due to these structural constraints, but also as unifying organizational structures might not be the most efficient way of responding to contemporary complex society. Unifying organizations tend to produce: (a) internal divisions because of the struggle for power (which grows incrementally as the scale of the organizations becomes bigger); (b) hierarchical practices, including discrimination against young people and women; (c) distances (and even separations) between the grassroots and national representative leaders; and (d) slow decision making processes or even incapacity to respond to the speed of social conflicts.

- Support for strengthening the connections, collaborations, interfaces and networks between different levels of conflicts; between different conflicts; and between institutions, grass roots organizations, activists and national representative organizations is crucial. The creation of—or contribution to—processes and spaces for strategic discussion seems a crucial element within this.
- The construction of a more democratic, transparent, and depolarizing political culture in Peru is an important condition for stronger social movements around extractive industries, with the capacity to transform the current scenario.
- The renovation of leadership, from the perspectives of both organizational and leadership culture, is a necessary condition for these processes, making the training of a new generation of leaders especially important. This would allow new relations of trust and communication between crucial leaders, the construction and spreading of proposals within their organizations, and more equitable relations between men and women in the organization.

¹⁹

A Spanish NGO that recently started working on mining in Peru supporting Grufides and CooperAcción



- Thematic training should be combined with building the capacities of democratic, inclusive, and transparent leadership;
- specific attention should be given to female leadership (including, possibly, processes for capacity building for women leaders);
- it is also recommended to specifically support processes in which leaders from different regions are trained together.
- As social movements tend not to have time to evaluate their work and learn from struggles—as several interviewees indicate—efforts to systematize them, either performed by activists themselves or by researchers linked to these movements, are important and deserve support (as in 19). Also the publications of the lessons and successes of certain struggles are important whenever they include a concrete plan on how to disseminate and apply such lessons in other conflicts.
- CONACAMI remains a crucial actor within this scenario.

As the transformation of the current situation requires structural political change, within social movements exists a profound preoccupation with how to relate to the political system, and more so, how to participate within its dynamics. A principal activist on mining stated: “As we felt that we had reached the limit of our possible contribution to positive change, and that further transformations require direct participation in institutional politics, we decided to construct the political movement”.

As such, currently two political movements are being constructed with a critical perspective towards developmentalism and genuine engagement with ecological justice and indigenous rights. One of them is being led by Father Marco Arana, whilst the other has leaders associated with CONACAMI and the representative organization of the Amazonian indigenous peoples Aidesep among its principal protagonists. What academics tend to perceive as a rigid separation between institutional politics and civil society, for most social leaders and activists, is a very blurry boundary which is crossed constantly.



For Greengrants this could present a dilemma regarding the extent to which political projects that promote ecological justice, and which are closely related to social movements, can be supported.

Box 8: Some concrete demands...

During the research, interviewees presented several concrete necessities and demands that might be supported by Greengrants and that also indicated priorities as seen by local leaders. Although several of these plans cost more than a small grant can provide, interviewees state that they could complement external funding.

- In La Oroya a member of the MOSAO stated that the biggest priority for the movement would be the purchase of a local radio station, as this would allow them to respond to the continuous media campaigns against the movement.
- In Porcon a legal demand against the Yanacocha mining company cannot advance as evidence has to be presented that a water source of the community has dried up due to mining activities. A small grant could cover the biggest part of the research costs on this issue.
- In San Marcos support to local agricultural activities would strengthen the struggle against a mining project, as this would affirm the existing developmental model based on agriculture. Support would especially be used for the population living higher up in the mountains, where conditions are more adverse, and the company tries to convince local peasants that agriculture is no alternative for mining.
- In Ayabaca the processes of participatory territorial ordering by the communities does not have the necessary resources. Through this process, the communities decide how to use their lands, and maps are elaborated that allow communicating this decision to other actors, including municipalities and the mining company.
- In Choropampa local population have almost endless needs, due to the impact of a mercury spill in the community ten years ago. Apart from medical support (as the companies' insurance does not allow sufficient access to medical care, due to its bureaucratic organization) and support to the running legal cases against the company, national and international media attention are required to demand attention to the persistence of damages in this case.
- In La Pajuela, support for legal cases against Yanacocha over land rights and access to water could be supported. Local leaders also hope Greengrants could facilitate access to the Newmont board or shareholders in the United States to make their case and seek a solution for current problems.

Social leaders tend to play a crucial role in most conflicts, which makes them a target of harassment, intimidation, public defamation campaigns, and even violence (which in some cases even led to the assassination of crucial leaders). Several mining companies use lists of “problematic persons” to guide their interactions with them. Simultaneously, directing positions in the communities affected by mining and in regional and national organizations demand a lot of time (and sometimes resources), which tends to affect the economic situation, physical and emotional health, family life, and affective relations of social leaders. Generally, commitment and activism generates additional responsibilities, stress, and fear in the lives of wives, husbands, parents, children, brothers, and sisters, which in some cases is deliberately used by groups with sympathies towards mining projects to threaten and pressure principal leaders. Several interviewees therefore talk about the enormous load their activism also represents, as well as of other leaders who couldn't bear these difficulties anymore.

- The support to social leaders and activists (as well as to their families) in situations of vulnerability in strategic conflicts is therefore crucial to sustain the opposition to or criticism of mining and can include support to the development of security measures, medical, psychological



or legal aid, create media attention and international solidarity, and even facilitate a temporary absence from the conflict.

- Therefore Greengrants could open a special fund for *environmental activists and social leaders in situations of vulnerability*. Although such a special fund probably won't affect the possibility to give grants to such situations, it would be an important public gesture, as it explicitly backs up activists whose rights are or may be violated.

One of the really critical points that emerged in the research was the centrality of knowledge and information in the asymmetries between transnational companies and affected populations, as only "objective", "scientific" information can constitute "sufficient" and "legitimate" "proof" of the social and ecological (in)viability (before a project starts) or damages (of an operating project). Not only do the companies have infinitely more resources than the communities to support research institutions and academics to produce such knowledge, but also the communitarian-based knowledge rooted in (sometimes centuries of) local experience are not taken into account at all in the current monocultural political and legal system in Peru.²⁰

On the contrary, communities have to be able to critically read hundreds of pages of Environmental Impact Reports to formulate their observations on the plans of the company in a very short period of time, or present (expensive) objective evidence to demonstrate and be compensated for the damages to their livelihood, evidence for which the State does not offer support or financing. This by itself constitutes discrimination against marginalized populations who have to express their concerns through a language and knowledge system that is not theirs while no intercultural mechanisms exist that allow the consideration of their knowledge.

Finally, in the interviews it was argued convincingly that transnational companies intend to control the local and even national circuits of knowledge production and impede access to evidence on damages to the environment and human health. Examples were mentioned of blood samples that disappeared before tests could indicate the level of heavy metals present in them, of laboratories that did not want to process water samples on environmental pollution, and of difficulties of finding a veterinarian to investigate the cause of death of animals in the influence zone of the mine.

- In spite of these difficulties, support to research in crucial moments of conflict remains very important, and should be a priority for Greengrants.
- Financial support can be provided when studies might generate breakthrough moments in important conflicts. Examples of this could be a study that indicates if and why water access has been reduced in a community or that evidences the damages to the health of affected populations, which might serve to legal cases or generate media attention.
- However, in other cases research is simply far too expensive (apart from the difficulty to find neutral institutions with the capacity to carry it out) and other kinds of solutions have to be sought, as the case of Saint Louis University collaboration with the MOSAO shows. It is, however, quite difficult for local organizations to identify such counterparts. Greengrants could

²⁰ Actually, in a large part of the development and philanthropy sector this same bias and cognitive discrimination is being confirmed and reproduced, as processes (and projects) of social transformation, economic empowerment or organizational strengthening are judged according to western timelines and criteria of knowledge, success, and production. These do not necessarily (and might even generally not) coincide with local cultural practices, and knowledge, nor with the complexity of reality itself. Therefore, the development of cognitive justice (which recognizes that different systems of knowledge live in different cultures, peoples, and practices) and of intercultural procedures and practices in all dimensions of society, including the development sector, are necessary.



play a crucial role as an interface between PhD students, research institutes, and universities in the United States and the demands of rigorous knowledge production of social movements.

- At the same time actions and initiatives to promote the recognition and construction of a plurinational and intercultural State, which incorporates mechanisms for intercultural dialogue that considers the existence of different knowledge systems and practices, require support.

One of the main tendencies that will have an impact on social movements around mining in the coming years, as well as on Greengrants, is the evident progressive reduction of funding from the Global North. While important development agencies are closing down their activities in Peru, others have had their funds reduced due to the financial crisis, and in general, strict conditions for projects and bureaucratic loads are growing. This especially puts more radical organizations, like CONACAMI, activist NGOs, and grass roots groups, in a difficult position, and might generate new demands on small grants to reduce the impact of this development.²¹ It might also generate more openness of some organizations to funds from alternative sources, like local governments (that already frequently support certain activities within their territories), and in some cases –more problematically—of mining companies (who tend to have enormous funds available for social and economic projects).

- On the one hand, grassroots organizations have to develop (or intensify) strategies to generate necessary funds autonomously, through economic activities and membership contributions. Greengrants can support initiatives that seek self-sustainability of grassroots organizations.
- Greengrants will debate whether it has to change funding strategies to respond to this tendency. Such a discussion considers the possibility of reiterated or bigger funding to some crucial organizations if they experience difficulties due to reduced funding.
- More collaboration is sought with other funding agencies to use funds as effectively as possible. Apart from traditional allies like Oxfam America, these agencies include AcSur Las Segovias and EntrePueblos from Spain, 11.11.11 and Broederlijk Delen from Belgium, Jewish Community Service from the US, and others who in a sense share a critical perspective with Greengrants.

Greengrants methodology and strategy making

Greengrants methodology is working very well in general terms, as it facilitates the flexible, quick, low cost, and committed support to grass roots groups involved in crucial environmental conflicts around the world. In this sense, the research approves the achievement of one of the aspirations at the basis of Greengrants according to a key informant: “the working mode by itself aspires to provoke discussion within other financiers, as we wanted to subvert their centralizing way of working that gives excessive power to their administration in the North.”

Simultaneously, this methodology is constructed on the basis of some (creative) tensions that require discussion. Greengrants does not use a narrow theory of change or explicit strategic prioritization, as this would limit its capacity to respond to the constantly changing scenarios of environmental conflicts, would affect the freedom of local advisors to identify priorities, and would negate the principal role of local organizations to define strategy. However, the necessity of support in the scenario of widespread environmental conflicts is enormous, making prioritization of cases and strategies inevitable. Therefore the organization works with a highly decentralized methodology based on communities of trust in which

²¹ At this point in time, all groups and conflicts have noticed this development. In the case of CONACAMI and Grufides, both have accessed new funding from more activist agencies like SAL from Sweden and AcSur from Spain, which have provided compensation for other funding cuts. However, it is uncertain this will continue in the future. In the La Oroya case the Mesa Tecnica is currently suffering from cuts in their funding.



local activists have a crucial role as advisors on grants and counterparts. The counterparts themselves cannot participate in the analysis or strategy definition underlying Greengrants' intervention in local scenarios other than through informal contacts with the advisors. A former advisor described one of the risks of this working mode stating: "We can easily end up privileging and legitimizing some actors over others. And who am I to do so?"

This subchapter will go into some dilemmas associated with Greengrants' methodology, and will suggest some approaches and modifications for further internal discussion at the organization.

Probably the crucial question at Greengrants is how to decide which cases to support, in which countries, with what potential for change, amidst so many possibilities and necessities. At the start of the study it was not clear why Greengrants prioritized La Oroya and Cajamarca, and not Ayabaca, Tambogrande or Islay, which all show an interesting potential for the affirmation of an alternative developmental model based on agriculture, or Madre de Dios and Cerro de Pasco, which needed support for the devastating impact of mining in regional health and environment in these departments.

The research evidenced that the principal reason for the choice was the existence of prior networks of Greengrants advisors in these regions, in combination with a general sense that these local populations were among the most vulnerable in environmental conflicts around the country. These are very legitimate reasons, which are also very coherent with Greengrants' vision and methodology, and for many reasons the Cajamarca and La Oroya cases are crucial in the context of mining in Peru. Nevertheless a fundamental debate on which cases are strategic for which reasons could have resulted in prioritizing other cases, or in other justifications for the current choice that could become a strategic orientation for Greengrants' work (on mining in Peru). For example, the fact that Newmont has its office in the same US state as Greengrants could have been such an orientation.

Evidently, narrow strategies end up limiting the flexibility of grants and could shift power in the process away from local communities, both genuine and appropriate concerns at Greengrants. At the same time, so many decisions are being made that strategy is implicitly present, and therefore it would be a step ahead in Greengrants methodology and impact if these debates can be more explicit and participatory.

- A process for the identification of strategic actors around mining will be realized to inform discussions on strategy and prioritization within Greengrants. The elaboration of this map of actors should be participatory (it can be connected to the periodic discussion meetings), and might be supported by an alliance of funders;
- In accordance with the *strategic case approach*, Greengrants identifies strategic cases every two years for which a certain amount of money will be reserved that might be used in repeated grants to strategic actors;
- Local advisors do a more intense follow up on these cases, preferably in constant dialogue with strategic local actors and counterparts;
- The funding for strategic cases can obviously only represent a certain percentage of all Greengrants funding in a country to remain open to a wide range of actors and conflicts permanently;
- Periodically, internal meetings are organized (probably the Andean Advisory board might be the best place to do so) to evaluate the development of these cases, and the strategic case approach in general.
- To increase accessibility of small grants, other strategic grass roots actors that stand out in the map of actors will be approached to inform them on the existence of Greengrants and its small grants through the sending of informative materials or directly by the local advisor.



Currently, strategy definition and prioritization of intervention of Greengrants depend for the most part on local advisors (except for the grants approved through the Global Advisors). This makes the choice of a local advisor highly important because these persons have to operate under structural limitations of time and resources (as they work voluntarily) in highly complex realities and within enormous geographic ranges, but also because the centralization of the work in one person runs the risk of creating clientelism or closing down access to small grants for actors with minimal relations with this person. In Peru both local advisors did a great job, in spite of these difficulties, and are largely responsible for the achievements that have been reached.

Taking in account their experiences, the current Peruvian scenario and Greengrants plans, the following characteristics of local advisors are suggested for future advisors:

- Evidently, local advisors have to be activists, with close connections to different grassroots organizations and actual experience in concrete conflicts, so that they can understand its complexity and unpredictability, just as Greengrants currently assumes;
- Preferably they have good relationships with some funding agencies, with whom a complementary relationship could be established. However, the local advisor should not work at a funding agency, as this can limit his capacity to find new partners in different ways, as was described by a former local advisor;
- Their daily activities and work (like consultancies or the work at NGO projects) should allow them to travel regularly so that they can do some follow up on Greengrants projects, and identify new partners;
- Preferably, local advisors have some knowledge of the political processes in the other countries present in a regional advisory board, allowing them to critically reflect on the proposals and choices of other local advisors as well;
- In an country like Peru, with very different geographical regions with proper problems and actors, it seems very difficult that one advisor could cover—for example—the Amazon and Andes regions. Either some regions need to be prioritized, an additional advisor should be found for the Amazon, or a new mechanism for strategy making and counterpart identification should be elaborated.

Generating possibilities for counterpart participation in processes in which strategy and priorities are being defined, or in which collective analysis is constructed to inform these decisions at Greengrants or by its local advisors, would mean an important step in the decentralized methodology Greengrants is developing. Although local advisors are usually very informed and have impressive analytical skills, collective construction of analysis and scenarios will always allow for a better informed and more complex vision on national scenarios or on specific strategic cases, as it incorporates different viewpoints (analysts, grassroots activists, community leaders, NGOs, etc). This can reduce unforeseen consequences like the ones described in Box 5.

Clearly, this would cost time and resources, so that it might be impossible to do in all countries or in all thematic areas, but it will be worthwhile to experiment with such methodology and evaluate its results afterwards, whenever Greengrants wants to further decentralize its strategy making processes contribute to generating strategic orientations within local civil society as well. In the case of Peru, and of the context around mining in particular, the creation of spaces for collective analysis also could contribute to the construction or strengthening of links between actors and conflicts, which could make it a contribution to the processes of social movement construction and alliance building themselves.

- More than direct participation in decisions on grants, collective analysis on strategies and present and future scenarios could be developed with Greengrants counterparts, other crucial actors, and



analysts every one or two years. These workshops would inform decisions on small grants afterwards, but can also serve the participating organizations themselves, as well as the connection between their strategies. Among the products of the workshop would be a small report with principal conclusions that serve also for public discussion;

- These spaces can be organized with a small grant (including a payment for the organizer and facilitator of the workshop), and would be prepared with the local advisor. Whenever possible, other local advisors participate as well (or maybe every year the Advisory Board Meeting will be combined with such a national workshop). They should count with a highly participatory methodology—inspired by popular education—that allows collective construction, instead of the all too familiar presentations of previously prepared action plans;
- The workshops can be organized at a national level (with parts dedicated to the analysis of specific issues like mining, IIRSA and the Amazon), or at a thematic level (like mining in Peru, or in the Andes), depending on the priorities identified at Greengrants and by local advisors. In the case of thematic workshops these can be organized together with already existing networks like the Peruvian or Latin American Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Peru and CONACAMI. Also these meetings can be linked to other events to optimize resource use and contribute to important dates on the social movement agenda;
- It is a possibility to organize such a workshop together with allied financing agencies to share costs and to allow the discussions to inform a wider audience of agencies, organizations, etc. This could also help in identifying complementarities between funders. On the other hand, the workshops might complicate issues like the definition of participants, methodology, conclusions, and future actions, and power might be shifted too much towards development agencies;
- If such meetings were organized among funders, it is crucial for social organizations to participate in the planning, organization and orientation to ensure the workshops avoid principally following the agendas of funding agencies.
- Although most interviewees agree that in the current Peruvian context these meetings would be important to the wider movement as well, activists and social organizations should both evaluate whether conditions for multi-actor dialogue exist at this point in time.

If this option to create more participation is seen as too costly in terms of time and resources, the creation of other possibilities for participation is recommended, especially in the cases of organizations that have been supported (and might be supported) repeatedly, like Grufides, MOSAO and CONACAMI. This continuous support is based on, and generates, trust that should be translated into dialogue on strategy and priorities, even more so in strategic cases.

As stated earlier, small grants are already complementing larger donations, as they are regularly solicited to finance gaps in wider strategies or processes. It is important that this remains so, and might become even more important in the context of reducing development funds, so that new strategies might have to be considered as well.

- Although local counterparts should remain the crucial instance for defining and giving shape to the complementarity between different grants, closer contact with other agencies might serve Greengrants. This could create possibilities for strategic collaborations that facilitate the access to bigger grants for Greengrants counterparts, to Greengrants funding complementing important projects of other agencies in strategic moments, or to support for the strategic cases adopted by several financers. It might also open up dialogue on agendas and methodologies that would enrich and integrate the international solidarity movements.



- These collaborations would specifically make sense with organizations like EntrePueblos, AcSur Las Segovias, 11.11.11, Broederlijk Delen, Solidaridad América Latina-SAL, ICCO, and Oxfam América who are all committed to the struggles around mining and share several counterparts and approaches. Ideally these like minded organizations would meet up periodically for coordination;
- In these cases, Greengrants small grants might serve, for example, to realize strategic plans with a crucial actor, which could then become the base for a bigger project afterwards, or even as proper funds for a larger project applied to by local organizations;
- On the other hand, Greengrants could also coordinate with funds, like Jewish Community Service and XminY Solidariteitsfonds²², who also aspire to support grass roots struggles in a more flexible way and in that sense can complement Greengrants small grants when these are insufficient to support necessary immediate action;

As stated in the study, the activist, decentralized, low cost, and relatively informal methodology of Greengrants allows its flexibility and engagement with struggles around the world, but also has a downside in the administration of the grants and in internal communications. Evidently, Greengrants does not want to become a traditional financier that spends a large share of its budget on administrating projects, as this would generate an additional working load for local counterparts as well. However it is very important that essential information circulates in the Greengrants network, and that local counterparts know how to access Greengrants and with whom to communicate on what issues and moments.

- A virtual tool can be developed that makes all information on a grant (including application, status, evaluation and products) accessible for the Greengrants network, and that can be modified in a decentralized way.
 - Greengrants advisors and personnel would have complete access so that they can see if a grant has been transferred, or check if a report has been sent in. Even the evaluation of new projects might take place through this tool;
 - Counterparts can have access to their specific projects, and at the same time to all the products and tools generated in other Greengrants projects (like training materials, documentaries, campaign materials, community mapping maps, etc.), so that these can serve as inspiration and might even be replicated.
 - Other contacts of Greengrants can have access to these products as well.
- At this internal site, information on financing rounds can be published as well.
- In agreement with counterparts, Greengrants can make products accessible on the Web as well, if they do not contain sensitive strategic information to these struggles.
- It is crucial to define exactly the role of local advisors:
 - Do they only advise, or do they follow up on projects as well?
 - Do they play a role in the evaluation of their success or not?
 - Are they a contact person after a project has been accepted or not?
- A standard email might be elaborated that communicates to counterparts what's expected from them, and with whom they should communicate during the different stages of the process, like the application, administrative stages, the final report and products, or on eventualities related to the grant (for example like threats or legal cases against activists that are related to a Greengrants project);
- Evaluations and the final products of the projects do need to get back to Greengrants, as this would increase the capacity to oversee the impact of the grants and at the same time would allow

²² XminY supports campaigns, marches, symbolic action, and alternative communication, among other things, from a very critical perspective inspired by autonomism.



learning and interchange between supported processes. Apart from the decentralized virtual community, an internal procedure should exist to follow up on reports and products.

- Staff should consider developing public information materials on Greengrants and putting announcements on funding rounds on the website. This would allow more groups to access Greengrants, but might also create an excessive number of applications that afterwards cannot be managed by the organization.

Conclusions and recommendations

The research clearly evidenced the value of small grants for wider social struggles, the positive impact of Greengrants' work on the development of social movements around mining in Peru, and the uniqueness of its methodology. The hypothesis that small grants contribute to the capacity of social movements to respond to political conjunctures or changing strategies by mining companies has been confirmed as individual grants can mark "breakthrough" moments in the development of local conflicts, or they can "plant seeds," allowing the start of new processes or synergies in situations that require social movement action. Small grants also allow the construction of resources and capacities that improve the overall social movement ability to influence the development of a conflict.

Less evidence has been found that small grants allow the promotion of lasting changes in mining policy and the advancement of communities' own development strategies, which seems to confirm the hypothesis that small grants are *more easily and effectively used for defensive struggles* than for offensive ones. However this also is a consequence of the particular situation of mining in Peru, in which fundamental political and economic change are required for the democratization of the governance of extractive industries and the transformation of the current developmental model, but the conditions for such transformation are still far away.

In this sense, the mission for Greengrants remains contributing to the construction of social movements with the capacity to change this scenario and create the conditions for a profound and integral democratization of the extractive industries. The crucial elements of this process are: (a) the construction of successful local resistances; (b) growing encounters and articulations between different conflicts; (c) efficient channels of communication to the legal and institutional political system; (d) the development of proposals for alternative political policies; (e) the development of alternative practices of production and social organization; (f) the construction of a more democratic and open political culture within society and the movements themselves; and (g) the strengthening of environmental and human rights awareness in general society.

Recommendations

Throughout the report the existing methodology, theory of change, and strategies of Greengrants have been studied. In general terms their results and efficiency are highly appreciated in the report and by its counterparts. No major changes are strictly required. Nevertheless a series of suggestions that intend to provoke internal debate on how to keep improving Greengrants work have been made. In this last section, some recommendations are presented that are considered by the report as necessary actions in this process.

A revision of internal procedures, roles, responsibilities and communication is required, as this dimension of Greengrants work seems not to receive the attention that's needed. Although, evidently no excessive bureaucratic practices should be created, it should be guaranteed that Greengrants receives a far higher percentage (at least 80 percent) of reports and final products than it currently does, and clear communication lines have to be established within the different layers of the organizational network and with its counterparts. The elaboration of a tool that allows the functioning of a virtual Greengrants



community, which facilitates access to all information on grants for the organization, and on the organization to its counterparts, is highly recommended.

Current Greengrants methodology limits the accessibility consciously, as it favors the networks of local advisors and Greengrants itself. It is recommended Greengrants discusses internally if it wants to make the small grants accessible and familiar in a larger part of Peruvian social movements through informative materials and the publication of the dates of financing rounds on the website, or not. At the same time, in the Peruvian case, it has to be considered if one local advisor can cover both the Amazon and Andean regions.

Greengrants' methodology gives huge responsibility to local advisors, who define strategy, identify counterparts, and advise on proposals. In the Peruvian case this has been working quite well. Nevertheless a more participatory methodology would empower counterparts within the Greengrants network, increase the quality of analysis and the level of information at the basis of decision making within the organization, and allow strategy definition with grassroots groups and social organizations without reducing the importance of local advisors. Periodic (yearly or biannual) workshops can be organized to analyze scenarios and discuss possible strategies that would inform Greengrants' work while allowing networking and coordination between participating actors. As this implies the investment of resources and time, experimenting with such a participatory methodology in one country or theme that has best conditions to do so is recommended. This experiment can serve as a basis for eventual reforms in Greengrants' strategy making.

Experiments with a strategic case approach--in which the periodic identification (preferably in dialogue with strategic actors inside the country) of cases in which the national and local developmental model itself is at stake--is also recommended. This would allow the concentration of some funds in one of these cases, through midterm, repeated, and maybe bigger grants to strategic actors. Special follow up on this strategic case will allow the evaluation and possible ratification or expansion of this methodology afterwards. Ideally, the identification of these strategic cases is preceded by a participatory process, and in any case a strategic mapping of mining conflicts in the country would be an important source of information.

One of the main weaknesses of Peruvian social movements around mining are the enormous difficulties in constructing collaboration and alliances within local conflicts, a difficulty that exists even more so on regional and national levels. Therefore, small grants that contribute to alliance building and the construction of common agendas, like campaigns realized by several organizations or meetings for the construction of proposals between different actors, need to be prioritized. To stimulate local actors to consider incorporating collaborations and alliance building in their activities, a question could be added to the application form: "in what way does the project create or strengthen alliances and collaboration with organizations other than your own?"

Although the Peruvian context is still characterized by the overwhelming presence of struggles in which the defense against mining projects and its impacts predominates, it is recommended that the Greengrants local advisor actively try to identify and support offensive struggles. The experimentation with the support to alternative economic initiatives related to social struggle should be part of this. Only through such grants will it be possible to evaluate to what extent Greengrants grants can contribute to this kind of transformation.

Women play a crucial role in detecting the impacts of mining projects (as they suffer these more directly than men), in organizing of local communities, and in developing alternative economic and social



practices to cope with these impacts. However their role tends to be underestimated within social movement networks, as well as within the projects supported by GreenGrants. Therefore GreenGrants should incorporate a gendered approach on ecological justice in its theory of change, and explicitly seek to support the strengthening of the position of women in these conflicts and within social organizations themselves.

The intimidation, persecution, and violation of crucial social leaders and grassroots activists play a central role in the strategies to impose mining projects. Therefore it is recommended, both as a practical policy and as a public gesture, that GreenGrants establishes a special fund for the support of activists and leaders in situations of vulnerability.

Another crucial weak spot in local population's struggles to claim their rights has to do with the politics of knowledge and information. Mining companies not only have more resources which enable research institutions and academics to produce knowledge favorable to their cause, but also, the communitarian based knowledges rooted in (sometimes centuries of) local experience are not taken into account at all in the current monocultural political and legal system in Peru. Therefore it is recommended that GreenGrants support research activities (as has been done) when these allow breakthrough moments in conflicts. Simultaneously, possibilities for more structural collaborations or alliances in this area should be explored, for which alliances with other organizations (like the Global Advisors) probably will be indispensable.

GreenGrants should discuss internally the implications of the conjuncture of progressive reduction of philanthropy and development cooperation funds, and the increased conditioning and administrative load of these projects, for GreenGrants small grant methodology and its counterparts. Some considerations on this issue have been presented above. More dialogue and coordination with other progressive development agencies can be an important part of this process.

The development, discussion, systematization, and diffusion of alternative ecological, economic, social, and cultural practices being applied currently on communitarian, local, regional, or national levels is already crucial and will become even more important in the coming decades when progressive ecological degradation will make the development or implementation of these practices increasingly more urgent and possibly more feasible. GreenGrants' network has enormous potential to inform the discussions and experiments on this issue, and small grants can be used to support them as well.

In this sense also, the interaction between indigenous populations, ecological activists, and progressive governments in Bolivia and (less so in) Ecuador have to be followed closely, as this will indicate the potentials, difficulties, and challenges for the creation of public policies that overcome extractivism.

Evidently, GreenGrants is not capable of transforming the mining industry of Peruvian public policies on mining by itself, nor should it intend do so. This requires collaboration between a variety of organizations, institutions, and individuals within ample social movement webs led by strong and innovative grassroots organizations with mobilizing force. Even the effectiveness of small grants depends to a large extent on the strength and abilities of local actors.

This means that GreenGrants' contribution to wider social movement struggles can be maximized through strengthening its own strategic alliances with: (a) strategic actors within Peru for strategy making; (b) activist groups in the Global North to support grantees in the South; (c) other progressive financiers, to increase complementarity within their activities; (d) research institutes (academic and non-academic) to support grantees, in order to be able to contribute even more to the struggles of communities around the world for more democratic, just, and sustainable societies.



Conclusion

The objective of this study was to determine the effectiveness of Greengrants' grantmaking in building the ability of the environmental movement to deal with the social and environmental problems of mining. The hypothesis was that small grants improve the capacity of local actors to respond to changing strategies of mining companies and the state to impose a mining project or demobilize civil society criticism to existing projects. Research in both Ghana and Peru supported this hypothesis. The research also found that while small grants were an effective means of supporting these social movements, there were important limitations to what small grants could do.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework proposed four basic factors for successful movements:

- Social movements mobilize resources and develop movement infrastructure to intervene in social conflicts and the power structures of society.
- Social movements raise consciousness and reframe problems, discriminations, and inequalities in society.
- Social movements respond to political opportunities on different scales, to promote their interests and social change
- Social movements develop alternatives to current political, economic, and cultural practices.

Small grants contributed to these four factors as follows.

Social movements mobilize resources and develop movement infrastructure to intervene in social conflicts and the power structures of society.

In both Peru and Ghana small grants supported organizations from the local to the national level to build their ability to intervene in mining struggles.

- Local groups attended training workshops, traveled to meetings with other communities affected by mining to learn and develop common strategies, organized local community meetings to organize people, improved their negotiating skills, and attended leadership development workshops. Grants allowed local groups to rent office space and buy essential office equipment, cameras, bicycles, etc. to facilitate their work.
- Grants also supported national and even international infrastructure development, especially in Ghana, by supporting networks of mining affected communities and NGOs to come together to develop common campaigns on the national and international levels. The growth and strength of the Ghana National Commission on Mining has strengthened the Africa Initiative on Mining, Environment, and Society, which is now supporting similar networks in other African countries.
- The ability to build infrastructure in between the local and national level was more mixed. In Peru regional networks were more successful than national networks in developing common programs, while in Ghana the only attempt to organize a regional group was short lived.
- Grants built organizations to the point that they have been able to mobilize more resources from other donors and from community members.



Social movements raise consciousness and reframe problems, discriminations, and inequalities in society.

Small grants have been able to contribute to the reframing of issues from the local to the international level. At the local level, community meetings and exchanges with other mining affected communities have been effective in showing that mines are not just about jobs and amenities, but also about displacement, pollution, and violence. Support for mapping projects allowed communities to demonstrate that they are making good use of natural resources and have a legitimate claim to their territory that cannot be brushed aside. When normal channels of discussion have been blocked, petitions, and peaceful demonstrations have brought attention to issues that are hidden to those outside the affected communities.

On the national level, grants to media projects have been powerful methods of reframing the debate to include community concerns. Videos in Peru and media contacts in Ghana have documented the illegal abuse of community members and activists and promoted a non-violent alternative to escalating violence from government and company-hired security forces. Technical reviews of mining activities and documents have presented different perspectives on the costs and benefits of mining than company reports.

On the hypothesis that small grants were better suited for defensive action than offensive initiatives, the reality turned out to be more complicated than that. In both Peru and Ghana informants agreed that offensive struggles require more resources over a longer period of time than small grants can provide. Yet the research also found that small grants can support the investigation of these alternatives, either through studying local resources, organizing communities to present their point of view, supporting advocacy at the national level at key moments, or presenting alternative points of view in the media about the value of farming and tourism over mining. And implicit in the defensive struggles is the idea that local communities have looked at the value of mining and concluded that “development,” in terms of extractive industry, means a degradation of their livelihood and way of life.

Social movements respond to political opportunities on different scales to promote their interests and social change

Political opportunities to advance movement agendas happen rarely and are unpredictable, so fewer grants have supported these opportunities. Grants have nonetheless been helpful in important moments in supporting organizations in Peru that lost their funding due to pressure on donors by mining companies, raising awareness of the safety issues around mining immediately following the drowning of two people in a Ghanaian mining pond, rapid response to a Ghana government proposal to allow mining in forest reserves, and sending activists to attend mining company annual meetings. Few grants supported general social mobilization, but in Ghana this method did generate attention from government officials to community concerns and facilitated official meetings that previously had been denied.

Social movements develop alternatives to current political, economic, and cultural practices.

As noted above, small grants are limited in their ability to promote alternatives. Nevertheless, there is a role in documenting the feasibility of alternative economic practices such as the cultivation of medicinal plants, community reforestation, and small scale mining. Small grants have also supported the entry of excluded communities into policy discussions and supported indigenous communities to develop their traditional governance practices to deal with modern mining and policy processes.



Grantmaking Practice

The research also revealed a number of implications about the way grants are made for supporting social movements.

Flexibility – In both Ghana and Peru the flexibility and minimal bureaucracy in the grantmaking process allowed a wide variety of groups to use them with a minimum amount of time taken from their normal work to raise money.

Decentralization – The fact that grant decisions are made either in the country or by international activists in constant contact with local activists increased the appropriateness of the grants to the current situation and needs.

Longer term support, repeat grants – Support over a long period of time to the same partners increased the impact on the movement by allowing organizations to build consistently over time. Greengrants should consider providing medium-term grant support, and possibly focus on strategic cases that will have implications for mining struggles throughout the country.

Trust – The system has been very successful at building and maintaining trust across the system and around the world. Trust is an important asset for movement building, and money can sometimes undermine it. The culture and practice of the organization have served well to build among staff, advisors, and grantees.

Greengrants as part of the movement – The Greengrants system allows the organization to function as a part of the movement. This inclusiveness can be developed further, such as by setting up meetings or processes to allow local partners to engage in creating grantmaking strategy.

Continue to encourage networks and collaboration – Some of the most effective work small grants have done is supporting networks among organizations pursuing similar goals. This proved harder in Peru than Ghana due to Peru's history, but it is nonetheless worth pursuing.

Need better documentation – In tension with the flexibility and decentralization of grant decisions, documentation and reporting need to be improved. Information about what grants have done exists, but it is spread through the network, and often not reported adequately back to the head office where it can be used for wider learning and documenting the return on investment.

Clearer communication – Another consequence of the decentralized system is that there is need for clearer communication within Greengrants itself and between Greengrants and potential grantees about the grants process itself and what the role of advisors is. Improved communication here could make grantmaking more effective.

Scope – In some cases advisors are covering vast amounts of territory with a variety of organizations in them. This suggests that Greengrants should ensure that advisors are not asked to cover too much.

Increase grants to alternatives – While small grants cannot in themselves create alternative economic, cultural, or political practices, they can act as a catalyst and tool for experimentation. Since movement success requires an alternative vision of how things should be done, grants should continue to support these efforts.

Increase support for alternative knowledge generation – In addition to alternative practices, movements cannot leave the framing of issues and the technical knowledge available up to those interested in promoting industrial mining alone. Grants should continue to support alternative studies and



viewpoints, including indigenous perspectives, to balance the self-interested documentation that often dominates the debate.

Increase focus on women – While grants in both Peru and Ghana supported women’s issues around mining, they were not made in proportion to the impact of industrial mining on women. The situation is improving, particularly in Ghana, but further attention is merited.

Grants for activist security or vulnerability – Violence by government and private security forces is on the rise in both Peru and Ghana, and a flexible and reliable means of protecting the rights of activists would be helpful to the movement in allowing activists to continue in peaceful work.



Appendix 1: Ghana

1-A References

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Field Interviews and Communications:

1. Daniel Owusu-Koranteng, Executive Director, WACAM
2. Darimani Abdulai, West Africa Greengrants Coordinator and Advisor/ Environment Programme Officer Third World Network-Africa
3. Nnimmo Bassey West Africa Greengrants Advisor (Nigeria)
4. Souleymane Dembele West Africa Greengrants Advisor (Mali)
5. Moses Kambo West Africa Greengrants Advisor (Burkina Faso)
6. Steve Manteau Coordinator Publish What You Pay Ghana and Member of National Steering Committee, Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (GHEITI)
7. Prince Erick Amoako-Atta, President, Sefwi Concerned Citizens
8. Richard Adjei-Poku, Executive Director, Livelihood & Environment Ghana (LEG), Kenyasi
9. Akpene Dzazera, Programme Assistant, ISODEC Sub National Project at Asutifi District (Newmont Ahafo Project area)
10. John Adza, Executive Director, The African Challenge
11. Hamida Harrison, Programme Manager, ABANTU for Development
12. Augustine Nibeh, Director, Centre For Public Interest Law
13. Norbert Anane Nyarko Secretary, Resettlement Negotiations Committee, Kenyasi
14. Ruth Aba Koranteng, Programme Officer, Network for Women's Rights (NETRIGHT)
15. Emmanuel Baaku, Community Relations Officer, Chirano Mines Limited
16. Angela Amponsah, Public Affairs Department, Newmont Ahafo Project.
17. Frederick Nyako, Executive Director, Bibiani farmers Rights Protection Society, Bibiani
18. Stephen Donkor President, Youth and Concerned Citizens Association, Teleku Bukaazo
19. Hon. Eric Addae, District Chief Executive for Asutifi District and former Director of Guards of the Earth and the Vulnerable (GEV), NGO that advocated for better compensation for Farmers in Newmont Ahafo operational area.
20. K Opoku, Executive Director, Civic Response
21. Abraham Menu, Director, Menu Shed Kenyasi
22. Richard Afenu, Director of Policy, Minerals Commission, Ghana.
23. Nana Ama Yirrah, Executive Director of COLANDEF (Community, Land and Development Foundation), Takoradi, Ghana.

1-B Interview Guide for Grantees

1. Name of organization
2. Designation of person in organization
3. What issues is the focus of your work?
4. How long have you been working on these issues?
5. Why did you choose to work on these issues?
6. What are the objectives for which the grant (s) was awarded?
7. Indicate whether the objectives of the grant were achieved?
8. What are some of the important indicators for success of the grant?
9. Did you have any problems accessing the approved grant?
10. Rate the time that it takes for you to access your grant
 - a. Very short
 - b. Short
 - c. Long
 - d. Very long
11. State four key things that you like most about small grants?
12. State four key things that you do not like about small grants?
13. What are the advantages of small grants over large grants?
14. What tools and approaches do you use in your struggles/advocacy work?
15. Have these approaches been successful?
16. If yes, how did you know?
17. If no, what have been the major challenges or barriers to success?
18. In what ways do small grants support your approaches?
19. How do you assess that the approaches you have been using are working or not?
20. In your view, how do small grants contribute to: (elaborate with examples)
 - Organizational capacity building
 - Policy initiatives
 - Networking and strengthening the relationship with other organizations
21. In what specific way did grants from GREENGRANTS contribute to your organization or group?
22. What good lessons did you learn from being a beneficiary of GREENGRANTS grants?
23. What negative lessons did you learn from being a beneficiary of GREENGRANTS grants?
24. Why should small grants continue on a long term basis or in a one-time or periodic



25. Make any suggestions that you think would improve the way small grants are administered.



1-C Mining Grants in Ghana, 2002-10

<i>Year</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Organization Supported</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Advisor</i>	<i>Kind of Action</i>	<i>Kind of Actor</i>
2011	54-638	Manu-Shed Community, Brong Ahafo	Kenyasi	Funds will be used by Manu-Shed Community for a campaign to compel the implementation of environmental impact mitigation efforts agreed upon by the community, Newmont Mining, and Ghana's Environmental Protection Agency. The company's commitments to address negative environmental impacts of mining activities, which were made in 2009 following negotiations supported by a Global Greengrants grant, have thus far gone unfulfilled.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	Community based organization
	54-639	Techire Community	Techire	Funds will be used for capacity building workshop designed to prepare community members for effective participation in social and environmental impact assessments. Special attention will be given to equipping women with effective monitoring and negotiation skills.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	Community based organization
	54-640	Tailorkrom Community	Kenyasi	Funds will be used for a media campaign designed to highlight the negative social and environmental impacts of Newmont Gold Ghana Limited's mining operations at a mine near the city of Kenyasi. The mine has polluted water resources, generating particulate pollution, and causes ongoing noise disturbance and safety concerns. Thus far, official complaints submitted to the company and to Ghana's Environmental Protection Agency have not yielded any response.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	Community based organization



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

54-643	Jakakrom Community	Ntotroso	Funds will be used to advocate for fair resettlement and compensation for the community, which has faced significant social and environmental impacts from the operations of Newmont Ghana Gold Limited. The community is comprised mostly of farmers, and has thus borne substantial hardship from the water pollution imposed by nearby mine sites, including cyanide contamination.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	Community based organization
54-644	Livelihood and Environment Ghana	Kenyasi	Funds will support Livelihood and Environment Ghana's work to defend the environmental and human rights of communities threatened and negatively affected by mining in Brong Ahafo and Eastern Region, Ghana. Newmont has publicly challenged claims that it has violated community rights; the grant will allow LEG to collect and compile documentation and evidence of grievances against the company's operations.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	Activist local NGO



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

2010	54-706	National Coalition on Mining	Accra	Funds will support the 2010 National Forum of NCOM, which will be held in Obuasi in October, 2010. The theme for this year's Forum is "Mining and Security of Communities," and participants will devote attention to the rising level of violence and human rights abuses communities are experiencing at the hand of government and private security agents. Issues, challenges, and strategies related to loss of livelihood, increased unemployment, environmental degradation, and destabilizing social impacts on communities will also be addressed at the event. Coverage of the Forum will be shared with national media outlets.	6,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure	National network
	54-567	Third World Network Africa	Accra	Funds will contribute to TWN's efforts to strengthen domestic and regional civil society networks, and to mobilize community actions, especially as related to the negative social and environmental impacts of extractive industries.	8,000.00	Donor Advised	building movement infrastructure	National NGO
	53-807	Concerned Citizens of Sefwi Akoti-Etwebo Communities	Wiaso	Funds will contribute to the group's effort to raise awareness and mobilize support for legal action against Chirano Gold Mines, and to support the convention of a National Forum of communities affected by Mining at Akoti. This forum will bring together all of the members of the National Coalition on Mining (NCOM) – over 500 representatives of communities, victims of mining-related violence, and small-scale miners – to share experiences and articulate concerns to policymakers.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure	Community based organization



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

53-985	Resettlement Negotiation Committee	Kenyasi	Funds will support capacity-building training for the RNC's community representative members. In increased understanding of the issues of compensation, resettlement and relocation as well negotiating approaches will allow these members to more effectively defend community interests.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	Community based organization
53-992	The Network for Women's Rights in Ghana	Accra	Funds will support the participation of several West African civil society organizations and community groups in at a regional consultative workshop on the African Mining Vision 2050, to be held November 25-27 in Accra, Ghana. The event is being organized by the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and is being hosted by Third World Network-Africa, in collaboration with ECOWAS. The workshop will discuss a draft Vision document. The community group participants will work to ensure that current regimes are reformed in a manner that expands local benefits from mining operations.	6,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure	National network
54-176	Youth and Concerned Citizens of Teleko-Bukaazo	Nkroful	Funds will support community workshops and meetings to facilitate the development of community-based strategies around which networking and linkages can be built to defend community interests related to oil development and gold mining. Specifically, the group will work to engage women in the workshops, and to support organization among the community's women to resist the expanding extractives sector.	5,500.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure	Local NGO



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

	54-179	Zaslari Ecological Farms Project	Walewale	Funds will support Zaslari's effort to secure the decentralization of the registration procedure for small-scale miners in Ghana (gallamsey). If the process of registration is made more accessible and less cumbersome, small scales miners will work within an established legal framework that would help to ensure protection from the negative impacts on water quality, agriculture, and livestock that small scale mining can have on local communities. Zaslari's campaign will target agencies including the Ghana Environmental Protection Agency, the Mineral Commission, and the District Assembly.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	NGO
	54-523	National Coalition on Mining	Accra	Funds will be used to organize a meeting in June 2010 to coordinate strategies for community input into ongoing reviews of both the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act and the 1992 Constitution, as they relate to extractives development and community rights. Specifically, funds will be used to ensure that representatives of affected communities can participate in the meeting.	3,708.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ political opportunity	National network
2009	53-639	Manu-Shed Community, Brong Ahafo	Kenyasi	Funds will provide general support to this organization so that they can engage in property/compensation negotiations related to the impacts of gold mining in their community and use non-violent means to resist eviction.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	Community based organization



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

53-685	Abantu for Development	Accra	Funds will be used to organize follow up activities to the 53rd session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women, the theme of which was “Equal Sharing of Responsibilities Between Women and Men, Including Caregiving in the Context of HIV/AIDS.” Specifically, ABANTU will work with women in mining-affected communities to mobilize against mining corporations in defense of their right to meaningful livelihoods.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure	NGO
53-706	African Initiative on Mining, Environment, and Society	Accra	Funds will be used to support the participation of four civil society representatives from Sierra Leone (1), Liberia (1), and Nigeria (2), to participate in AIMES’s 11th annual strategy meeting, to be held June 24-27th in Nairobi, Kenya. The objectives of the meeting are to: build the capacity of AIMES members to address the impact of the global economic crisis and its implications for advocacy and mining reform in Africa; reflect on how the economic recession affects the draft mining regional model developed and adopted last year, in order to re-activate it as an advocacy instrument; adopt a strategy for promoting the positions and outcomes of the meeting.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	International network



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

	53-986	Ntotroso Community	Kenyasi	Funds will be used for a community meeting, to be held in coordination with Livelihood and Environment Ghana. Ntotroso community has participated in tree planting and other activities aimed at mitigating the negative environmental impacts of mining in the community. Since undertaking this work, the group has been approached by Newmont Mining representatives with offers of financial support for their projects. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss how to approach this offer in a manner that will help to ensure corporate accountability, and that will avoid any potential conflict of interests.	3,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ political opportunity	Community based organization
2008	53-008	Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining	Accra	The Newmont Ahafo Mine in the Kenyasi area of Ghana, has received \$105 million in IFC financing. Local communities with WACAM and other allies have petitioned the IFC and convinced the US EPA to review the mine's EIA. Organizing and workshops will increase the capacity of communities and WACAM to engage with Newmont and its lenders around IFC safeguards and other international standards.	7,200.00	IFI Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	Local NGO



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

53-295	Centre for African Research and Development	Accra	Funds will support CARD's work to build community capacity in relation to Ghana's extractive industries. Surface mining and logging have yielded negative environmental impacts and ecological debt in the country. The capacity building program will educate communities and local stakeholders on these issues, and on the role of IFIs in the extractives sector. The program will include a training workshop, supported community engagement with government authorities on existing extraction policies, and an advocacy campaign to promote sustainable ecological practices.	5,000.00	IFI Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	NGO
52-865	Livelihood and Environment Ghana	Kenyasi	Funds will be used to organize a series of workshops in order to educate local communities about the negative socio-environmental impacts of regional mining. The Newmont Mining Company plans to expand its mining activities, negatively impacting over 19 communities in turn. The workshops will train participants in leadership and group dynamics, compensation and negotiation skills, as well educate participants about community rights.	6,200.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure	Activist local NGO



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

52-893	Youth and Concerned Citizens Association	Teleku-Bukaazo	Funds will be used to assist the organization in their efforts to build awareness about the negative socio-environmental impacts of regional surface mining. Specifically, Global Greengrants funds will be used to organize community meetings in 12 Ghanaian communities affected by the surface mining activities of Adamus Resources Limited and Australian Gold Mining Company. Additionally, funds will cover the costs associated with producing and distributing informational materials.	4,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	Local NGO
52-894	Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining	Accra	Funds will be used to cover the costs of an awareness-building campaign about Ghanaian mineral and mining laws. The campaign will target communities affected by the expansion of the Golden Star Resources Corporation's gold mining operations. Additionally, communities will be educated about the Environmental Impact Assessment process.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	Local NGO
53-223	Youth and Concerned Citizens Association	Teleku-Bukaazo	Funds will be used to organize a series of workshops in order to train communities negatively impacted by the gold mining industry to administer environmental and social impact assessments. The assessments will then be presented publically as alternatives to those administered by the gold mining company itself.	4,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	Local NGO



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

	53-224	Crop Rate Review Committee	Kenyasi	Funds will be used to assist CRRC in its efforts to stem the encroachment of the Newmont Corporation's gold mining activities in Ghana's Ahafo region. Newmont has continuously employed tactics of fragmenting affected communities by resorting to individual family negotiations rather than collective community ones. There are three remaining communities that have yet to settle, and funds will be used to organize a series of training workshops and meetings to influence these communities to stand united.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	Community based organization
	53-426	Group of Activists	Tarkwa	Funds will be used to organize a series of community workshops and meetings to build solidarity among 14 communities in Ghana's Nzema East and Jomoro Districts, in which gold and oil fields have recently been discovered. The workshops will bring affected communities together in order to strategize and network.	3,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure	Community based organization
2007	51-986	Africa Initiative on Mining Environment and Society	Accra	Funds will be used to fund the participation of four community representatives at the World Social Forum, to be held in Nairobi January 20-26, 2007. The event will offer the opportunity to share strategies and to network with like-minded organizations.	12,480.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	International network
	52-147	Adrobaa Community Group	Kenyasi	Funds will be used to organize two training workshops that will work to: 1) build advocacy techniques so that their confidence in self-organization can increase, and 2) learn negotiation and leadership skills.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	Community based organization



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

	52-591	Concerned Citizens of Chirano	Kenyasi	Funds will be used to cover the costs of organizing two training workshops. The purpose of the workshops is to train participants in advocacy techniques, and negotiation and leadership skills. The workshops will address in particular the implementation of phase two of the Newmont Ahafo gold mining project. This phase will extend the company's mining activities throughout the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana, and will compromise local farmlands and crops, forcing in turn the relocation of over 3000 affected people.	5,500.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	Activist local NGO
2006	51-401	Foodfirst Information and Action Network - Ghana	Accra	Funds will be used to enable FIAN Ghana to support the efforts of communities directly affected by Newmont's Ahafo Gold Mine, an IFC-financed project. FIAN plant to assist communities in negotiating with the company on resettlement packages and to continue monitoring the impacts of the mining operation to ensure that precautionary measures are implemented to protect the communities' sustainable access to land, water and livelihood.	5,000.00	IFI Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	National NGO



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

51-539	National Coalition on Mining	Accra	Funds will be used to enable communities affected by mining in Ghana to participate in routine meetings in order to be active members of the coalition and to input their perspective on the national agenda of the coalition. Additionally, funds will be used to support the April 19th, 2006 launching of a national campaign entitled, "Stop the Impunity at the Mining Sector."	4,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure	National network
51-540	Africa Initiative on Mining Environment and Society	Accra	Funds will be used to enable three people, two representatives from the Ghana National Coalition and one community member, to participate in the next AIMES meeting. This meeting is scheduled for May 11-13th in Johannesburg, South Africa.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	International network
51-714	Concerned People of Ahafo	Accra	Funds will be used to help sensitize, mobilize, and organize communities in their fight against the mining operations of large corporations. Specific activities will include: 1) Lessons in filming and documenting the effect of mining and creating a film from the footage; 2) Training of selected community representatives on resistance strategies; 3) Providing skills training in leadership and compensation negotiation. 4) Receiving and using media exposure; 5) Contracting legal aid.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	Activist local NGO



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

2005	50-904	League of Environmental Journalists in Ghana	Accra	Funds will be used to send a Mike Anane, the President of the LEJ, to the Annual Shareholders meeting of Newmont Mining Corporation. This will be combined with a series of strategic planning and training meetings that will be attended by representatives from communities all over the world that have been affected by Newmont's mining operations. The goal is to provide each attendee with more information not only about the company, but about other international efforts to hold them accountable for the negative impacts of their mines on local communities.	2,500.00	Rainforest Action Network	framing and consciousness raising/ political opportunity	National network
	51-227	League of Environmental Journalists in Ghana	Accra	Funds will support a three day workshop for 30 members of the media. The workshop will focus on the destruction of Ghana's forests, its impacts on forest communities and the environment, and the need for sustained media coverage of this and related issues. The workshop will include presentations by academics, forestry and wildlife experts, and experienced environmental journalists. Additionally, the workshop will include field visits to some well-managed and degraded forests, biodiversity hotspots, and forest reserves under the threat of gold mining.	4,000.00	Rainforest Action Network	framing and consciousness raising	National network



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

50-897	National Coalition on Mining	Accra	Funds will be used to continue supporting the meetings of the Ghana Coalition, an organization that advocates for policies that promote the equitable distribution of mining benefits and promote forest protection in Ghana, as well as to finish advocacy research on mining in Ghana's forest reserves. The research findings will be used as tools for both community-level advocacy and networking among communities working on mining and forestry.	4,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	National network
51-066	Center for Public Interest Law	Accra	Funds will be used to research, document and publish a pamphlet on issues of environmental compliance in the mining sector. Research will be conducted in the mining communities of Bonteso and Wassa West and additionally regulators, policy makers and environmental activist groups will be interviewed. The published pamphlet will be widely disseminated within Ghana as well as placed on the CEPIL website.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	National NGO



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

51-067	Crisis Action Solutions Organization	Takoradi	Funds will be used to campaign for the halt of illegal mining in forest reserves in the Western region of Ghana, as well as to educate small-scale miners and community members about the dangers of mercury use in the mining process. CASOLS hopes to involve community members through a series of local meetings and the development and dissemination of educational materials, and to reach out to a wider audience by holding a regional conference on illegal mining.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure/ political opportunity	National network
51-218	Western Region Development Network of NGOs	Takoradi	Funds will be used support a project that aims to improve the capacity of journalists to enable them to report consistently and accurately on environmental issues in the region. Funds will also be used to strengthen the Western Regional Environmental Journalist Network. The objectives of the project include training 20 journalists from print and electronic media in a two-day workshop, facilitating a one-day fact finding trip to selected environmentally degraded areas in the region and the organization of three bimonthly strategic meetings that will focus on hotspots in the region.	3,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	building movement infrastructure	Regional network



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

2004	51-222	Guards of the Earth and the Vulnerable	Kenyasi	Funds will be used to support activities initiated as a response to unsafe mining practices by Newmont Mining that resulted in the drowning of two people in October 2005. Funds will support a larger campaign that includes capacity building in the community, disseminating information about unsafe mining practices and conducting a fact finding mission regarding the circumstances of the drowning.	1,800.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure/ political opportunity	Local NGO
	50-384	League of Environmental Journalists in Ghana	Accra	Funds will be used to put on a one-day workshop entitled "Mining, Environment and Communities," which will educate journalists on gold mining and its negative impacts. LEJ hopes that the workshop, which will coincide with Earth Day, will increase public awareness and broaden public discourse about the environmental and social consequences of mining in Ghana.	1,300.00	IFI Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	National network
	50-593	National Coalition on Mining	Accra	Funds will be used to support the Ghana Coalition in a variety of its projects, including community mobilization campaigns to gain support, expand the coalition, and give voice to community issues, and networking and strategizing with like-minded groups to ensure the equitable distribution of mining benefits and to promote forest protection in Ghana.	5,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure	National network



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND

2003	50-063	Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining	Accra	Funds will be used to support a campaign to ban all mining activities in forest reserves throughout the country. Planned actions include general awareness-raising (especially among rural forest dwellers), a strengthening and expansion of advocacy for policy reform at the national level, and a signature campaign against mining in forests.	5,000.00	Rainforest Action Network	framing and consciousness raising/ political opportunity	Local NGO
	50-339	Guards of the Earth and the Vulnerable	Kenyasi	Funds will be used to secure an office space to hold meetings and act as a centralized gathering place for community mobilizers. The grant will also provide community organizers with transportation to perform educational and outreach work in remote communities.	2,000.00	West Africa Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure	Local NGO
2002	02-301	Center for Public Interest Law	Accra	Funds will be used to allow CEPIL to undertake an extensive research project on the effects of World Bank-sponsored mining activities in Ghana, which will be presented as part of the Extractive Industries Review committee hearings in early 2003. CEPIL intends not only to present its own results, but also to aid other African NGOs in and civil society groups in actively participating in the hearings as well.	5,000.00	IFI Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	National NGO



GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND


02-102	Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining	Accra	This grant will allow WACAM to carry out several activities to expand its support for communities affected by mining to new areas. WACAM works to educate communities about the importance of preserving their environment, campaigns against mining in forest reserves and protected areas and provides training in sustainable economic alternatives.	5,000.00	Rainforest Action Network	framing and consciousness raising/ building movement infrastructure	Local NGO
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GLOBAL GREENGRANTS FUND



GHANA MINING GRANTS WITH BOARD



1-D Global Greengrants grants on the national map of mining concessions



Appendix 2: Peru

2-A References

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Field Interviews and Communications

National Social leaders

1. Magdiel Carrión (President of the Federación de Comunidades Campesinas de Ayavaca, and current president of the CONACAMI)
2. Lourdes Huanca (President of the National Federation of Farmer, Indigenous, Native and Artisan Women)
3. Mario Palacios (Former president of the CONACAMI, 2007-2010)

Researchers and NGO representatives

4. Ramon Pajuelo (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos)
5. Alejandro Diez (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)
6. José De Echave (CooperAcción)
7. Julia Cuadros (CooperAcción)
8. José Luís Lopez (Dialogo Minero)
9. Vladimir Pinto (Colectivo Tinkuy – Programa de Defensa de Derechos Indígenas)
10. Luís Vittor (Asesor de la Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones Indígenas)
11. Ana Leiva (Red MUQUI)

Peruvian State

12. Iris Cardenas (Ministry for Mining and Energy)

Global Greengrants staff

13. Chris Allan, over e-mail
14. Peter Kostishack, over e-mail

Global Greengrants Latin American network

15. Denise Bebbington (Former Coordinator Latin America Program), over Skype
16. Martin Scurrah (Consultant, former Peruvian Advisor, and former director of Oxfam América)
17. Cesar Padilla (Coordinator Latin American Observatory of Mining Conflicts, and Ecuadorian Advisor), over Skype

Other financiers

18. Clara Ruíz (EntrePueblos)
19. Javier Arrocca (Oxfam America, Coordinator Extractive Industries Program)

Private sector

20. Juan José Velarde
21. Official at Yanacocha office in Cajamarca

CASE STUDIES



Cajamarca

22. Pablo Sanchez (Grufides)
23. Mirtha Vazquez (Grufides)
24. Ophelia Vargas (Grufides)
25. Denis Malpica (Grufides)
26. Nilton Deza (Universidad Nacional de Cajamarca, y ex presidente del Frente de Defensa de Cajamarca)
27. Juana Martinez (Former president of the Defense Front of Choropampa)
28. Felipe Flores (Community leader in La Pajuela)
29. Eugenio Calva (Community leader in La Pajuela)
30. Nelida Ayay Chilon (Community leader in Porcon)
31. Seferino Zambrano Yopla (President of the water administration in Porcon)
32. José Lesma (President from the Defense Front of San Marcos)

33. Maria Victoria “Victorinha” (Nun from the Sister of Jesus Order in San Marcos)
34. Wilder Sanchez (National board of the Peruvian Peasant Confederation of Peru, and Rondas Campesinas Federation of Bambamarca)
35. Segunda Castrejon (Honorary president of the FEPROCAFENOP)
36. Julio Marin (Vice-president of the FEPROCAFENOP)

La Oroya

37. Liliana Carhuaz (Movement for Health of La Oroya)
38. Ester Hinostroza (Filomena Tomeiro Paxi, and founder of the Movement for Health of La Oroya)
39. Pablo Fabian Martinez (Founder of the Movement for Health of La Oroya, and ex-vice president of the Provincial Neighborhoods Association)
40. Leonicio Rimari (Former authority in the Indigenous Community Huaynacancha, and integrant of the Movement for Health of La Oroya)
41. Maria Isabel Fereyra (Labor)
42. Antony Jo (Labor)
43. Rosmary Davila (DAR)

Other counterparts

44. Ernesto Cabellos (Guarango)
45. José Balado (DocuPerú)
46. Reinhard Seife (Manos Limpias)
47. Nora Bonifaz (Manos Limpias)
48. Eduardo Bonifaz (Manos Limpias)
49. Vicente Zapata (Tropico Seco)

2-B: Grants related to mining in Peru, 2001-2011

Year	No	Organization supported	Location	Description	Amount	Advisor	Kind of action	Kind of actor
2010	43	Vicaría del Medio Ambiente	Jaen, Cajamarca	To create a training curriculum and organize sixteen capacity building workshops on the impacts of extractive industries for communities located in mine-affected areas. Efforts will be focused in the areas around the Rio Blanco, La Granja, Cañariaco, and Barrick Mishiquillay mines, and include collaboration with organizations on the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border that are affected by mining activities.	\$3,870	South America Regional Fund	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Pastoral organization
	42	Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible	San Marcos, Cajamarca	To enable participation at the International Meeting of Victims of the Vale Corporation, in Rio de Janeiro. The meeting provides an opportunity for communities in Perú, Chile, Canada, Argentina, Mozambique and others that have been affected by Vale's operations, to discuss and expose the company's history of intimidation and human rights violations, and to develop common strategies. The group seeks to promote gender equality, environmental conservation, and sustainable resource use.	\$2,870	South America Regional Fund	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Activist NGO
	41	Red de Comunicadores por la Educación y Defensa Ambiental	Cajacay, Ancash	To raise awareness about hazardous material spills and what to do in the event of a spill in the districts of Cajacay, Pampas Chico, and Antonio Raymondi - all places hazardous waste is commonly transported. Additionally, funds will be used to create a network of environmental monitors and implement campaigns for the communities affected by large mining projects.	\$5,000	Rainforest Action Network	framing and consciousness raising	Alternative media

40	Colectivo Manos Limpias	Cajamarca and La Oroya, Junin	To create a Mining Truth Commission that will investigate the legitimacy of the activities of mining companies such as Yanacocha and Doe Run Perú. Raising awareness about the socio-environmental impacts that these companies have had on surrounding communities will help Colectivo Manos Limpias advocate for mining practices that respect human rights and the environment.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	Activist collective
39	Acullicu Films	Cerro de Pasco, La Oroya and Callao	To raise awareness about the health and environmental impacts of the Cerro de Pasco mine, and to uphold a law that calls for the relocation of the Cerro de Pasco community. Activities include the creation and dissemination of a documentary as well as several educational workshops for local communities.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	Alternative media
38	Federación Regional de Comunidades Campesinas y Nativas de Pasco	Cerro de Pasco	To send members of the group to the Fourth National Congress of Mining Affected Communities in Peru in April. The group defends the collective rights, territories, environment, and cultural identity of the communities in the Pasco region.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Federation
37	Coordinadora Regional de Comunidades Afectadas por la Minería de Moquegua	Moquegua	To organize several community meetings, one regional meeting and a public forum about water resource problems, how they are related to mining activities, and the impacts of climate change. Additionally, funds will be used to: produce a weekly radio show about water, mining and climate change; create and disseminate a newsletter; and to support the general expenses of the organization.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Local network

2009	36	Movimiento por la Salud de la Oroya	La Oroya, Junin	To organize a workshop for like-minded organizations to participate in discussions and disseminate information about public health issues, human rights violations, and environmental contamination resulting from Doe Run's metal smelter in La Oroya. The workshop will be used to develop strategic alliances, strengthen networks and social capacities, and promote leadership.	\$5,000	South America Regional Fund	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Activist collective
	35	Frente Unico de Defensa de los Intereses de Tiaparo	Tiaparo, Apurimac	To organize a campaign against the Southern Peru mining company; the mining work is threatening the community's land and wellbeing. Activities include holding workshops to strategize nonviolent campaign tactics and training people to investigate and document the negative socio-environmental impacts of the mining.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Local network
	34	DocuPerú	Cajamarca	To hold workshops on video production for local environmental groups in Cajamarca. The workshops will strengthen the capacity of these groups and will involve them in the production and distribution of a documentary, entitled "Operación Diablo", aimed at raising awareness about blatant intimidation of environmental leaders.	\$5,000	South America Regional Fund	framing and consciousness raising	Alternative media
	33	Mesa Tecnica del Movimiento por la Salud de la Oroya	La Oroya, Junin	To advocate for the environmental and human rights of residents of La Oroya, one of the most contaminated places in the world as a result of the Doe Run smelter. Activities include meetings with Doe Run officials to hold them accountable to environmental health benchmarks; and an education campaign about the implementation of La Oroya's air pollution alert system.	\$5,000	Donor Advised	political opportunities	NGO network

	32	Asociación de Mujeres Productoras CHALHUAHUACHO	Apurimac	To organize capacity building workshops for women in the area around the Las Bambas mine to raise awareness about their rights, the mining process, environmental impacts, and income inequity between the sexes to better enable these women to participate in decision making processes.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Women's association
	31	Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible	Cajamarca	To map mining concessions in northern Peru using GIS technology. The information will be incorporated into an awareness building campaign spearheaded by the Red Muqui Norte, a network of likeminded Peruvian organizations (including GRUFIDES) that works to defend communities' rights against the impacts of the mining industry.	\$5,950	South America Regional Fund	framing and consciousness raising	Activist NGO
	30	Frente de Defensa del Medio Ambiente de la Cuenca del Río Casma	Casma, Ancash	To hold a series of workshops to increase public awareness about the negative impacts of mining, including cyanide contamination, in the Buenavista Alta and Casma districts. Activities include creating networks and alliances with local, district, and provincial government representatives to press for halting the implementation of a proposed ore processing plant.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Local network
2008	29	Frente de Defensa y Desarrollo Agrario de Moquegua	Moquegua	To hold the group's first regional Congress, which will address issues including sustainable agriculture and new mining projects planned for Moquegua. This organization aims to protect biodiversity through sustainable natural resource management.	\$2,183	Andes Advisory Board	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Local network
	28	Movimiento por la Salud de la Oroya	La Oroya, Junin	To build awareness about the negative health impacts of contamination and industrial pollution generated by La Oroya's Doe Run-owned smelter. The campaign will include	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	Activist collective

2007				medical treatment for residents suffering from lead poisoning by bringing in 30 visiting doctors and medical supplies.				
	27	Red de Comunicadores Juveniles	Carabayllo, Lima	To protect the dry forest habitat in the area around Lomas de Carabayllo, which is threatened by illegal mining and unsustainable farming. This youth network runs a community radio program and holds workshops on environmental issues for students and the public.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	framing and conscience raising	Alternative media
	26	Mesa Tecnica del Movimiento por la Salud de la Oroya	La Oroya, Junin	To build awareness about the impacts of pollution from the Doe Run Smelter in La Oroya, named as one of the world's worst polluted places. This campaign is focused on building awareness throughout North America and US non-governmental organizations about the situation in La Oroya.	\$5,000	South America Regional Fund	framing and conscience raising	NGO network
	25	Coordinadora Regional de Comunidades Afectadas por la Minería de Moquegua	Moquegua	To hold leadership training workshops on environmental conflict resolution for rural communities affected by mining. The group will also produce radio spots about the legal rights of communities threatened by mining.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Local network
	24	Red de Comunicadores por la Educación y Defensa Ambiental	Cajacay, Ancash	To build public awareness about a recent copper sulfate spill in Cajacay, in the Ancash region. The spill has been attributed to the Antamina Mining Company.	\$5,000	South America Regional Fund	framing and consciousness raising	Alternative media
	23	Centro Desarrollo Huayhuash	Huayhuash, Huanuco	To hold community mapping workshops in Paillon, Quero, and Chiquian in order to give people the skills to inventory natural and cultural resources with the goal of creating community-based sustainable development plans. Also to fund a trip for Huayhuash leaders to visit the community of La Oroya so that they can gain	\$1,350	Donor Advised	framing and consciousness raising	NGO

				insight about the long-term impacts of mining development.				
22	Coordinadora Regional de Comunidades Afectadas por la Minería de Moquegua	Moquegua	To strengthen a community-based campaign to pressure the Aruntani mining company for increased social and environmental accountability. Workshops will be held in three affected communities and will culminate in a march to the city of Moquegua.	\$2,850	Andes Advisory Board	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Local network	
21	Centro Desarrollo Huayhuash	Huayhuash, Huanuco	To continue to support community mapping and resource management initiatives in the communities of Pacllon, Quero, and Chiquian in the Cordillera Huayhuash. Also to hold an exchange visit between Huayhuash leaders and the La Oroya community, which has long suffered the impacts of mining development.	\$2,722	Donor Advised	framing and consciousness raising	NGO	
20	Coordinadora Regional de Comunidades Afectadas por la Minería Región Tacna	Tacna	To support the development of small community groups that have formed in response to the pressures of mining and other extractive industries. Activities include workshops and facilitating networks among communities, with the goal of raising awareness about the negative impacts of mining.	\$2,750	Andes Advisory Board	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Local network	
19	Coordinadora Nacional de Comunidades del Perú Afectadas por la Minería	National	To hold a workshop about environmental rights, based on the experience of this grassroots organization over the last ten years. This organization works to defend the collective rights of the indigenous communities negatively impacted by mining in the region.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	National Social Movement Organization	

2006	18	Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible	Cajamarca	To continue the legal case against the Yanacocha gold mine (owned by Newmont) and raise awareness about the negative effects of the current mine and its intended expansion on surrounding communities. Funds will also be used to analyze how to safely continue GRUFIDES' advocacy work in the light of recent death threats and abduction attempts against the group's leaders.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	political opportunities / resource mobilization and development of movement infrastructure	Activist NGO
	17	Asociación Ecológica Trópico Seco	Ayavaca and Huancabamba, Piura	To educate the communities of Ayabaca, Pacalpampa, and El Carmen de la Frontera about the latest referendum on regional mining activities. This is a volunteer organization that works to protect the increasingly endangered dry tropical ecosystems in northern Peru.	\$4,687	Friends of the Earth	framing and consciousness raising / political opportunities	Activist collective
	16	Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible	Cajamarca	To provide legal defense to communities affected by mining activities, specifically the Yanacocha Gold Mine in Cajamarca. Especially because some environmental leaders have been victims of violence in the past, GRUFIDES will also complete an analysis of necessary security measures to reduce the chance of unwanted conflict, as well as lead an awareness campaign about the environmental dangers of gold mining.	\$5,000	Donor Advised	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Activist NGO
	15	Red Uniendo Manos Peru	National	To support an investigation into human rights abuses related to extractive industries. The grantee will present its evidence to mass media outlets in the country, in order to promote increased oversight and monitoring of such cases.	\$500	Special Opportunities Fund	framing and consciousness raising	Network
	14	Centro Desarrollo Huayhuash	Huayhuash, Huanuco	To continue to support Centro Desarrollo Huayhuash's community-based mapping project. This effort aims to create communal maps of the area that inventory the natural,	\$500	Special Opportunities Fund	framing and consciousness raising	NGO


				cultural, and socio-economic resources of the communities.				
2005	13	Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible	Cajamarca	To support local responses to environmental problems such as the negative effects of mining activities, and to provide affected communities with access to legal representation.	\$5,000	Friends of the Earth	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Activist NGO
	12	Asociación de Defensa y Educación Ambiental	Cajamarca	To fund an inventory of the 100+ native medicinal plants in the Cerro Negro de Llapa district, a first step in seeking protected status for the region.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	Activist collective
	11	Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible	Cajamarca	To fund a program to equip community leaders with the necessary legal tools to enter into negotiations with gold mining companies, and to empower community members to campaign nonviolently for their rights.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Activist NGO
	10	Asociación Guarango Cine y Video	Tambogrande, Cajamarca and nation wide	To launch a nationwide grassroots education and advocacy campaign on non-violent conflict resolution, focused on the increasing number of violent conflicts in Peruvian mining communities.	\$3,000	Andes Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	Alternative media
	9	Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental	La Oroya, Junin	To support several organizations protecting the rights of the La Oroya community and taking legal action against a mining company for allegedly contributing to high lead levels in local children.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	political opportunities	NGO
	8	Asociación Civil Labor	Cajamarca and La Libertad	To fund a review of the environmental and social impacts of gold mining at Yanacocha and Alto Chicama, to conduct a series of workshops for affected communities, and to develop recommendations for better regulation of mining.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	NGO
2004	7	Centro Desarrollo Huayhuash	Huayhuash, Huanuco	To fund workshops to help indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Huayhuash create communal maps of traditional lands, inventory natural and cultural	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	NGO

				resources, and develop sustainable management plans.				
2003	6	Asociación Guarango Cine y Video	Cajamarca	To provide a group of youth in Cajamarca with training and support in video editing, production and distribution so that they can create a video and raise awareness about a watershed endangered by expansion of Latin America's largest gold mine.	\$3,000	Andes Advisory Board	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Alternative media
	5	Asociación Ecologista Trópico Seco	Tambogrande, Piura	To fund community reforestation efforts in northern Peru and to promote renewable forestry and integrated forest management.	\$5,000	Friends of the Earth	autonomy politics	Activist collective
2002	4	Comunidad Campesina de Quilcas	Quilcas, Junin	To support a workshop bringing together indigenous communities and Peruvian NGOs to develop plans for sustainable resource use and conservation.	\$5,000	Andes Advisory Board	autonomy politics	Peasant community
	3	Asociación Guarango Cine y Video	Choropampa, Cajamarca	To fund the completion of a video on a mercury spill that affected an Andean community and to use the video to support efforts to gain medical treatment and compensation.	\$3,000	Andes Advisory Board	framing and consciousness raising	Alternative media
2001	2	Asociación Civil Labor	La Oroya, Junin	To fund review of the environmental impact assessment of a proposed mine to ensure its accuracy and explore potential design alternatives.	\$3,500	Special Opportunities Fund	political opportunities	NGO
	1	Federacion de Rondas Campesinas Femeninas del Norte del Peru	Cajamarca	To support a safe forum for communities near the Yanacocha gold mine to express concerns, articulate demands and negotiate with the company operating the mine.	\$5,000	Friends of the Earth	resource mobilization and the development of movement infrastructure	Federation

2-C Global Greengrants grants on the national map of mining concessions

GGF SMALL GRANTS IN PERU

on the national map of mining concessions



Scale: 1/7 500 000 / Elaboration: CooperAcción and Raúl Huerta / Source: Ingenint (November 2008)